

MUCKAMORE ABBEY HOSPITAL INQUIRY
SITTING AT CORN EXCHANGE, CATHEDRAL QUARTER, BELFAST

HEARD BEFORE THE INQUIRY PANEL
ON TUESDAY, 24TH SEPTEMBER 2024 - DAY 109

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1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED ON TUESDAY, 24TH SEPTEMBER 2024 AS
2 FOLLOWS:

3
4 CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. Thank you. Right, just a
5 few words before we start. I just want to set out the 10:04
6 plan for closing submissions and to give you as much
7 notice as possible as to what will be expected.

8
9 First of all each Core Participant group or
10 organisation will be given the opportunity of making 10:04
11 closing submissions in accordance with Rule 11 of the
12 Inquiry Rules. Written submissions in skeleton form
13 should be filed in advance of oral submissions as I'm
14 going to indicate, and I'm going to set out some
15 maximum times for oral submissions which, please, are 10:05
16 not to be exceeded but do not have to be met.

17
18 The written submissions in skeleton form, there will be
19 further directions on this, but could I just invite
20 everybody to remember that where there is reference to 10:05
21 restricted evidence, in some form that will need to be
22 separated from unrestricted evidence and it should be
23 clearly marked, but we'll give further directions in
24 due course.

25 10:05
26 All written submissions should be provided to the
27 Inquiry by 16:00 hours on Friday, 22nd November. All
28 written submissions will be cross served on all CPs and
29 consideration will be given to whether they can be

1 published on the website. Obviously that is with the
2 exception of any restricted material.

3
4 The timetable for oral submissions is proposed as
5 follows: The usual mid morning and mid afternoon 10:06
6 breaks will be observed, and oral submissions should be
7 focused on the contents of the written skeleton.
8 Again, reference to restricted evidence should be
9 clearly indicated, so we may have to move into closed
10 session at an appropriate point. 10:06

11
12 So the oral submissions will start on Tuesday, 26th
13 November, and the morning session will be devoted to
14 AFM and SPFM between 10:00 o'clock and 1:00 o'clock.
15 So a morning session. 10:07

16
17 Group three, represented by O'Reilly Stewart
18 Solicitors, will be given an afternoon session between
19 14:00 hours and 16:00 hours approximately.

20 10:07
21 Wednesday, 27th November, the morning session will be
22 devoted to PSNI, RQIA and PCC. At the moment it's
23 proposed to give the PSNI one hour between 10:00 and
24 11:00, RQIA one hour between 11:15 and 12:15, and PCC
25 45 minutes from 12:15 to 13:00 hours. 10:07

26
27 The afternoon session on that Wednesday will be devoted
28 to the Department of Health.
29

1 Moving to Thursday, 28th November, the morning session,
2 the whole of the morning session will be given to the
3 Trust, the HSCT, and I'm hoping at present that counsel
4 to the Inquiry will begin their closing address in that
5 afternoon session on the 28th November, that may spill 10:08
6 over into the following week.

7
8 So that's the plan. We will issue that in a written
9 form, but I thought it would be helpful to give
10 everybody as much notice as possible so that you can 10:08
11 devote the appropriate amount of time to written
12 submissions.

13
14 I will be placing some sort of restriction on written
15 submissions, for perhaps obvious reasons, and if I can 10:09
16 say now, what I hope to avoid is large sections of
17 transcripts or statements simply being copied and
18 pasted into a written submission, which isn't going to
19 help us at all.

20 10:09
21 All right. I hope today we will not have as late a
22 session as we did yesterday. We did sit late yesterday
23 because otherwise Dr. Milliken was going to have to
24 cancel his clinical list, and that was the only reason.
25 I have made my peace now with the stenographer. 10:09
26

27 Right. I think we're ready for the next witness.
28 MS. BRIGGS: Yes, Chair. This morning's witness is
29 Dr. Hughes. The statement reference is 311. Before we

1 start, Chair, there is a paragraph of this witness'
2 evidence to which a Restriction Order applies, that's
3 Restriction Order 9, and it's paragraph 31 of the
4 statement. So my submission is, Chair, that we will
5 require a brief restricted session at the end of the 10:10
6 evidence in order to deal with that specific paragraph,
7 Chair.

8 CHAIRPERSON: Well that's because that specific
9 evidence was given itself in wholly closed session.

10 MS. BRIGGS: That's right, Chair. 10:10

11 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. Sorry, do come in. Good morning.
12

13 DR. DAMIEN HUGHES, HAVING AFFIRMED, WAS EXAMINED BY
14 MS. BRIGGS AS FOLLOWS:
15

16 CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Hughes, can I just welcome you to the 10:10
17 Inquiry. Thank you for coming to assist us. Thank you
18 for your statement. We'll normally break after about
19 an hour and a quarter, something like that, but if you
20 feel the need for a break at any earlier stage, please 10:11
21 just let me know and we'll stop.

22 A. Thank you.

23 CHAIRPERSON: All right. So I'll hand you over to
24 Ms. Briggs.

25 A. Thank you. 10:11

26 1 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Thank you, Chair. Dr. Hughes, good
27 morning. As you know I'm going to be asking you
28 questions about the statement you have provided for the
29 Inquiry, and the reference is 311, and you have a copy

1 of that in front of you, and also you'll be able to
2 follow along on the screen that's in front of you as
3 well.

4
5 If I can just remind you to avoid using ward staff or 10:11
6 patient names where you can, and you have a cipher list
7 in front of you, Dr. Hughes, which you can consult in
8 the first instance.

9
10 Your statement is dated the 31st July 2024, and it's 18 10:11
11 pages long. Do you wish to adopt the contents of that
12 statement as the basis of your evidence to the Inquiry?

13 A. Yes, please.

14 2 Q. I'm going to ask you questions about the statement and 10:11
15 we'll go to certain parts of it on the screen, but I'm
16 going to start off with the periods of time that you
17 worked at Muckamore, and this is at paragraph 2 on page
18 1, and you say there that you worked at Muckamore
19 August 1996 to January 1997 as a Senior House Officer,
20 and then August 1999 to July 2000 and August 2001 to 10:12
21 July 2002 as a Senior Registrar, and 2002 to 2018 as a
22 consultant, is that all correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 3 Q. Okay. If we can go on to paragraph 7 of your 10:12
25 statement, page 3. About halfway down that paragraph,
26 Dr. Hughes, you're describing how in October 2006
27 Cranfield opened, and you had been offered the role of
28 consultant for Cranfield, and you describe this as an
29 exciting time for the hospital. Can you tell the

1 Inquiry a bit more about why it was an exciting time
2 for the hospital?

3 A. A number of reasons really. The main one, I suppose,
4 was it was a time when it was obvious to all of us who
5 worked in the hospital or around the hospital that it 10:13
6 was no longer fit for purpose in terms of the buildings
7 and the surroundings. So the development of brand new
8 carefully designed wards in which we could better meet
9 the needs of our patients was an exciting development.
10 Time was taken to engage with a number of stakeholders, 10:14
11 but most reassuringly with patients and families around
12 what this "new hospital", in inverted commas, would
13 look like. I think from memory it was the first time
14 that patients had single rooms, and not either shared
15 rooms or even dormitory style accommodation, but from a 10:14
16 professional perspective it was a time when we were
17 able to I suppose separate in a lot of ways acute
18 hospital services from longer stay or continuing care,
19 and we were excited by the prospect of that, that we
20 would have a dynamic ward that patients flowed in and 10:15
21 out of. Patients came in unwell, recovered and went
22 home. And there were I think a number of very senior
23 staff who, as I say, were excited and looking forward
24 to the prospect of being able to do that.

25 4 Q. Okay. The Inquiry has heard that perhaps the core 10:16
26 hospital was more institutionalised and less homely,
27 what would you say about that?

28 A. I think it's fair comment. You know, I did, as I've
29 outlined in my statement, I did for brief periods have

1 responsibility for some of the continuing care wards,
2 and the environment in some of them, if not all of
3 them, was pretty stark. You know, you did have very
4 little space where patients could be by themselves or
5 take part in activities that interested them, and only 10:16
6 them, so there was a sense that it was, you know, a
7 group of people brought together and had to share some
8 quite dilapidated surroundings, and the impact of that
9 on people's lives was significant.

10 5 Q. And in terms of the views of the patients in terms of 10:17
11 the move to the core hospital, how were those obtained
12 and then reflected in the design of the new hospital?

13 A. I'm not really best positioned to answer that. That
14 work was done obviously prior to the new facilities
15 opening and, as I say, I only took up the post when it 10:17
16 opened in 2006. But my understanding, my memory is
17 that there were a number of focus groups. There was a
18 group for patients, there was a group for families.
19 The TILII Group I remember them being called - Tell It
20 Like It is - were very heavily involved, and I can 10:18
21 remember a number of away days and, you know, strategy
22 development days around ward processes, some of which I
23 was involved in at a later stage but not in the early
24 stages. But the sort of excitement and positivity that
25 I described earlier wasn't just amongst staff, I can 10:18
26 remember patients being similarly excited by the
27 prospect.

28 6 Q. Okay. And how did the opening of the core hospital,
29 how did that affect the model of care given to

1 patients?

2 A. That's a very good question. I hadn't worked in the
3 acute side of the hospital for a number of years before
4 2006, but I do recall in the late 1990s, maybe around
5 the turn of the millennium, that it was difficult for 10:19
6 multidisciplinary teams in Fintona and Movilla, which
7 were the two complexes that would have catered for the
8 acute side, the admissions, the assessment and
9 treatment, it was difficult for the multidisciplinary
10 teams to focus on that because they also had to meet 10:19
11 the needs of a very different group of patients who had
12 been in the hospital for a very long time, and I can
13 only imagine, and having worked there as a trainee
14 psychiatrist, I did get a flavour of just how difficult
15 that was. 10:20

16 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what do you mean it was difficult
17 for them to focus on that?

18 A. The business of assessing and treating acute
19 psychiatric illness is very different to meeting the
20 needs of those requiring continuing care or those in 10:20
21 recovery, and I suppose there are parallels with what
22 happened then later on with the resettlement process,
23 where the business of discharging patients who had been
24 in hospital for a very long time is very different to
25 the acute assessment and treatment. So the demands 10:21
26 that were placed on the multidisciplinary team in terms
27 of having a group of patients who were acutely unwell,
28 who required a treatment plan, a treatment plan that
29 was fluid, that required review and monitoring, and at

1 the same time you had another group of patients.
2 CHAIRPERSON: A mix.
3 A. Yes. Yes. 10:21
4 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Okay.
5 A. Yes.
6 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
7 7 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Towards the end of that paragraph on page
8 4, this is after you had been offered the role of
9 consultant for Cranfield in 2006, and you say that
10 unfortunately you had also learned that you would 10:22
11 retain some out-patient responsibility and you would,
12 therefore, not be in a position to entirely commit
13 yourself to the patients under your care in Cranfield.
14 Was that the North and West Belfast Trust, as it was
15 then, that you retained responsibility for? 10:22
16 A. Yes. Yes.
17 8 Q. Yes. And I think later on in your statement you say
18 you relinquished your role as a community consultant.
19 When was that? Was that between 2009 and 2011 I think
20 you say in your statement? 10:22
21 A. It was 2009. For the first three years of my time in
22 Cranfield I did have half of Belfast in terms of a
23 community sector.
24 9 Q. And after 2009 then, just so we get a sense, did you
25 have any community role after that? 10:22
26 A. No.
27 10 Q. No?
28 A. No. I had other hospital roles. I don't think until
29 the latter stages of my time in Cranfield, I don't

1 think my job plan allowed me to entirely focus on
2 Cranfield. I always had other responsibilities within
3 the hospital.

4 11 Q. Okay. Well we'll come to that and we'll come to your
5 workload and the demands on your time. But just 10:23
6 thinking about your time as a community consultant
7 between 2006 and 2009, I'd like to ask you a little bit
8 about that and your experience of community services.
9 The Inquiry has heard an abundance of evidence about a
10 lack of resourcing in the community for patients and 10:23
11 that this may have led to crisis admissions, and later
12 in your statement you say that crisis admissions were
13 much more common than planned admissions, isn't that
14 right?

15 A. Very much so, yeah. 10:23

16 12 Q. Would you agree that a lack of community services
17 impacted the occurrence of crisis admissions to
18 Muckamore?

19 A. I would, undoubtedly. For those three years I had
20 direct experience of both sides of what was happening 10:24
21 in the community, what services were being provided to
22 patients, and likewise in the hospital, and I wish it
23 was better today, but I'm not sure services have
24 developed much in the last 15 or 20 years with regards
25 to community. My role in the community sector between 10:24
26 2006 and 2009 isn't particularly different to what my
27 role has been since 2018 since I became a community
28 psychiatrist again, a lot of it is crisis management.

29 13 Q. Okay. Thinking back then to your time in 2006 to 2009,

1 were you able to make or effect any changes in the
2 community in terms of its servicing, in terms of its
3 resourcing, that might have impacted crisis admissions?
4 A. Ehm, no. well, I suppose I was able to relay my
5 experience and indirectly then the experience of the 10:25
6 patients to people within the Trust, to managers within
7 the Trust, there were opportunities for us to do that.
8 But resources were so scarce that it was very difficult
9 for me to do anything other than clinical work at that,
10 at that time. As I say a lot of it was crisis. It was 10:25
11 -- probably reflecting on it, it was the most, in terms
12 of workload, it was the most challenging time of my
13 career, those three years.

14 14 Q. I think Dr. Maxwell has a question.
15 DR. MAXWELL: Did you raise your concerns about the 10:26
16 lack of resources in the community at that time?
17 A. Yes. I mean it's a long time ago but, yes, I do recall
18 that, you know, any opportunity we had we took. When I
19 say "we", I mean as a group of professionals within
20 community teams, but also as a group of consultants in 10:26
21 the region.
22 DR. MAXWELL: So who did you raise it with?
23 A. Well initially it was to, you know, my own sort of line
24 management structure.
25 DR. MAXWELL: So that would have been the Clinical 10:26
26 Director?
27 A. That would have been to the Clinical Director. And
28 there was a sense that they -- they were also, you
29 know, doing similar work.

1 DR. MAXWELL: Did you raise it with the Medical
2 Director of either Trust that you worked for?

3 A. Ehm, I'm not -- I don't recall ever doing that, no. I
4 don't recall ever having meetings with medical
5 directors at that time. 10:27

6 DR. MAXWELL: And given that there was a lack of
7 community services, do you think that any patients came
8 to harm as a result of, or would the presence of
9 community services prevented any harm coming to
10 patients? 10:27

11 A. I can't think of any examples of patients directly
12 being harmed.

13 DR. MAXWELL: Okay.

14 A. But there's no doubt that the psychological well-being
15 of patients was affected by a lack of services. 10:28

16 DR. MAXWELL: Did the lack of services cause any harm
17 to any of their carers?

18 A. Undoubtedly, yes. The accounts that I received from
19 patient's families and carers would indicate that there
20 was, and remains, considerable stress in the lives of a 10:28
21 significant number of family members and carers of
22 patients with intellectual disabilities.

23 DR. MAXWELL: Thank you.

24 15 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Dr. Hughes, have you seen any improvements
25 in community services over the years that you'd like to 10:29
26 tell the Inquiry about, comparing say now with 2006?

27 A. There obviously have been some developments within
28 services. I don't recall in 2006 having things like
29 intensive support services, or Positive Behaviour

1 Support services, they're called different things in
2 different Trusts and different sectors, but that is,
3 that is a development, a positive one. But, again,
4 those services are under-resourced. Approaches are
5 quite piecemeal. A lot of them are 9 - 5 services, and 10:30
6 when it comes to crisis management that doesn't do much
7 to help people who enter a crisis outside of those
8 hours, as they often do in the evenings and weekends.
9 But in terms of some of the other services, I'm not
10 sure we're much better off for day services, for 10:30
11 respite services, to name just two, than we were in
12 2006.

13 CHAIRPERSON: Could I just ask about crisis management,
14 because presumably that's part of the intensive support
15 services that you've referred to. Who would be 10:30
16 involved in crisis management? Say there's a patient
17 in the community, and for whatever reason something
18 goes wrong and there's consideration of having to admit
19 that patient to a hospital, who would be there to
20 intervene and see if the community could continue to 10:31
21 cope? Is that how it would work?

22 A. Yeah, there are a number of ways, Chair, that those
23 patients at those times come to our attention. The
24 vast majority are known to services, so often it will
25 be direct contact between the patient themselves or 10:31
26 their family/carers and a member of the team, usually
27 maybe a social worker, or a community nurse, or myself
28 or someone, but quite often there's an indirect route
29 through the GP where the patient will make contact, or

1 someone on their behalf will make contact with the GP,
2 and then a crisis referral almost is made, and that
3 will trigger a response amongst the team. And that
4 could be anything. I mean it would depend very much on
5 the initial impression of the presentation of the 10:32
6 patient and where their immediate needs might lie and
7 might best be met. So that can be a social problem
8 that requires a social solution, and that will be maybe
9 the social workers leading on that. It could be a
10 medical problem, a psychiatric problem. It could be 10:32
11 related to a degree of challenging behaviour, and in
12 that case it would be the Intensive Support Team or the
13 Positive Behaviour Support Team who would lead. But
14 generally, there is a multidisciplinary response to
15 that. 10:33

16 DR. MAXWELL: And --

17 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I just finish very quickly.
18 why is that only available sort of 8:30 or 9:00
19 o'clock, 9:00 until 5:00? It seems quite odd because,
20 as you say, a crisis can happen at any point within the 10:33
21 24-hour clock?

22 A. Yes. Yes. I know that there have been, within one or
23 two of the Trusts, there have been efforts made to
24 expand that service into the evenings and even at
25 weekends, and I think that sort of pilot projects -- 10:33
26 I'm not sure if that -- did indicate that there wasn't
27 much demand in each of the Trusts. So I think a lack
28 of joined up sort of regionality to those services is
29 what has hampered them in their development.

1 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yeah. Thank you. Sorry,
2 Dr. Maxwell.
3 DR. MAXWELL: You seemed to imply that the Intensive
4 Support Team was only for challenging behaviour, is
5 that correct? 10:34
6 A. In many instances, yes. Now, they will, of course,
7 almost immediately do - if the presentation is related
8 to challenging behaviour, they will do an assessment of
9 that and of the - the ideology is one of the things
10 that they assess, and depending on that, that may 10:34
11 dictate future assessment and treatment. So, you know,
12 if there's an aspect of the presentation that relates
13 to mental illness that is triggering some challenging
14 behaviours, then that will -- and, you know, and other
15 things. 10:35
16 DR. MAXWELL: So if I'm the primary carer for my
17 relative and I am suddenly taken ill this afternoon, is
18 there no system of supporting my relative in the home
19 while my acute illness is managed?
20 A. There sometimes is, but not always, and it is 10:35
21 increasingly difficult to provide families with what
22 they need at those times.
23 DR. MAXWELL: And so that adds to the harm that you
24 said was happening to carers in response to my question
25 about the lack of community service and the effect on 10:35
26 carers?
27 A. I think so, yes.
28 PROFESSOR MURPHY: You said I think a bit earlier on
29 that you knew who was likely to have a crisis within

1 the community teams, very often. Was it possible to
2 put in crisis management plans for those individuals
3 where you knew that, for example, they had bursts of
4 challenging behaviour under circumstance X, Y and Z?
5 A. That work does go on, it does form some of the work 10:36
6 that our multidisciplinary teams in the community do,
7 but to be honest, so much of what we do is actually
8 fighting fires and...
9 PROFESSOR MURPHY: So it's reactive --
10 A. -- and managing crisis. That crisis prevention is 10:37
11 unfortunately secondary to crisis management in an
12 under-resourced service.
13 PROFESSOR MURPHY: So there's not very much proactive
14 work?
15 A. Not as much as we would like, yeah. 10:37
16 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Thank you.
17 16 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Just to close off this topic, Dr. Hughes.
18 Thinking about avoidable admissions to Muckamore, the
19 Inquiry has heard evidence from Mr. Veitch, and he gave
20 evidence about the hospital's Modernisation Group, 10:37
21 which he chaired, and an analysis of admissions that
22 that group carried out during 2014. I know you're
23 aware of this exhibit and you've had a chance to
24 consider it. I think we can pull the first page of
25 that on to the screen. It's Inquiry reference 10:38
26 STM-275-46.
27
28 Now the audit goes on for a number of pages, but I'm
29 just going to refer you to the first page, it's on your

1 screen as well, Dr. Hughes. But we can see there that
2 it's headed:
3
4 "The future core hospital.
5 Review of NHST admissions to Cranfield, Muckamore, 10:38
6 during August to November 2014, with a medical
7 opinion/view on the potential preventability of
8 admission."
9
10 And then towards the bottom of that page, in fact at 10:38
11 the very bottom, it goes through the various
12 admissions, and at the bottom there it says that:
13
14 "18 out of 24 (i.e. 75% of admissions) during this
15 period were potentially avoidable." 10:39
16
17 And the document goes on to break that down into
18 different months so that the statistics change slightly
19 as it's broken down, but really it's in and around that
20 75% for that period August to November. 10:39
21
22 Were you aware of that audit, first of all?
23 A. Yes, I was involved in it. I was involved in providing
24 some of the medical opinion.
25 17 Q. Some of the medical opinion. So there are obviously 10:39
26 other consultants, or doctors, or nurses involved in
27 providing some of the medical opinion?
28 A. Yes. Yes.
29 18 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yes. Yes.

2 19 Q. And it is Cranfield, so it's the ward that you were
3 responsible for?

4 A. Yes. Yes.

5 20 Q. Okay. How do you reflect upon that figure that 75% 10:39
6 were potentially avoidable?

7 A. I think it's important to sort of set the context. The
8 hospital modernisation process was developed at a time
9 when the demand for beds was extremely high. The
10 austerity/cuts that really sort of came into effect 10:40
11 around the start of that decade had really begun to
12 bite and, you know, some of the services that I
13 referred to earlier in terms of those that patients
14 with learning disabilities can access, had really begun
15 to struggle; day centres, respite facilities, and 10:41
16 that...

17 CHAIRPERSON: Is the decade 2010 to 2020?

18 A. Yes, sorry.

19 CHAIRPERSON: It is. Sorry.

20 A. Sorry, yes. Yes. So -- and as well as that, and just 10:41
21 touching on maybe over the page a wee bit, Ms. Briggs,
22 about where it documents the presentation, the sort of
23 initial reason for admission of some of the patients,
24 and you'll see an awful lot of reference there to
25 suicidal ideation. 10:41

26 21 Q. MS. BRIGGS: I think we can show that on the screen,
27 and it goes on page 47 and page 48 are the pages that I
28 think Dr. Hughes is referring to.

29 A. Yeah. So I think that is indicative of also maybe some

1 of the -- I mean the province, the city of Belfast,
2 certain areas within the city of Belfast were
3 experiencing extremely high rates of suicide, and when,
4 you know, compared to other regions on these islands,
5 suicide rates were in some cases remarkably high for 10:42
6 certain areas, and obviously there was an awareness of
7 that, and at that time the process of admission to
8 hospital for patients with learning disabilities was
9 different to mental health wards, was different to
10 those, to that that existed for patients without 10:43
11 learning disabilities, in that there was no triage or
12 filter system in place. It was a direct phone call
13 from a GP to the hospital, usually to the consultant or
14 to one of the medical staff, and the admission was
15 arranged. So, I mean I can't obviously recall those 10:43
16 individual cases, but I can recall a trend where, you
17 know, a GP would be called to a house where there was a
18 lot of worry, a lot of concern, a lot of maybe
19 expressed emotion, tension, and the patient was
20 expressing these ideas, and in the absence of any 10:44
21 filter there was almost an inevitability about
22 admission.

23 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask, when you say these are
24 potentially avoidable, at the point at which you
25 receive the call was the patient so distressed that 10:44
26 admission was the only option, and you're saying
27 actually if there had been intervention by mental
28 health teams earlier that might have been avoided. Or
29 are you saying at the point at which you received the

1 phone call, if there had been good community mental
2 health services then you could have avoided the
3 admission at that point in time?

4 A. I think both.

5 DR. MAXWELL: Right.

10:44

6 A. There was certainly very little focus on, you know,
7 promoting good mental health amongst our patient group,
8 but there was undoubtedly also a lack of alternative to
9 hospital admission in this type of crisis. And, you
10 know, one example that I can give is that, you know,
11 the impact of home treatment and home treatment teams
12 on Mental Health Services was quite dramatic in terms
13 of admission reduction. Obviously without that layer,
14 I suppose, of service, it was inevitable that we would
15 come under pressure against a backdrop of some of the
16 things that I described about services and what was
17 going on in communities in Belfast.

10:45

10:45

18
19 So, yes, I was never completely happy with - I
20 acknowledge that a profiling exercise like this was
21 necessary, but I was always cautious that we couldn't
22 read too much into it. It didn't feel very scientific,
23 and it maybe feels even less so looking back on it now.
24 But I suppose what we were trying to capture, what
25 Mr. Veitch and Senior Managers within the Trust were
26 trying to capture, was some sort of flavour of how
27 community services needed to develop to prevent
28 admissions, and a good starting point is to profile the
29 people who were coming in to hospital and trying to

10:46

10:46

1 work back-ways to see what might have prevented their
2 admission.

3 PROFESSOR MURPHY: So nowadays would you say that in
4 these kinds of cases it would be down to mental health
5 teams to intervene, or would it still be the community 10:47
6 learning disability teams intervening?

7 A. It varies. Personally I think that the majority of my
8 patients could have their needs met, probably well met
9 and probably better met within Mental Health Services.

10 PROFESSOR MURPHY: And did Mental Health Services 10:47
11 acknowledge that people with mild learning disabilities
12 were part of their job?

13 A. No.

14 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Or did they say 'No, learning
15 disabilities goes to the Learning Disability Team'? 10:47

16 A. Yes. Yes.

17 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Has that changed?

18 A. Not significantly.

19 DR. MAXWELL: And you said in answer to Professor
20 Murphy that you think your patients could be well or 10:48
21 better managed by mental health teams, do you think
22 then that admitting them to Muckamore in this situation
23 actually produced any harm for them?

24 A. I'm not aware of it, and actually this is perhaps going
25 to sound paradoxical, but the vast majority of patients 10:48
26 who presented in this way recovered well in Cranfield.

27 DR. MAXWELL: So why do you think they would do better
28 in a mental health setting?

29 A. I think they could also have recovered well somewhere

1 else.

2 DR. MAXWELL: But you said "better". Do you want to
3 revise that view that they would have been better in a
4 mental health setting?

5 A. A mental health setting that was able to treat them at 10:49
6 home, for example.

7 DR. MAXWELL: So you mean mental health practitioners
8 in their own home?

9 A. Yes. Yes. I mean within --

10 DR. MAXWELL: Rather than admission to the Mental 10:49
11 Health Hospital.

12 A. Yes, I mean -- sorry, I should have made that clear. I
13 meant being able to avail of Mental Health Services.

14 DR. MAXWELL: Right.

15 A. Both out and in-patient, but certainly out. Those with 10:49
16 mild and moderate learning disabilities I have to
17 stress.

18 DR. MAXWELL: And given that this report identified a
19 real gap in services, do you know what happened to the
20 report? Because ultimately it would require a new 10:49
21 funding stream.

22 A. Yes.

23 DR. MAXWELL: which wasn't within the gift of the
24 Muckamore Hospital management. Do you know if it went
25 up to the Department of Health, or the HSCB, or the 10:50
26 Public Health Agency?

27 A. I'm not sure.

28 DR. MAXWELL: You don't know?

29 A. I'm not sure really.

1 22 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Dr. Hughes, I'd like to move on to
2 something else now, and it's the pressures on your
3 workload and it's something you've touched upon
4 already. At paragraph 9, the second half of page 4,
5 you're describing the pressures on your workload, and 10:50
6 in particular the pressures that resulted from the
7 retirement of two of the most senior consultant
8 psychiatrists, and that was around 2007 to 2008 you
9 say. You describe there that between 2006 to 2009, and
10 this is towards the end of the paragraph, you say: 10:50
11
12 "I was effectively holding a position for which up to
13 four consultants would have been recommended."
14
15 That's because you were looking after 35 patients on 10:51
16 Cranfield Assessment Ward, which you say is twice the
17 number recommended by the Royal College of
18 Psychiatrists, and on top of that you were expected to
19 retain your role in the community with a caseload of
20 300 patients. 10:51
21
22 You go on to say that your experience was by no means
23 unique and you were aware of the plight of a number of
24 senior colleagues with similarly onerous workloads.
25 10:51
26 When you refer to your other colleagues with the heavy
27 workloads, was that an issue for psychiatry that was
28 specific to Northern Ireland or were you aware that it
29 was an issue across the United Kingdom?

1 A. I think it is an issue in many areas of the United
2 Kingdom. It was particularly acute here. There were
3 times in and around that time where it really did feel
4 like the dearth of senior psychiatrists within the
5 service in the region was potentially catastrophic, you 10:52
6 know, it was at a time, those of us that were left sort
7 of after those retirements. I mean I can remember all
8 it took was for a colleague to go on extended leave, be
9 that maternity leave, there were so few of us. I mean
10 just to give you an example, I can -- at the minute our 10:52
11 on-call rota is what we call a one in eight, so
12 everybody is on every eighth night, or you're on every
13 eighth night. There were times when there were three
14 of us on that rota and you were on a one in three, so
15 every third weekend, and that was on top of not just 10:53
16 having to do your own work, which was already onerous,
17 but then having to cover for colleagues and that. So
18 there was a time in and around that where I can recall
19 that striking a work/life balance was difficult.

20 23 Q. You say it was at times catastrophic. What do you mean 10:53
21 by that?

22 A. Well, potentially so, in that you just didn't feel at
23 times that you were able to keep up and, you know, we
24 bumped into each other in corridors and at sort of
25 Royal College meetings, if we could get away to them, 10:54
26 and you did get a sense of a psychiatry service in
27 crisis. And there were all the other things within the
28 service, you know, that were, you know struggling, but
29 just that particular spell I can recall it being very

1 difficult.

2 CHAIRPERSON: And, again, the spell is 2006 to 2009?

3 A. '09/'10 Chair, yes. Yes, in and around that. I can

4 remember appointing -- well the Trust appointed a

5 couple of consultants around 2010. 10:54

6 CHAIRPERSON: Right.

7 A. And that eased things.

8 CHAIRPERSON: I was going to ask --

9 A. Slightly.

10 CHAIRPERSON: -- alleviate it? 10:54

11 A. Yes. Yeah. You got a sense from that time on that

12 things were a bit better. But, you know, even recent

13 reports from the Department of Health have suggested

14 that we're considerably under-resourced.

15 CHAIRPERSON: In Northern Ireland generally? 10:55

16 A. In Northern Ireland, yeah.

17 24 Q. MS. BRIGGS: And how did the catastrophe, as you've put

18 it at that time, how did that impact patients?

19 A. It's very hard to measure that. We tried desperately

20 to -- you're -- I suppose your working life became 10:55

21 almost entirely an exercise in triage and about

22 focusing your efforts to where you and other -

23 obviously you were guided by other sort of senior

24 members of multidisciplinary teams, but to try to focus

25 your efforts on where they would be of most benefit to 10:56

26 patients. And I can't think of, you know, direct

27 examples, but there's no doubt that across that time

28 and at other pockets of time that, you know, patients

29 might have been discharged sooner had there been more

1 resource in the hospital multidisciplinary team, and
2 psychiatry was part of that.

3 25 Q. And you describe sitting on this Speciality Advisory
4 Committee in Northern Ireland, and that workforce was a
5 common topic between 2000 and 2010 you say. Were there 10:57
6 any other mechanisms by which you escalated your
7 concerns about the lack of consultant support or
8 consultants in Muckamore?

9 A. Just through senior management. Just up -- I mean it
10 was a situation that certainly the people within my 10:57
11 sphere were all acutely aware of, you know. And then
12 I'm -- you know the issue -- recruitment and retention
13 obviously are multi-factorial, but we did also at that
14 time struggle to recruit trainees into the speciality,
15 and some of that may have been related to their 10:58
16 impression of it, of what the speciality, and that it
17 was quite beleaguered. So, yeah, I mean we --
18 basically any channel that we had, certainly at the
19 level that I worked, it was mostly through Clinical
20 Director and hospital management team and, as I say, we 10:58
21 got a chance every year - now those SAC, Speciality
22 Advisory Committee meetings were big, there was a large
23 sort of collection of people there. There was, you
24 know, a lengthy agenda. But I do recall that when we
25 were asked to raise concerns about our practice and 10:58
26 what mattered to us most, we did talk about workforce a
27 lot.

28 26 Q. Okay. And just focusing back in 2006 to 2009 when you
29 had your community consultant role alongside your role

1 in Muckamore, how was your time divided between those
2 two?

3 A. There were certainly fixed points within the week where
4 I had to be in one place or the other. So, for
5 example, at ward rounds or multidisciplinary team 10:59
6 meetings in the hospital, it would happen on a certain
7 day, the same day every week, and I made every effort
8 to be there for those, and was there for the vast
9 majority of them. Clinics, likewise, in the community.
10 So that probably accounted for around half my week, 10:59
11 four or five sessions a week was fixed in the diary and
12 you knew where you were. The rest was fluid, and as
13 we've said a lot, as I've said a lot, subject to triage
14 and crisis management and working out where your
15 presence would be of most value. 11:00

16 27 Q. Do you think it was a roughly 50/50 split as between
17 the community and Muckamore, or would that be unfair?

18 A. No, I think, I think that -- it wouldn't be far off,
19 yeah.

20 28 Q. And you also tell the Inquiry about your heavy interest 11:00
21 in your various roles and positions in education?

22 A. Yes.

23 29 Q. How did that time spent in education, how did that sit
24 within your other time at Muckamore and as a community
25 psychiatrist? 11:00

26 A. It was different in that it was possible to plan that.
27 Certainly the role between, is it 2002? Whenever I was
28 Training Programme Director for the Psychiatry of
29 Intellectual Disability, that was quite a small role

1 and there were only a number of sessions in the year
2 when you were needed around recruitment, annual review
3 of trainees, those types of things. So, that was
4 something that you could ring-fence, and it was often a
5 case of, you know, asking the Senior Registrar to Chair 11:01
6 the ward round or things like that.

7 DR. MAXWELL: How many sessions in your job plan were
8 for education?

9 A. Throughout my time, never more than one and a half,
10 which is six hours a week. 11:02

11 DR. MAXWELL: Yeah.

12 A. And often less than that. And certainly during that
13 time it would probably have been a half a session for
14 Training Programme Director, so that's two hours a
15 week. 11:02

16 DR. MAXWELL: And you were on a maximum session
17 contract, were you?

18 A. Yes. Yes.

19 30 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Dr. Hughes if we move on to paragraph 10
20 on page 5, you're describing there some changes to your 11:02
21 role between 2009 and 2011, and to summarise you say
22 you relinquished responsibility for the Belfast
23 community sectors and you were able to focus on
24 Cranfield. But you were also given the additional
25 responsibility of Foybeg, which in 2011 was changed for 11:02
26 Oldstone. Oldstone then closed in 2014, and then in
27 2015 Cranfield was re-profiled and you had
28 responsibility for Cranfield 1 and Killead ward, which
29 are male and female admissions wards. And you worked

1 there until you left Muckamore in September 2018.
2 Just thinking about the different wards there, did you
3 notice a difference in atmosphere or culture on
4 different wards or across different staff teams?
5 A. No, I don't recall having an impression like that. The 11:03
6 experience I had in Oldstone was probably amongst the
7 best that I had in my time in Muckamore. In short, it
8 was a fantastic place. It was a number of houses
9 across Oldstone Road, across the road from the main
10 hospital, and half of them were in sort of public 11:04
11 ownership and people lived there with their families,
12 and the other half was set up at that time -- it had
13 existed in a number of different guises over the years,
14 none of which I was involved in, but at that time it
15 was set up specifically as a rehabilitation ward, and 11:04
16 it was essentially for patients who were in other wards
17 who it was deemed would benefit from an extra layer of
18 treatment before discharge. So, exposure -- you know
19 there's quite a big jump between life on a hospital
20 ward and, you know, in a community setting, virtually 11:05
21 any community setting, and Oldstone acted as a bridge
22 for a lot of patients.
23 DR. MAXWELL: So given that Oldstone -- and as I
24 understand it, they had more autonomy, they were less
25 closely supervised in making this transition. 11:05
26 A. Yes. Yes.
27 DR. MAXWELL: So given that seems to be quite a central
28 approach to resettlement, why did it close?
29 A. I was told at the time that it was down to resources.

1 DR. MAXWELL: It seems an odd decision if there was a
2 major drive towards resettlement and the one place that
3 was preparing people for resettlement gets closed?
4 A. Yes. I can remember thinking that at the time.
5 31 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Thinking about Cranfield, because that's 11:05
6 where you really spent the majority I think of your
7 time, what was the mix of patients and their needs?
8 A. Broad. Both in terms of clinical presentation, which
9 within Learning Disability Services is how it is. You
10 know, Mental Health Services have a narrower range of 11:06
11 presentation. With Learning Disability Services we do
12 have to factor in people with not just mental illness,
13 but people with neurodevelopmental disorders, with
14 neuro-diversity, with - we've mentioned the term
15 "challenging behaviour". So there was that whole range 11:06
16 of people, of patients. And also then across the range
17 of intellectual disability. So people who had mild to
18 borderline, who had very, often very different needs,
19 as you could imagine, to someone with severe or
20 profound intellectual disability. And equally then, 11:07
21 there was a broadening of the age range when compared
22 to Mental Health Services. So there is no such thing
23 as a specialist service for older people with
24 intellectual disability, either in out-patient settings
25 or in in-patient. So essentially to try to illustrate 11:07
26 what that was like, you know, we would often have had
27 18-year-old patients with a condition like attention
28 deficit hyperactivity disorder in the next room to an
29 80-year-old patient with Alzheimers. So you could

1 imagine the skill set that was required to manage those
2 extremes and everything in between. We also then at a
3 time would have had sporadic cases of children being
4 admitted to Cranfield. I can't, I can't really recall
5 the last, the date the last child was admitted? 11:08
6 Probably around 2014. So for those first seven or
7 eight years of the existence of Cranfield, we would
8 have had a number of children admitted, obviously with
9 a very significant level of risk assessment and risk
10 management around that. 11:09
11 DR. MAXWELL: Is that because the Iveagh Centre didn't
12 have any beds, or was it a conscious decision to admit
13 them to Cranfield instead of Iveagh?
14 A. For some of it I'm not sure Iveagh existed. For the
15 initial few years - I can't remember what date Iveagh 11:09
16 opened, but I think it was after 2006.
17 DR. MAXWELL: Yeah, but before 2014?
18 A. Yes. So, yes, Iveagh also struggled undoubtedly with
19 some of the issues that I've just spoken about in terms
20 of - in relation to Cranfield. You know, the 11:10
21 difference between a 5-year-old and a 17-year-old, and
22 keeping everyone safe within that was difficult at
23 times, and a decision was sometimes made that a 16 or
24 17-year-old could possibly have their needs better met
25 in an adult ward, or simply by dint of risk management, 11:10
26 collective risk management within the unit. You know
27 if, for example, if a 16 or 17-year-old boy was
28 behaving in such a way that a 5-year-old was at a
29 particular risk. You know those sorts of things. So

1 there were -- now that stopped, there was a very
2 conscious decision to stop the practice of having
3 children in adult wards, but for a time during my spell
4 in Cranfield we did look after. So I suppose in --
5 that's a longwinded answer -- we catered for the needs 11:11
6 of a very broad range of patients.

7 32 Q. MS. BRIGGS: And on paragraph 17 on page 9, you're
8 talking at that paragraph about treatments that were
9 available for patients, and you talk about therapeutic
10 day services, Positive Behavioural Support Services, 11:11
11 pharmacological treatment, cognitive behavioural
12 therapy and so on. You mention in that paragraph
13 Positive Behaviour Support Plans, and you say that they
14 were widely introduced during your latter years in
15 Cranfield, having been around in slightly different 11:11
16 guises before this. Can you help the Inquiry with
17 this: when do you say that they were introduced, can
18 you recall?

19 A. I can't, I can't really. You know we -- from the day
20 we opened we had a behaviour service, as it was 11:12
21 somewhat ham-fistedly called, and we would have had
22 BNTs, Behaviour Nurse Therapists, whose job it was to
23 assess and treat challenging behaviour in patients and
24 develop bespoke plans around that. That did sort of
25 crystallise a lot more sort of around about 2011/12 11:12
26 when -- I don't think we were much behind the curve
27 with introducing Positive Behaviour Support, I think
28 that's around about the time that the world cottoned on
29 to this as being a good idea. So that was then

1 gradually introduced. But again, you know, resources
2 were often a factor in how much of that and to what
3 degree that could be provided to the patients.

4 33 Q. Thinking about -- I'll move on from that. Thinking
5 about your visibility on the ward, seeing all this 11:13
6 treatment being given, how often were you out on the
7 wards spending time with patients?

8 A. Not often enough. And this is where workload obviously
9 impacts. My role -- unfortunately there are a number
10 of things that require a consultant and only a 11:13
11 consultant can do. A lot of those relate to the Mental
12 Health Order, and forums, and tribunals, but also at a
13 -- and maybe this reflects on my practice, but I did
14 always see it as my job to engage as much as I could
15 with patient's families, and some of that came from me, 11:14
16 but a lot of it actually came from the families
17 themselves, where quite rightly they were keen to
18 engage with the psychiatric lead within the team. So
19 there were demands across the piece really that
20 unfortunately limited the amount of time that I could 11:15
21 spend in direct contact with patients.

22 34 Q. Could families make appointments to see you directly?

23 A. That was how I tried to work, yes.

24 35 Q. And thinking about the involvement of families in
25 decision making, you say in your statement that you 11:15
26 tried to do this when possible, and it was, you say -
27 it's at paragraph 13 - you say:
28
29 "It was always our quest to involve families in

1 decision making as much as possible."

2
3 when was it not possible to involve patients or their
4 relatives in decision making?

5 A. Usually, I have to say, when patients or their families 11:15
6 chose not to be involved, and that, that happened a
7 lot, where patients either came into hospital without
8 much family involvement, or families took the view that
9 whenever the patient was in hospital that we were the
10 experts and we could crack on. 11:16

11 CHAIRPERSON: Presumably there were many who didn't
12 take that view?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 CHAIRPERSON: And are you saying that there was
15 relatively open access to you? 11:16

16 A. Yes.

17 CHAIRPERSON: Provided you were the lead consultant for
18 the particular patient?

19 A. Yes. I'd like to think that. And we did have very
20 sort of touch points across an admission where we 11:17
21 attempted to very actively engage with families, so
22 around progress meetings. So I've mentioned in my
23 statement that each patient had a post-admission
24 meeting and families were always invited to those.
25 Equally, on the cusp of discharge there was a 11:17
26 pre-discharge meeting and, again, our social workers
27 worked very hard. They were our sort of liaison
28 officers, if you like, with families. So they would
29 engage with families at those times and issue an

1 invite.

2 CHAIRPERSON: And how quickly would the post-admission
3 meeting take place?

4 A. Our standard was within two weeks, but we always tried
5 to have it within one. We had -- most of the time I 11:18
6 was there the structure of the week was such that in
7 order to ensure that the key people were around at the
8 most important times for families, we would have had an
9 all day agenda in each of the two wards. So I think
10 off the top of my head Tuesdays was men's day and 11:18
11 Thursday's was women's. And that was the ward round,
12 the multidisciplinary meeting that was mostly the
13 multidisciplinary team discussing and reviewing the
14 patient, often with the patient there, or there for
15 some of it, again if that was their choice. And then 11:18
16 in the afternoon -- so that was a more business-like
17 meeting, and then in the afternoon we would have had I
18 think it was four 45 minute slots between 2:00 and 5:00
19 to have meetings about patients, and they were --

20 CHAIRPERSON: Meetings with whom, with families? 11:19

21 A. Oh, that was with families. So these were the
22 preadmission/post-discharge meetings.

23 CHAIRPERSON: Right. Okay.

24 A. Or if a patient was there long enough sometimes we felt
25 it necessary to have a progress meeting or an update 11:19
26 meeting. So if a patient was in hospital having
27 treatment for say, you know, beyond three or four
28 months, we would have had a meeting within that time to
29 update everyone, and that was not just families, but

1 that would have been the community teams, because we
2 had this model where it was the hospital team who
3 looked after the patient during the admission and the
4 community team before and after. So in order to
5 facilitate transfer of information we would have had 11:20
6 community teams, key people from the community teams at
7 those meetings.

8 CHAIRPERSON: And in terms of post-admission meetings,
9 just so that we deal with this quickly, we did hear
10 from a number of witnesses that - or certainly more 11:20
11 than one set of witnesses - that post-admission
12 sometimes parents and relatives were told not to go and
13 visit their patient relative for a number of weeks.
14 Does that ring a bell with you? Is that part of the
15 policy of the hospital or not? 11:20

16 A. Not at all. Well not at all in terms of it being
17 policy of the hospital.

18 CHAIRPERSON: But might it have happened?

19 A. There may have been examples where on the basis of a
20 risk assessment we felt as a team - I can remember 11:20
21 having the very odd conversation with family members
22 that it might not be a good idea. If people's safety
23 was threatened.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I can understand that, but that
25 would presumably be for a relatively short period? 11:21

26 A. Yes, that was -- yeah, as short a period as possible.

27 CHAIRPERSON: And not as long as something like six
28 weeks? Or could it be? Or could it stretch to that?

29 A. It possibly could. I don't recall any examples, but it

1 possibly could. It did sometimes take us that length
2 of time or longer to maybe get a patient's mental state
3 settled enough that the risk diminished.

4 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. I'm just aware of the time. We're
5 less than half way through the statement at the moment, 11:21
6 and that's nobody's fault. Are you finished with this
7 area as it were or...

8 MS. BRIGGS: I have one question arising out of this
9 area, Chair, and then we can perhaps take a break and
10 move on to something else. 11:22

11 CHAIRPERSON: Sure. Sure.

12 36 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Thank you, Chair. The Inquiry,
13 Dr. Hughes, has heard evidence of really
14 dissatisfaction from families regarding, some families,
15 regarding the lack of information given to them about 11:22
16 their loved one's care upon admission, and indeed
17 thereafter, and the lack of ongoing involvement in
18 their care. Was that ever something that was raised
19 with you?

20 A. Genuinely I don't recall receiving complaints of that 11:22
21 nature.

22 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask, you've talked about being
23 available for families Tuesday afternoons and Wednesday
24 afternoons, but we've also heard from some families
25 that often siblings wanted to advocate and were perhaps 11:23
26 more confident dealing with authorities, was there any
27 capacity to talk to families at times when people
28 wouldn't have been at work?

29 A. Yes. I would often have been on the ward in the

1 evenings doing that sort of thing.

2 DR. MAXWELL: So you would -- if required you would see
3 families --

4 A. If it was possible, yes.

5 DR. MAXWELL: -- in the evenings. 11:23

6 A. Yes. Yes.

7 MS. BRIGGS: Chair, I wonder now if we take our break?

8 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah, certainly. All right. We normally
9 take around a 15-minute break now, you'll be looked
10 after. Don't speak to anybody about your evidence, and 11:23
11 we'll see you back in 15 minutes. So we'll try and
12 stick - we'll try and come back in at about 25 to.
13 Thank you very much.

14

15 THE INQUIRY RESUMED AFTER A SHORT ADJOURNMENT AS 11:24
16 FOLLOWS:

17

18 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

19 37 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Dr. Hughes, I'm going to pick up on a
20 couple of discrete issues, and one of those is the GP 11:40
21 services or lack thereof in Muckamore for a time, and
22 this is paragraph 15, mainly on page 8. You're
23 describing the physical health monitoring of patients,
24 and you say that:

25 11:41

26 "Over many years the consultants at Muckamore raised
27 our concerns to the hospital management team and beyond
28 lobbying vociferously for a primary care service for
29 our patients."

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Then you go on to say:

"In the absence of any primary care services day to day clinical issues were addressed by one of the psychiatry team. More recently before I left Muckamore in 2018, a general practitioner was welcomed on to the medical team."

So really before 2018, did the hospital have to rely on the services of a GP in the community to attend the hospital if it was felt that a GP was needed to see a patient, or was it managed by the psychiatrists really?

A. Yeah, exactly the latter.

38 Q. Okay.

A. There was no routine access to general practice for the patients who lived there, to all intents and purposes, or for the patients who were there being treated for illness.

39 Q. When you say no routine access, was there access in other ways?

A. Very little. The reason I didn't say "none" was because for a number of years, certainly from I arrived in Muckamore, probably through the noughties, the out-of-hours cover, medical cover, was provided by a group of local general practitioners, which was unusual. Most, if not all other mental health facilities in the region would have had trainee doctors, psychiatrists, on a rota, but there was

1 out-of-hours GP cover. And occasionally those, the
2 goodwill of those GPs was utilised to the maximum, in
3 that the nurses would have said, "while you're here
4 doctor, will you have a wee look at that?". But that
5 was sort of unofficial and there wasn't any governance 11:43
6 around it. But, no, essentially there was no GP
7 medical service available to our patients.
8 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just clarify, because you've said
9 before the break that you were on a one in eight rota.
10 A. Yes. 11:43
11 DR. MAXWELL: Meant that you were on-call every eighth
12 night.
13 A. Yes.
14 DR. MAXWELL: Every eighth weekend.
15 A. Yes. 11:43
16 DR. MAXWELL: And now you're saying there was no cover
17 for Muckamore out-of-hours?
18 A. Oh, no, there was no what we call first on-call cover,
19 so cover for medical issues, or first on-call for
20 psychiatry issues is usually provided by trainee 11:43
21 doctors, they're on a rota. We didn't have that
22 out-of-hours in Muckamore.
23 DR. MAXWELL: So there was no junior doctors at the
24 weekend?
25 A. No. Well now that you mention it, the junior doctors 11:44
26 were on site between 9:00 and 12:00 on a Saturday
27 morning.
28 DR. MAXWELL: And that's all?
29 A. That's all out-of-hours.

1 DR. MAXWELL: So anything that happened between midday
2 Saturday to 9:00am Monday --
3 A. And every evening after that.
4 DR. MAXWELL: And every night.
5 A. Yes. 11:44
6 DR. MAXWELL: The nurses had to make the decision 'Is
7 this something I need to call the on-call GP for?'.
8 A. Yes. So things like admissions of patients
9 out-of-hours, the clerking the admission process was
10 undertaken by the GP. 11:44
11 DR. MAXWELL: Oh, really!
12 A. Yeah.
13 DR. MAXWELL: And the seclusion policy requires a
14 doctor to be informed every hour that a patient is
15 secluded. So if the patient was secluded out-of-hours, 11:45
16 were they informing the GP?
17 A. Yes. For that spell. Now things did change, I can't
18 remember when, but in recent years there has been a
19 first on-call rota that is covered by core trainees in
20 psychiatry. But for I would say most of my time in 11:45
21 Muckamore it was that GP service that ran out-of-hours.
22 CHAIRPERSON: And given that an admission at the
23 weekend would very often be a crisis admission.
24 A. Yeah.
25 CHAIRPERSON: You're saying there'd be no psychiatric 11:45
26 involvement until the Monday morning?
27 A. Well, there would have been psychiatry involvement in
28 the accepting of the admission.
29 CHAIRPERSON: Right.

1 A. So -- and if the GP then felt it necessary to have --
2 there was a consultant on-call rota where the
3 consultant could, and we often did go in, but there was
4 no on-call psychiatry below consultant level.

5 CHAIRPERSON: No. Okay. Thank you.

11:46

6 40 Q. MS. BRIGGS: How did the lack of primary care services
7 for patients affect patients in Muckamore?

8 A. Again, it's hard to capture the extent of that, but one
9 -- you know, it was incredibly frustrating as a
10 clinician to work with a big group of patients who
11 essentially weren't having their primary physical care
12 needs met. Things like, for example, screening.

11:46

13 Throughout that time there were a number of, you know,
14 departmental initiatives around screening of patients
15 and the onus for that - I'm thinking about breast
16 screening for women of a certain age, and mammograms
17 and that kind of thing, our patients in Muckamore were
18 often excluded from that because that was dictated by
19 GP lists, so GPs were invited to be involved in that
20 process and had maybe targets around it, but our
21 patients, the patients who lived there were no longer
22 on GP lists so didn't have access to that.

11:47

23 41 Q. And when you raised your concerns about primary care
24 services with the hospital management team, how was
25 that received?:

11:47

26 A. Well, we were listened to. You know, it was
27 acknowledged that it was a gap, but it just proved
28 difficult to fill.

29 CHAIRPERSON: So you were listened to but nothing

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"Unfortunately we were not always in a position to meet all the needs of a patient. There were sometimes gaps in the service which dictated this. At times, for example, I can recall periods when patients did not have access to a clinical psychologist or an occupational therapist due to staff shortages."

11:49

Thinking about the NICE Guidelines regarding challenging behaviour specifically, that they say that anti-psychotic medication shouldn't be used alone for the treatment of challenging behaviour, was practice falling short of those guidelines during the periods that there were no psychologists or occupational therapists?

11:50

A. Yes. Yes. Undoubtedly, that's exactly what I referred to, Chair, that there were times of feast and times of relative famine, and it was very noticeable in terms of the difference between the two. At various junctures we had a well staffed, almost complete multidisciplinary team, and at those times it felt like the ward functioned much better and, you know, patients recovered quicker and were -- and then at other times the opposite ensued where parents -- we didn't -- now, I have to say, you know, particularly with things like clinical psychology, there were recruitment issues. It wasn't that -- it didn't seem to be that these were about resources. So the resource was there, it was intermittent, and I think that related more to

11:50

11:50

11:51

1 recruitment than allocation of resource, and often it
2 was only a matter of a few months and then we would get
3 a new psychologist. But there were, over the period of
4 my time there, there were gaps in a number of
5 disciplines.

11:51

6 CHAIRPERSON: We also heard -- I'm sorry to intervene,
7 but we also heard that there was effectively no OT
8 service until pretty late in the day, again I think it
9 was 2018. Were there OTs on the wards when you were
10 there?

11:52

11 A. My impression is that it was possibly a couple of years
12 before that.

13 CHAIRPERSON: Right.

14 A. Maybe from about 2015 or '16 we went from having no OT
15 and never had OT, I think it was felt that Day Care
16 filled the gap, you know that sort of vocational
17 training stuff, but it wasn't, you know, anything like
18 occupational therapy. But that did change around about
19 2015 or '16 where they did become very active members
20 of the multidisciplinary team.

11:52

11:52

21 CHAIRPERSON: Right. Thank you. Sorry, Ms. Briggs.

22 42 Q. MS. BRIGGS: No problem, Chair. Thinking about then
23 shortfalls in the multidisciplinary support or staff
24 that were available to patients, did the times when it
25 was lacking, did that perhaps lead to the use of what
26 might have been otherwise unnecessary MAPA or
27 seclusion?

11:53

28 A. I'm not sure it's possible to answer that. It would
29 seem logical, but I can't, I can't think of specific

1 examples.

2 43 Q. And as a consultant with responsibility for the
3 patients on the ward, was it your role to draw the
4 inadequacy of the service in terms of a lack of
5 psychologists or a lack of OTs to the hospital 11:53
6 management's attention or was it somebody else's?

7 A. I saw it as part of my role to liaise with the hospital
8 management team. I had the opportunity to do that.
9 Mostly through meetings with the Clinical Director, be
10 they consultant meetings, or as I've referred to in my 11:54
11 statement, the medical staff meetings. So, yeah, there
12 were opportunities, and I certainly took those
13 opportunities to illustrate gaps in the service that we
14 were providing to patients in Cranfield.

15 44 Q. And what was the response? 11:54

16 A. It varied. As I say, usually because both Clinical
17 Directors that I worked with had responsibilities
18 within the hospital. I would have engaged with them
19 regularly in terms of things like patient handover and
20 patient movement between wards. So they were as aware 11:54
21 of issues like this in their ward. My job was to
22 inform them of the situation in Cranfield, which I did
23 regularly.

24 45 Q. Okay. Further on in paragraph 16 you give some
25 statistics for the admissions to Cranfield during your 11:55
26 time on the ward. You say that during the 12 years you
27 worked there as a consultant there were approximately
28 1,500 admissions to wards that you had responsibility
29 for, an average of two to three new admissions per

1 week. You say that you can recall evaluating length of
2 stay figures for the service, probably around
3 2012/2013, and you believed that the average stay was
4 approximately 13 weeks.

5
6 where did you take those statistics from? Do you have
7 a source document for those?

8 A. I'm sorry, I don't. And it's -- when it came to me
9 making my statement, and obviously I attempted to, you
10 know research my statement, and unfortunately things
11 like audits, I didn't keep. A lot of them were led by
12 trainees, trainee psychiatrists who worked with me.
13 They would have been kind of a joint project. And
14 ultimately they would have been, you know, PowerPoint
15 presentations that were presented at, you know, medical
16 staff meetings or things like that, and had I known
17 what was ahead I certainly would have kept them.

18 46 Q. where did you get the 1,500 admissions number from
19 then?

20 A. well that's just - any time we sat down to review
21 admissions over the time I was there, we were roughly
22 in the region of 100 to 120 or 30 a year. So that's
23 just extrapolation.

24 47 Q. Okay. I'm thinking about the average stay of 13 weeks
25 in the 2012/13 period. Was a move to a resettlement
26 ward counted as finishing a length of stay?

27 A. I can't remember, but probably. We were focused on the
28 length of time it took a patient to recover in
29 Cranfield to a level that enabled them to move on. And

1 A. Yes.

2 51 Q. And that's an exhibit he has to his statement. The
3 statement reference is STM-101, and it's an overview
4 chart he exhibits at page 5490 of his statement. If we
5 can pull up 5490 first of all? And I know, Dr. Hughes, 11:59
6 you've had a chance to look at this as well. And
7 Mr. Hagan's statement says that the graphs there were
8 produced by the Risk and Governance Team at the Trust.

9 A. Mhm-mhm.

10 52 Q. 11:59
11 "... to assist the Inquiry."
12
13 And he says that the data was collected from Datix.

14 A. Mhm-mhm.

15 53 Q. And it's that graph on the left there that I'm going to 11:59
16 look at. I think we can actually pull up, yeah, a
17 bigger version of that. When looking at this graph,
18 the green line represents inappropriate or aggressive
19 behaviour towards staff by a patient, and this is
20 behavioural incidents between January 2009 through to 11:59
21 December 2022. And when you look at the green line
22 there you can see that there's a steep increase in
23 incidents of aggressive or inappropriate behaviour
24 towards staff by a patient really from in and around
25 2014, and it goes up then to a height of about 2000 -- 12:00
26 well, a height of 2,505 in 2018. And you can also see
27 that there's a smaller rise from that graph in terms of
28 inappropriate or aggressive behaviour by staff towards
29 patients?

1 A. Mhm-mhm.

2 54 Q. Are you following all that okay as I've said it?

3 A. Yes. Yes.

4 55 Q. I'm just going to give you a chance to reflect on that.
5 what do you think caused those increases? 12:00

6 A. Obviously this is something that I have reflected on
7 and considered very carefully. Any insight that I can
8 give is purely speculative.

9 DR. MAXWELL: Were you aware of this data? Because we
10 see a stepwise change in 2014 going up to 2018. So 12:01
11 this was Datix incidents, and we've heard that Datix
12 incidents were reviewed regularly in the hospital.
13 Were you actually aware that there had been this steep
14 rise?

15 A. I wasn't, but the information that I was supplied with 12:01
16 was specific to the wards that I worked on, and I'm
17 not, I'm genuinely not sure how much of that affects
18 the overall figures that we see.

19 DR. MAXWELL: So you were responsible for the admission
20 wards for Cranfield? 12:02

21 A. Yes, at that time from 2014/15 for Cranfield 1 and
22 Killead. The female admissions moved out of the
23 Cranfield complex in 2015 I think.

24 DR. MAXWELL: Right. Were you responsible for the
25 PICU? 12:02

26 A. Until 2015.

27 DR. MAXWELL: Because might one have expected these
28 behavioural incidents to be more likely to happen in
29 admission wards in Intensive Care Units than the

1 resettlement wards?

2 A. Yeah, I think so.

3 DR. MAXWELL: Those were the wards where you were more
4 likely to see challenging behaviour?

5 A. Yes. Although what had also happened, and again I was 12:03
6 peripheral to this, the resettlement agenda had limited
7 success. A number of patients sort of between 2010 to
8 2015 or '16, had moved on to -- out of hospital. That
9 led to at least a couple, if not more, re-profiling
10 exercises where -- so the resettlement process, as far 12:03
11 as I understood it, focused on one ward at a time, and
12 the plan was to close wards in sequence. What happened
13 in reality was when a ward was approaching closure, so
14 it had shrunk from -- the population in it had shrunk
15 from 15 or 20 patients to maybe five patients, it 12:04
16 seemed to be that a decision was taken at that point to
17 fast-track closure and move the remaining patients into
18 other wards. Some of them were long stay wards, but
19 some of them were, the moves were into the acute side,
20 and this was something that frustrated us as a 12:04
21 multidisciplinary team. But by definition, and I
22 suppose one could maybe assume that the patients that
23 were left in those wards as that happened were perhaps
24 more difficult to discharge.

25 DR. MAXWELL: Distressed. 12:04

26 CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I'm so sorry, Dr. Maxwell.

27 DR. MAXWELL: Sorry. Can I just ask one other
28 question? So I'm wondering if you had been aware of
29 this what you might have done, because it seems to me

1 that if the staff were experiencing more assaults they
2 might get distressed and burnt out and might be more
3 likely to being potentially assaulting the patients who
4 were assaulting them?

5 A. I did become aware of staff suffering more from stress 12:05
6 at around that time. There's no doubt about that. A
7 lot of senior staff seemed to seek alternative
8 employment, or retire, those that could.

9 DR. MAXWELL: So if part of this stress was because,
10 for whatever reason, the patients were becoming more 12:06
11 distressed and there were more assaults on staff, what
12 could or should have been done?

13 A. It's a very good question. I'm not sure I have any
14 answer to -- I'm not a manager, I don't know. But
15 certainly if these figures came to light and came to my 12:06
16 attention, I would be raising concern and, you know, I
17 did get a sense around that time that the hospital, and
18 by that I mean the staff within it particularly, were
19 struggling. I don't perhaps want to open up too much
20 in terms of the direct impact on me, but suffice to say 12:07
21 that around that time I began to consider what was best
22 for me in terms of employment, and ultimately it took
23 until 2018 for me to have an opportunity, but it was in
24 my thinking from around this time. A lot of senior
25 colleagues were leaving and left and... 12:07

26 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah.

27 A. Yeah.

28 CHAIRPERSON: Could I just ask this, I think we can all
29 understand how you wouldn't necessarily be aware of

1 precise figures.

2 A. Yeah.

3 CHAIRPERSON: But in terms of a general increase of
4 inappropriate behaviour towards staff by a patient, I
5 don't quite understand how you wouldn't have been aware 12:08
6 of that, because you were doing ward rounds.

7 A. Yeah.

8 CHAIRPERSON: You would have MDT meetings in relation
9 to your patients, presumably?

10 A. Yeah. 12:08

11 CHAIRPERSON: You were having consultations with your
12 patients. So if X had assaulted Y, wouldn't you be
13 told about that?

14 A. Oh, yes, yes, and those incidents and figures were
15 presented each week at the ward round relating... 12:08

16 CHAIRPERSON: Right.

17 A. But I --

18 CHAIRPERSON: But you weren't aware of an increase?

19 A. I didn't get a sense of this sort of an exponential
20 increase in the two wards that I worked on. I 12:08
21 genuinely didn't.

22 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Okay. Thank you.

23 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Did you get a sense that there were
24 increasing staff shortages as well? Because we've
25 heard from a number of witnesses that from about 2012 12:09
26 onwards there were increasing difficulties with nursing
27 staffing?

28 A. Yes. Yes, certainly. And that impacted on, you know,
29 patient care. You know, we noticed that it was more

1 difficult for patients to spend time off the ward
2 accompanied by nurses and, of course, that's
3 therapeutic. So there were certainly examples of that.
4 One other area where it I suppose affected practice was
5 in response to risk of harm to self or others, we would 12:09
6 sometimes have had patients on levels of observation.
7 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Mhm-mhm.

8 A. There was a clear policy around that. And I did get a
9 sense from nursing colleagues that our decisions in
10 terms of that would impact on the care that was being 12:10
11 provided to other patients. So, for example, whenever
12 we decided, for whatever reason, that a patient -- and
13 it wasn't very usual for a patient to need two-to-one
14 observations, we were told that that would
15 significantly eat into staffing resources. There 12:10
16 weren't any extra staff coming along to do that for
17 that individual patient, and that would undoubtedly
18 lead to other patients not having access to the nursing
19 team in the way that they did before.

20 PROFESSOR MURPHY: And presumably other consultants 12:10
21 covering other wards had similar worries about
22 staffing?

23 A. Yes.

24 PROFESSOR MURPHY: And how was that escalated upwards?

25 A. Through the appropriate channels that we had, which was 12:11
26 up through Clinical Director. I can remember it being
27 discussed often at consultant's meetings and medical
28 staff meetings.

29 56 Q. MS. BRIGGS: If we can go on to paragraph 19, that's

1 page 10. You were asked, Dr. Hughes, to comment upon
2 the evidence of some families that their relatives
3 appeared "zombified" or "spaced out" or "not in the
4 room" when they visited. You say that you do not
5 recall this ever being the case with any patient under 12:11
6 your care.

7
8 "It would, however, not be unusual for a patient to
9 appear sedated having taken medication such as rapid
10 tranquillisation where it had been required, a not 12:12
11 uncommon occurrence in acute mental health wards."

12
13 Did any relatives ever raise that specific concern with
14 you?

15 A. I can recall discussions taking place around this 12:12
16 issue, and taking the time to explain to relatives, and
17 sometimes patients themselves, that what we were trying
18 to find was a balance between symptom control and the
19 patient having enough energy and motivation to live a
20 meaningful, active life. And at times of acute 12:13
21 distress, finding that balance was a challenge for
22 everyone, and is, in terms of psychiatric practice in
23 acute wards. But in Cranfield it was always our focus,
24 that balance, and we never accepted some of those
25 things that have been referred to about being "zombie", 12:13
26 that was so far removed from what we were about or who
27 we were.

28 CHAIRPERSON: when you say you never accepted, what do
29 you mean? Do you mean you never accepted allegations

1 difficulties that resulted from the shortage of nursing
2 staff on the wards had a knock-on effect on the levels
3 of medication and PRN that you were having to use to
4 keep things "calm"?

5 A. Again, it's -- there is evidence that that is the case. 12:16
6 In the absence of other forms of treatment, often
7 medication is used. The word "inappropriate" is, I
8 think in cases ill-judged in that regard, because we
9 have to accept that other treatments aren't there but
10 the patient is still suffering, and it's our job to 12:16
11 alleviate that. So I think there is perhaps a logical
12 assumption that can be drawn that the absence of other
13 forms of treatment do lead to increased use of
14 medication. But I don't ever recall a situation where
15 a patient came to direct harm as a result of that. 12:17
16 CHAIRPERSON: When you say "other forms of treatment",
17 are you referring to things like Positive Behaviour
18 Support or something else?

19 A. Yes, all forms, Chair. So, yes, those, you know,
20 things that we've mentioned around psychology and that, 12:17
21 but also -- I don't want to call them "softer", but
22 those sort of therapeutic interventions that, you know,
23 a well resourced nursing team can deliver.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

25 A. That don't fall under the umbrella of any particular 12:17
26 form of psychotherapy.

27 CHAIRPERSON: No.

28 A. But they're just sort of more, more sort of
29 psychosocial, you know, human interaction, exercise,

1 you know those sort of lifestyle issues that are very
2 important for good psychological health.

3 DR. MAXWELL: So are you saying then that the shortages
4 in ward staff, of both Registered Nurses and healthcare
5 assistants, meant that there were less therapeutic 12:18
6 interventions between the ward staff and the patient,
7 and less activities, which resulted in patient's mental
8 health and behaviour becoming more distressed?

9 A. Yes.

10 DR. MAXWELL: But that at the point at which the 12:18
11 patient became distressed you had to do something which
12 was some sedation?

13 A. Yes, if -- everything else we had was tried and failed.
14 So, I mean, I saw, you know, daily examples of nurses
15 using, you know, distraction, diversion, those sorts of 12:19
16 things and, you know, in a huge proportion of cases
17 that worked.

18 DR. MAXWELL: But if there weren't enough nurses to
19 give enough time to each patient to do that...

20 A. Yes. Yes. 12:19

21 DR. MAXWELL: And the patient became distressed.

22 A. Yes.

23 DR. MAXWELL: You're saying that however they got
24 there, that patient was distressed.

25 A. Yes. 12:19

26 DR. MAXWELL: And you had to treat that, which might
27 have involved sedation?

28 A. Undoubtedly, yes.

29 PROFESSOR MURPHY: I think PRN wasn't monitored in

1 terms of trends, was it, the way that seclusion, and
2 incidents, and physical intervention were treated -
3 were analysed for trends?

4 A. Yes, I certainly have no evidence to contradict that.
5 What I can say is that at an individual patient level 12:20
6 in Cranfield we worked very hard to monitor the use of
7 PRN medication. But I'm not aware of the same systems
8 being in place for an overall review of use within the
9 hospital, for example.

10 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Do you think they should have been 12:20
11 analysed for trends in the same way that some of the
12 other restrictive practices were analysed?

13 A. Yes.

14 57 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Dr. Hughes, Clozapine or Clozapine is a
15 drug that the Inquiry has heard some evidence about. 12:20

16 A. Mhm-mhm.

17 58 Q. Can you explain its uses and effects first of all?

18 A. Clozapine is an antipsychotic drug that is licensed for
19 use in patients with schizophrenia. It is considered
20 -- it's not considered a drug of first choice. So it's 12:21
21 -- guidelines for its use are very clear in that it is
22 seen as an option when other forms of treatment have
23 failed to control the patient's symptoms. So it's for
24 those reasons, and reasons that relate to how it has to
25 be monitored, which is, you know, regular blood samples 12:21
26 and other things, it's not widely used. But in my
27 experience it's a very effective drug at controlling
28 symptoms in people with severe mental illness.

29 59 Q. Is it a drug that you prescribed at Muckamore?

1 A. Yes.

2 60 Q. And what -- you've said it's really a drug of last
3 resort. Why is that? What are its effects on the
4 patients? Is that due to the effects on the patient?

5 A. It's related to the effect it can have on blood cells, 12:22
6 and ultimately it can leave patients prone to infection
7 and some serious infection. So there are very clear
8 boundaries around its prescription and monitoring.
9 It's carefully controlled is what I mean.

10 61 Q. And can it have the effect of spacing out or 12:22
11 "zombifying" a patient as well?

12 A. No more than any other antipsychotic drug.

13 62 Q. And if a patient disagreed with your prescription of a
14 drug like Clozapine, how would you deal with that?

15 A. In the way that we would -- usually -- well I suppose 12:23
16 what's slightly different about Clozapine, if there is
17 patient objection we would need to think very carefully
18 about proceeding. I can't remember a case where we
19 did. Because essentially the monitoring that's
20 involved where a patient has to have very regular blood 12:23
21 checks, certainly in the early stages of prescription
22 in the initiation period blood tests are very frequent,
23 and patients more or less have to consent to a blood
24 test being taken. So, yes, I can't remember a single
25 case where we proceeded where there was patient 12:24
26 objection.

27 63 Q. If we can move on then to paragraph 22, it's on the end
28 of page 11 and into page 12, you're describing medical
29 staff committee meetings and you say, and this is the

1 last line on page 11:

2
3 "During these meetings we reviewed Datix and other
4 Serious Incident Summary Reports for patients and for
5 the wards. It was a big part of the agenda of the 12:24
6 meeting for around a decade. We had lists of incidents
7 and enough detail to go through incidents individually.
8 It was seen as part of the governance of the hospital
9 in identifying safeguarding issues or concerns.

10 Throughout this time I never had any indication which 12:24
11 alerted me to the fact that patients were being abused
12 by staff."

13
14 were you ever at any time alarmed at the number of
15 safeguarding incidents on the wards? 12:24

16 A. I don't recall being alarmed. I do recall being
17 reassured. what happened was that at a point in the
18 meeting -- so there was an agenda and this was a
19 rolling agenda item, I think it was called "Incidents
20 and Accidents", and each of us had a crib sheet with 12:25
21 details of incidents, and it was everything that had
22 happened in the hospital that was considered an event.
23 Through from a stranger being seen in the carpark, and
24 that was reported through as an incident by a concerned
25 member of staff, to some of the issues on the wards 12:25
26 where there were assaults, you know, across the people
27 that were on the wards. And each, each incident was
28 skimmed through. Time dictated that we couldn't focus
29 on every one. So the Chair of the meeting would --

1 everybody had their crib sheets, so the Chair would
2 signal that we were on page 1, page 2, and anybody had
3 the opportunity at any point in the meeting to ask a
4 question about any of the incidents, and usually it was
5 the consultant with responsibility for the ward who 12:26
6 addressed whatever concerns. But occasionally those
7 medical staff -- those staff meetings were a bit of
8 misnomer because there were other senior members of the
9 hospital management team there, so they would often
10 chip in and say: 'Yes, I've heard of that incident' or 12:26
11 'I've investigated that incident and here's what' --
12 so, yes, it was -- it felt like a robust exercise.

13
14 As to whether or not all of the doctors in the hospital
15 needed to take the time to do this, and I don't know if 12:27
16 that was a factor ultimately in the decision to take
17 that scrutiny away from that Committee and into the, I
18 think it went into the hospital management team, at a
19 time that I can't recall.

20 64 Q. Yes, you do say that in around 2012/2013 the role of 12:27
21 scrutinising incidents in the hospital was transferred
22 to the hospital management team?

23 A. Yeah.

24 65 Q. And was therefore no longer on the agenda of the
25 Medical Staff Committee. Do you know why that was? 12:27

26 A. I don't.

27 66 Q. You don't?

28 A. I don't.

29 67 Q. Okay. And just taking it back to really the broader

1 question: At any time during your time in Muckamore,
2 did you ever worry that there was institutional abuse
3 happening?

4 A. No.

5 68 Q. What about around the time of the Ennis Investigation 12:27
6 or again in 2017?

7 A. To be honest, the Ennis Investigation, I obviously was
8 aware of it. We -- not so much the detail, but it was
9 something that we were all made aware of, and all
10 cognisant of and, you know, determined, in as much as 12:28
11 we could, to take whatever steps we were able to, to
12 prevent anything like that from happening again. But
13 on the wards that I worked on, such was the honesty of
14 the staff that I worked with, I honestly -- and maybe
15 -- I mean I genuinely don't know as much as other 12:29
16 people in this room about, you know, the level of abuse
17 that patients suffered on each ward, but I would still
18 be staggered to think if there was any, or certainly
19 any significant abuse that took place on the wards that
20 I worked on when I worked on them. 12:29

21 69 Q. And just thinking then about the Ennis Investigation.
22 What learning was actually shared and utilised from the
23 Ennis Investigation, can you recall?

24 A. Not specifically. I do recall receiving written
25 communication, it was discussed at medical staff 12:30
26 meetings, and beyond that I can't be specific.

27 70 Q. Just thinking about other avenues that concerns might
28 have reached you. What about your trainees, your role
29 in education, did any of your trainees ever raise

1 concerns about poor practice or abuse at Muckamore with
2 you in supervisions, for example?

3 A. Never. Never.

4 71 Q. And what about your role then as a community
5 consultant? I mean, had you come across former
6 patients and their families who perhaps expressed
7 concerns or even dissatisfaction about Muckamore?

12:30

8 A. Not that I recall. And actually what I experienced,
9 continue to experience, is the opposite, where people,
10 I suppose, share my disbelief and incredulity. You
11 know patients themselves, families of patients, would
12 often express - not often, would sometimes express to
13 me in out-patient appointments their feelings about
14 obviously what has been in the public domain now for a
15 number of years, and still would stress their surprise,
16 based on their experience.

12:31

12:31

17 72 Q. And I'm just going back to the transfer of
18 responsibility really for scrutinising incidents. As
19 you've said in your evidence it went from the hospital
20 management team -- it went to the hospital management
21 team from the Medical Staff Committee in 2012/2013.
22 Was that a positive or a negative change in your view?

12:31

23 A. In hindsight a negative one, because the more scrutiny
24 by senior people within the hospital the better, one
25 would assume. But actually at the time I, I probably
26 had mixed feelings about it, because medical staff
27 meetings were lasting an inordinate amount of time, and
28 I was sitting at most of them thinking about where else
29 I could be and what other work I could be doing.

12:32

1 DR. MAXWELL: But at this time they were also being
2 reviewed in other committees.

3 A. I think so, yes. Yes.

4 DR. MAXWELL: It wasn't that the medical staff were the
5 only people reviewing it? 12:32

6 A. Yes. Yes.

7 DR. MAXWELL: It was just a decision was taken not to
8 present it at the Medical Staff Committee?

9 A. Yes. Yes.

10 DR. MAXWELL: But would you have been looking at some 12:32
11 of these trends when you were doing the MDT meetings?

12 A. Yes, and a bit beyond. There would have been occasions
13 where -- now not in any structured or formal way --
14 where we would have sat down with the Operations
15 Manager, who was usually a nurse, I think maybe didn't 12:33
16 always have that title. So the nursing structure
17 within Cranfield, which is all I can speak about, each
18 ward had a Ward Manager or a Ward Sister, and then
19 there was a more senior nurse overseeing the wards, and
20 that person was key to a lot of this and we would have 12:33
21 discussed trends around seclusion and physical
22 intervention, but, as I say, not in a formal way that
23 was on an agenda in a meeting, it was just something
24 where -- it was brought up.

25 DR. MAXWELL: Things that had come to your attention in 12:34
26 your review of patients.

27 A. Yes.

28 DR. MAXWELL: That suggested something unusual, a spike
29 in a certain thing.

1 A. Yes. Yes.

2 DR. MAXWELL: And you had a route to raise that?

3 A. Yes.

4 73 Q. MS. BRIGGS: And just thinking about what you've said
5 there about ward rounds and getting information in 12:34
6 different ways. At paragraph 23 you're talking there
7 about reviewing reported incidents involving patients
8 at weekly ward rounds, and the information was prepared
9 from the patient's care plan, and you say that those
10 reports detailed the number and nature of incidents, 12:34
11 including the use of physical intervention, PRN
12 medication, and seclusion. Did those reports include
13 peer-to-peer incidents and peer-on-staff incidents?

14 A. Yes.

15 74 Q. You go on to say, and it's in that paragraph I think, 12:35
16 that as far as you were aware every incident was
17 recorded in the patient's care plan. How did you
18 satisfy yourself that that was the case?

19 A. I didn't go to any lengths to. I simply had to trust
20 the senior people who were providing me with the 12:35
21 information, and I did.

22 75 Q. Okay. If we can go on to paragraph 24 on page 12? You
23 say there:
24
25 "I like to think that I always enjoyed good working 12:35
26 relations with the hundreds of staff I worked with in
27 Cranfield over the years. There were times when it
28 felt like we were a beleaguered team working in
29 extremely challenging circumstances and our ability to

1 function well as a team undoubtedly contributed to the
2 excellent outcomes for the vast majority of our
3 patients."

4
5 why did your team feel beleaguered? Was that due to a 12:36
6 lack of staff or other reasons?

7 A. Just simply that. As I said earlier, there were times
8 of plenty and times of scarcity, and there's no doubt
9 that during the latter there was that spirit that I've
10 described there where we dug in and, you know, we 12:36
11 stayed late and, you know, we did what we could.

12 76 Q. If we can go on to paragraph 25 on page 13. You say
13 there that you recall only one situation potentially
14 impacting on patient safety which you felt duty bound
15 to report. You say: 12:36

16
17 "I was one of a small number of staff involved in
18 raising awareness to the hospital management team,
19 specifically on my part to the Clinical Director,
20 raising concerns about the health and therefore the 12:36
21 performance of a medical colleague in the hospital.
22 Indeed, I raised these concerns on more than one
23 occasion, some of which were brought to me by those
24 less senior with less experience of such matters. With
25 time, I did feel that my concerns were heard by those 12:37
26 in senior management roles."

27
28 Perhaps it's difficult to separate the two, but was
29 that a personal issue or a safeguarding issue about

1 that member of staff?

2 A. I was never made aware of any incidents that could have
3 been regarded as safeguarding, but my concerns were
4 that if the situation was allowed to develop it might
5 reach that stage. 12:37

6 CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we need to spend more time
7 on this. This was a member of staff who was unwell in
8 some way.

9 A. I'm uncomfortable with this, yeah.

10 CHAIRPERSON: Let's move on. 12:38

11 77 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Thank you, Chair. If we go on to
12 paragraph 26, you're providing the Inquiry with your
13 view regarding what the strengths and weaknesses of
14 care were during your time at Muckamore. You reflect
15 on some positives. You talk about the treatment of 12:38
16 patient's mood disorder and schizophrenia, which you
17 feel was an area of excellence, and you reflect upon
18 many gifts and praise received from families. You tell
19 the Inquiry about that as well. Regarding weaknesses,
20 you refer to a sub-group of patients who you feel were 12:38
21 less well served, those with moderate or severe
22 intellectual disabilities and autism. You say that it
23 sometimes proved impossible to help those patients to
24 achieve psychological well-being, such was their
25 difficulty in adjusting to life on a busy hospital 12:39
26 admission ward. And you say that Cranfield was
27 sub-optimal in several cases that you recall.
28 Can you explain what you mean by this, how the care at
29 Cranfield was sub-optimal in several cases?

1 A. Most of it relates to the environment, and whilst it
2 was carefully designed, it's well-documented that the
3 admission wards do not meet the needs of people who
4 struggle with the level of stimulation that is an
5 inevitable consequence of bringing a number of sick 12:39
6 people into the same environment.
7 CHAIRPERSON: Could you keep your voice up? Sorry,
8 you've dropped your voice.
9 A. Sorry. Yeah, the plight of people with autism on the
10 ward was a constant concern. They have very specific 12:40
11 needs when it comes to sensory stimulation and the
12 environment, and from the start it was clear that we
13 weren't geared up to meet those needs.
14 78 Q. MS. BRIGGS: So for those patients, might it have been
15 the case that admission to Muckamore decreased their 12:40
16 mental health and well-being?
17 A. Yes. And that was acknowledged, and I can remember
18 several conversations with -- often I was alerted to
19 the possibility of an admission by a consultant
20 colleague who worked in the community in advance of it 12:40
21 happening. And I can remember a number of
22 conversations where the consultant was already
23 concerned about whether or not the patient would do
24 well in Cranfield, but there often was no alternative.
25 And it's been the long held view of many of us working 12:41
26 in the speciality that the need for a specialist autism
27 service is glaring. The gap -- the -- we simply don't
28 cater well for the needs of, I have to say particularly
29 young men, young men who leave school, and we had a

1 particular cohort of them who came through Cranfield
2 during my time there and really struggled, 18, 19,
3 20-year-old young men who -- and, again, this was
4 something that, you know, we regularly portrayed to
5 people advocating on behalf of the patients, but were 12:42
6 repeatedly told that there simply wasn't the resources
7 to develop. And, you know, it certainly would have
8 needed to go beyond Muckamore. This needed to be a
9 bottom-up strategy, you know, for children with autism,
10 for young, transitioning to adult services and all of 12:42
11 that, and to this day we still don't have anything that
12 resembles a strategy.

13 PROFESSOR MURPHY: So do you think it should have been
14 more an issue of social care than health care for those
15 particular individuals? 12:42

16 A. Yes, often. Often. I can recall visiting a unit in
17 the north-east of England and being mightily impressed
18 and thinking that it could be something that we could
19 do here, and relaying it to a number of senior staff
20 both at sort of hospital and maybe beyond level, but 12:43
21 they had very creatively refurbished an old long stay
22 ward, in a hospital that wasn't unlike Muckamore, and
23 had turned it into a four-bedded assessment and
24 treatment unit, but it was almost like four pods around
25 a central hub, and it worked an absolute treat. And 12:43
26 actually the thing that struck a cord with me
27 particularly was because the environment felt very like
28 Erne in Muckamore, and I beat the drum for as long as I
29 could and said -- but was told that there just simply

1 wasn't... Now, I can understand that, because those
2 four men, when I asked, there was a staff team of
3 around 40 looking after, so it was very resource
4 intensive, but... It's those sorts of things that are,
5 you know, professionally very frustrating when you see 12:44
6 them happening in other areas and not your own, and see
7 then very directly the consequences, and when you're
8 walking into work every day and having to, you know, do
9 your best for the patients that are there, knowing that
10 patients in other areas are receiving a much better 12:44
11 service, that's tough.

12 PROFESSOR MURPHY: So you may be aware that in England,
13 people with autism and severe learning disabilities are
14 - or there's debate about whether they should be
15 removed from the Mental Health Act for exactly the 12:44
16 sorts of reasons that you're explaining. Has there
17 been that kind of debate over here?

18 A. No.

19 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Do you think there should be?

20 A. Mhm-mhm. And I think even across the border they're 12:45
21 miles ahead of us. I see they launched a new
22 innovation strategy just last week or the week before.
23 The Government - I think it was the Taoiseach maybe who
24 launched it, you know, it's considered so serious.
25 But, sadly, we don't have anything like it here. 12:45

26 79 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Before we move on to a part of your
27 statement where you respond to criticisms that are put,
28 I just want to go on to paragraph 29 very quickly, and
29 you're reflecting on a number of matters there, and one

1 of those is something you've touched on earlier, the
2 effects of austerity and government cuts, and how those
3 were felt in Cranfield really from around 2012. How
4 were they felt in Cranfield from 2012?

5 A. I think mostly in terms of the nature of the 12:46
6 presentation of patients at the point of admission and
7 their social circumstances and the number of - I think
8 I've used the word "beleaguered" a couple of times, but
9 it probably doesn't come close to describing how the
10 condition that some carers and families were in at the 12:46
11 point of admission, where the patients were so deprived
12 of what they needed there was an inevitability about
13 the circumstances, but also then the concern is that --
14 the concern always was that -- and some patients did,
15 some families had reached a point of no return, and I 12:47
16 saw a direct connection between the gaps in services in
17 the community brought about by -- not -- I mean
18 austerity made things considerable, they were never
19 great, we never directed resources to the care of
20 people with intellectual disabilities in a way that 12:47
21 other areas did. It's the same for Mental Health
22 Services here. Our spend, to put it bluntly, is much
23 less than anywhere else on these islands, and certainly
24 in western Europe, and Learning Disability Services
25 were at least as bad as that, if not worse. And then 12:47
26 along comes austerity and, you know, simple things that
27 patients who had a five day a week placement at an
28 adult centre, which is kind of 9:30 to 3:00 o'clock,
29 they're hardly full days, had that reduced to two, you

1 know overnight, and increasing the burden on, you know
2 parental responsibility, family responsibility, and you
3 know direct payments were introduced and it never
4 really took hold. It was more stress for the family.
5 So for all of those reasons we started to see patients 12:48
6 whose starting point when it came to what we were
7 tasked with was very different to what we had seen
8 before.

9 80 Q. And what about on the ward itself, how was the ward
10 itself affected? 12:48

11 A. Well just in the ways that we've discussed. Once, you
12 know, the numbers of staff on the ward began to
13 diminish, the seniority of the team members reduced
14 and, you know, generally there was just a sense -- and
15 I think it was reflected across -- I mean my work 12:49
16 within education, and other things where I would have
17 gone to other hospitals to complete pieces of work,
18 second opinions and things, I never had the impression
19 - whilst things were bad where I worked, I never really
20 got the impression that they were significantly worse 12:49
21 than any of the other facilities. You know in terms of
22 things -- in as much as you can grasp morale, I think.
23 But talking to other consultants, as I often did, and
24 you know, equally they would come to Cranfield and have
25 second opinions for me, and there was never a sense 12:49
26 that Cranfield was an outlier in terms of Mental Health
27 and Learning Disability Services.

28 81 Q. And you finish off by saying that the service is really
29 still under-resourced?

1 A. Yes.

2 82 Q. So, really would you say that for the last 12 years or
3 so there has been a continued under-resourcing of LD
4 adult care?

5 A. Yes. Yes. 12:50

6 83 Q. In Northern Ireland or across the UK, do you think?

7 A. Well, certainly in Northern Ireland. And, you know,
8 the impact of restrictions on admissions to Muckamore
9 and other places like, bed reductions in other
10 in-patient facilities really have led to a considerable 12:50
11 deterioration in the level of care that we can provide.

12 84 Q. The last page or so of your statement, Dr. Hughes, is
13 your response to criticisms that have been made about
14 you by other witnesses who have given evidence to the
15 Inquiry. For completeness I'm just going to read those 12:50
16 into the record and your response to them, and I'll
17 give you an opportunity each time to add to your
18 response, if you would like to, and by no means do you
19 have to do so.

20 12:51

21 A Restriction Order applies to paragraph 31, so I'm
22 going to start at paragraph 32 on page 16.

23

24 A criticism was made by P109's mother, and that was put
25 to you, and she said this - the criticism that was put 12:51
26 to you was as follows, that, on the 4th July 2016, the
27 patients from Cranfield women's ward, including P109,
28 were transferred to Killead ward. You were on leave
29 when this transfer occurred. Before the transfer, P109

1 was doing well. After the transfer, P109's hygiene was
2 being neglected and she was not being properly cared
3 for or protected. There were 21 patients on the ward
4 and there was a shortage of staff. There were a lot of
5 incidents on the ward. P109 was pushed by a patient 12:52
6 and fell hitting her head. She was bitten twice within
7 days. P109's mother heard screaming on the ward when
8 she visited and was told P109 was hitting out. There
9 was no stimulation for P109. P109's mother complained
10 about this and phoned the ward twice daily to ask if 12:52
11 P109 had been taken off the ward and was told that
12 there were not enough staff to facilitate this. P109
13 was a voluntary patient. P109's mother thought of
14 bringing P109 home, however she believed that if she
15 attempted to do so Muckamore would detain P109. P109's 12:52
16 mother alleged that you had previously told her that if
17 she attempted to remove P109 that she would be
18 detained.

19
20 And your response is at paragraph 32, and you say that: 12:52

21
22 "I do not recall this specific conversation, but I
23 would frequently have been asked by a patient or their
24 relative/carer in relation to these matters of the
25 legal status of a patient who had been voluntarily 12:53
26 admitted to the hospital. In response, it was my
27 practice to outline the range of potential
28 eventualities in the event of a change in the patient's
29 expressed view regarding continued admission."

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Dr. Hughes, would you like to add to that response?

A. No, thank you.

85 Q. Okay. And then paragraphs 33 and 34 are your response to a criticism made by P77's mother. P77's mother alleged that P77 was taken to Antrim Area Hospital Accident & Emergency Department due to a very high heart rate. The A&E consultant advised that P77 needed to come off Haloperidol immediately. P77's mother was not aware that P77 was on Haloperidol. P77's mother phoned you four days in a row to discuss this. You returned her call from your car so she found it hard to make out what you were saying. P77's mother told you that the A&E consultant said that P77 needed to come off Haloperidol immediately. You seemed to be suggesting, she said, that the A&E consultant did not know what they were talking about. You told P77's mother that P77 could not come off Haloperidol immediately and had to be weaned off it. P77 was taken to the same A&E again due to a high heart rate. The A&E consultant told P77's mother that he had told MAH to take P77 off Haloperidol, but P77 was still on this medication. You ignored the advice of the A&E consultant. The A&E consultant told P77's mother that he would follow up directly with you and that he was unwilling to discharge P77 unless you confirm that P77 would be taken off Haloperidol, because he was concerned that P77 could have a heart attack. P77's mother told the A&E consultant that you said that P77

1 had to be weaned off Haloperidol. The A&E consultant
2 reiterated to P77's mother that P77 would not be
3 leaving A&E unless he had an assurance from Muckamore
4 that P77 would be taken off Haloperidol immediately.
5 The A&E consultant told P77's mother that he was going 12:55
6 to call you immediately.

7
8 And your response at paragraphs 33 and 34:

9
10 "A concern has been raised by P77's mother, a patient 12:55
11 at Muckamore, in respect of advice stated to have been
12 given by A&E consultant that P77's Haloperidol
13 medication should be ceased. It is stated that I
14 refused to cease the medication and advised instead
15 that P77 should be weaned off it. Given the specific 12:56
16 clinical nature of this concern it would not be
17 possible for me to comment on it without access to the
18 relevant medical notes.

19
20 In the event, however, that there was any divergence of 12:56
21 opinion as between myself and another clinician as to a
22 patient's appropriate medication, it would have been my
23 customary practice for me to have factored the opinion
24 of a colleague into my decision-making."

25 12:56
26 Dr. Hughes, would you like to add to that response in
27 any way?

28 A. No, thank you.

29 CHAIRPERSON: I mean it's a fair point you make that

1 would you ever have thought of seeking a cardiology
2 consultant's opinion?

3 A. Yes.

4 DR. MAXWELL: And that's why you need to see the notes.

5 A. I think that's what in this. I think that's what 12:58
6 happened, but I can't state that in any categorical way
7 because I haven't seen the notes, but that would
8 usually have been what we would have done.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

10 86 Q. MS. BRIGGS: The final response that we'll deal with is 12:59
11 P34's sister. A criticism made by P34's sister who
12 alleged as follows; you told P34's mother that P34 was
13 allergic to Benzodiazepines. However, you later
14 prescribed Benzodiazepines to P34 in January 2018. And
15 your response at paragraph 35: 12:59

16
17 "A concern has been raised by P34's sister that I
18 prescribed P34 Benzodiazepines despite having knowledge
19 that he was allergic to them. It is not possible for
20 me to address this concern without having access to the 12:59
21 relevant medical notes."

22
23 would you like to add to that response in any way?

24 A. No, thank you.

25 87 Q. Okay. I'm going to give the Panel an opportunity to 12:59
26 ask any questions they might have arising out of this
27 portion of the witness's evidence.

28 CHAIRPERSON: No, I think we've asked them all as we've
29 gone along. I think we're going to need to move into

1 closed session.

2 MS. BRIGGS: we do, briefly, Chair.

3 CHAIRPERSON: It would be useful if we can keep going.
4 I think it'll be a very short session. So what we'll
5 do now is move into closed session. There is already a 13:00
6 Restriction Order in place. I think it is Restriction
7 Order No. 9.

8 MS. BRIGGS: It is Restriction Order 9.

9 CHAIRPERSON: which effectively covers this scenario,
10 so I don't need to make any further Restriction Order. 13:00
11 All we will be doing is going into closed session. The
12 feed please to B should be cut and the wider feed as
13 well.

14

15 RESTRICTED SESSION 13:00

16

17 OPEN SESSION

18

19 CHAIRPERSON: But it only remains in fact for me to
20 thank you - unless there is any other matter. 13:04

21 MS. BRIGGS: No, unless there's anything from the
22 Panel.

23 CHAIRPERSON: No other matters from us. Dr. Hughes,
24 can I thank you for attending and thank you for
25 answering all of the questions with some care, and I 13:04
26 think this will be the last time that we see you, so
27 thank you for your attendance.

28 A. Thank you.

29 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Right. Good timing, Ms. Briggs,

1 if I may say so. 2:05 we'll meet again. Thank you.

2
3 LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT

4
5
6 THE INQUIRY RESUMED AFTER THE LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT AS
7 FOLLOWS:

8
9 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms. Tang.

10 MS. TANG: Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair and Panel. 14:11
11 This afternoon the Inquiry will hear from Ms. Monica
12 Molloy, and she'll be giving evidence as part of Module
13 7, which considers Muckamore Operational Management.

14
15 The internal page for the statement is 285, and there 14:11
16 are several exhibits under a total of three tabs, which
17 include some reports that the witness can speak to. I
18 should say that the statement and the exhibits have
19 been published on-line on the Inquiry website.

20 CHAIRPERSON: Excellent. And there's no cipheryng and 14:11
21 no redaction?

22 MS. TANG: There's no cipheryng and no redactions. If
23 there's nothing further, the witness can be called.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Let's get the witness in. Thank you.
25 I think we all need to keep our voices up. 14:11

26 MS. TANG: Yes, yes. Thank you.

1 MS. MONICA MOLLOY, HAVING BEEN SWORN, WAS EXAMINED BY
2 MS. TANG AS FOLLOWS:

3
4 CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Molloy, can I just thank you very
5 much for coming to help us this afternoon. welcome to 14:12
6 the Inquiry. Thank you for taking the time to draft
7 this statement, and I'm going to hand you over to
8 Ms. Tang to take you through your evidence.

9 A. Thank you.

10 CHAIRPERSON: If you're still going in about an hour 14:13
11 we'll take a break.

12 A. Okay.

13 CHAIRPERSON: But if you need a break before that, just
14 let me know.

15 A. Okay. Thank you. 14:13

16 CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

17 88 Q. MS. TANG: Thank you. Hello again, Ms. Molloy. We met
18 a short time ago, as you may remember. I'm Shirley
19 Tang. I'm one of the barristers for the Inquiry. I'm
20 going to be taking you through your evidence this 14:13
21 afternoon, and I want to just check that you have a
22 copy of your statement in front of you.

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 89 Q. You do. And you have your own handwritten notes, I
25 understand, on your original statement? 14:13

26 A. Yes.

27 90 Q. Can I confirm did anyone assist with you those notes or
28 are they purely your own?

29 A. No, they're my own notes and they're just on the border

1 of the statement.

2 91 Q. Okay. In view of that, can I ask you to confirm that
3 you're content to adopt your statement as your evidence
4 to the Inquiry?

5 A. I am. 14:13

6 92 Q. So you made your statement to the Inquiry. It's dated
7 17th June 2024, and you set out in that, that until you
8 retired in December 2020, you were a Senior HR Manager
9 in Belfast Trust?

10 A. I was, yeah. 14:14

11 93 Q. HR standing for Human Resources?

12 A. Yes.

13 94 Q. So in old money that would be personnel manager?

14 A. Yeah. Well I suppose in some regards. We had HR
15 managers, but my role was a wee bit higher than that. 14:14

16 95 Q. I understand?

17 A. And sat under the Co-Director role. Okay?

18 96 Q. Okay. Thank you. And you say that you had been in
19 that role since 2008, and that latterly from June 2016
20 you assumed responsibility to provide a Business 14:14
21 Partner role to the Adult Social and Primary Care
22 Directorate?

23 A. Can I just clarify that a wee bit?

24 97 Q. Yes.

25 A. I always had a Business Partner role from 2008, but I 14:14
26 was aligned to the Children's Community Directorate.

27 98 Q. I see.

28 A. Initially. And then in 2016 there was a sort of
29 reorganisation of HR structures a bit, and the HR --

1 the Co-Directors who would have been aligned to the
2 Business Partner role stepped back from that. So some
3 of the senior, other Senior Managers were given
4 Business Partner roles as well, and as part of that I
5 was moved from Children's to Adult Social and Primary
6 Care. 14:15

7 99 Q. And that was 2016, is that correct?

8 A. Yeah. Yeah.

9 100 Q. Okay. So was that the point in time when you would
10 have first had dealings with Muckamore or had you any
11 dealings with Muckamore before that? 14:15

12 A. I've always, I've always known about Muckamore, and
13 I've been up on the Muckamore site quite a lot even
14 before that. My husband was the Director of HR and
15 Corporate Affairs in North and West, so we would have
16 gone up to Muckamore during their gala days and, you
17 know, going round, and we bought their hanging baskets
18 and things like that. I also, at the start of my time
19 in the Belfast Trust, 2008, and I can't remember the
20 exact date, but I did sit on a Disciplinary Panel and
21 it was in relation to a Nursing Assistant who was
22 accused or alleged to have abused a patient, and I did
23 dismiss that individual. So I was always aware of
24 Muckamore and how it was set up. 14:15

25 101 Q. And what year was that, do you think that -- 14:16

26 A. Of the?

27 102 Q. Of the disciplinary that you referred to?

28 A. I'm not sure. I'm really not sure. It could have been
29 '09, or it could have been '10, I'm not sure. Because

1 as a HR Manager you do have to participate in
2 disciplinaries and grievances and things like that, so
3 I can't remember exactly. But there will be a file on
4 it, there will be a file on the whole disciplinary
5 case.

14:17

6 103 Q. So, what amount of your work would that type of HR work
7 have been, because you mention later on that you were
8 involved in workforce planning and modernisation. The
9 Business Partner bit of it, what percentage of your
10 time did that take up?

14:17

11 A. The Business Partner role I would say took up about 25%
12 of my time. My main function was the modernisation and
13 supporting the whole of the organisation through
14 change, the management of change, and supporting staff
15 as well through that. And later on, as you can see in
16 my statement, in 2013/14 I also resumed or undertook
17 responsibility for the workforce planning, the
18 workforce planning team.

14:17

19 104 Q. I want to ask you about workforce planning
20 particularly. Do I understand correctly that that
21 process would be basically looking at what workforce we
22 have, what are we going to need, where are the gaps, or
23 is there more to it than that?

14:18

24 A. No, it's mainly that, and it's taken on board then in
25 terms of what is proposed for the future and what
26 changes are going to be made, and working on that basis
27 then to try and work out how much staff is required,
28 what's the staff level to be, what's the skills
29 required, you know, will people be working differently?

14:18

1 that premia you have to get departmental approval.

2 106 Q. Can I just check so that everyone understands. A
3 premia, do you mean by that an additional payment?

4 A. Yes, yes.

5 107 Q. Yes. 14:20

6 CHAIRPERSON: was it 15%, the uplift you're talking
7 about?

8 A. Yeah. To be honest, I can't actually remember the
9 percentage, but, yes, it was applied to the individual
10 salary. But I had to liaise with the Department to get 14:20
11 that approval.

12 CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask something really basic
13 about the Business Partner role. Why is it any
14 different to just doing your job as a Human Resources
15 Manager? What does the Business Partner bit of it 14:21
16 mean?

17 A. Well, I suppose it is like the conduit between the
18 Directorate and HR. So in my role going to the senior
19 manager meetings, I would have been asked various
20 questions that weren't always necessarily within my 14:21
21 sphere of HR, so I would have advised managers on who
22 they should be going to and what they should be looking
23 at and stuff like that.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see.

25 A. Rather than, you know, them flapping about. 14:21

26 CHAIRPERSON: Right. So was it almost as a consultant?

27 A. Yes. Yeah.

28 CHAIRPERSON: All right. Thank you.

29 A. It was, yeah. So, sorry, I was --

1 MS. TANG: That's okay. No, not to worry.

2 A. I was talking about the premia, yeah?

3 MS. TANG: Yes, yes, we had touched on that. So in
4 terms of things that you did then, you've mentioned the
5 premium to try and retain staff. Was there any other 14:22
6 support that you were aware of that was being given to
7 staff who were working on a site that had an increasing
8 number of vacancies?

9 A. Yeah. Well, there was always a senior meeting, team
10 meeting, and one of the -- because of the CCTV issue, a 14:22
11 lot of that was moved up the organisation, if you like,
12 to the Directors and the Chief Executives. So they
13 were always aware that there was issues with staffing.
14 But from my perspective, in terms of how I tried to
15 help that, I also went to other Trusts, because I 14:22
16 suppose you know that in Muckamore the clients weren't
17 just all Belfast Trust clients, some were Northern,
18 some were South Eastern.

19 108 Q. Mmm.

20 A. So I went to those Trusts to seek assistance from them 14:22
21 to help us with managing, you know, the workload in the
22 wards. Because they did have a responsibility as well,
23 because those clients were their clients.

24 109 Q. So do you mean when you went to other Trusts that you
25 perhaps asked to borrow staff or things like that? 14:23

26 A. Yeah. Yeah.

27 110 Q. And was that successful on occasion?

28 A. No, it wasn't hugely successful.

29 111 Q. Okay.

1 A. But we did get some staff, and then some of the staff
2 as well would have maybe joined our bank and done
3 sessions through the bank, but I suppose sometimes
4 people were reluctant. But I think once you got the
5 retention premia it sort of attracted people a wee bit 14:23
6 more.

7 112 Q. So would you say that you noticed an improvement, a
8 measurable improvement in terms of the turnover rate
9 once the premia was in place?

10 A. Now I can't say hand on heart that that, you know, 14:23
11 there was evidence to say that, but there certainly was
12 - I think for staff on the ground it helped them, it
13 helped them with their motivation, because a lot of
14 staff would have voiced their concerns about the fact
15 that the staff who were in, in block agency, were 14:24
16 earning a lot more money than they were. So this in
17 fact helped, helped them get over that a wee bit as
18 well, the fact that they were getting extra money.

19 113 Q. Were there surveys done of staff satisfaction at the
20 time that you recall? 14:24

21 A. Sorry?

22 114 Q. Were there any surveys done of staff satisfaction
23 during this period?

24 A. Well, we had listening events, and I know you've had
25 Jackie on here, Jacqui Austin, and Jacqui and her team 14:24
26 actually conducted a number of those listening events.
27 The modernisation, HR Modernisation Team, did conduct
28 exit interviews, face-to-face exit interviews with
29 staff. So, yes, there was a lot of things came up.

1 But satisfaction survey, around that time I would say
2 it wasn't actually a satisfaction survey.

3 115 Q. Okay.

4 DR. MAXWELL: Is there not an annual staff survey? In
5 Scotland, Wales and England there is an annual staff 14:25
6 survey that can be drilled down to individual wards.
7 Do you not have that in Northern Ireland?

8 A. Well, yes, we do actually, but if it was yearly, I'm
9 not sure. But we did have staff satisfaction surveys
10 conducted on a number of years. 14:25

11 DR. MAXWELL: And you can compare different Trusts'
12 performance?

13 A. Yes, yes, yes.

14 DR. MAXWELL: So Belfast Trust does participate in
15 that? 14:25

16 A. Yes. Well, we would have had staff surveys definitely.
17 So they would be there if, you know, from the Trust, if
18 you need to look at that.

19 DR. MAXWELL: So there will be staff satisfaction
20 surveys that we can compare with other parts of the 14:25
21 Trust.

22 A. Yeah, yeah. Absolutely.

23 DR. MAXWELL: And other Trusts in Northern Ireland and
24 indeed the rest of the UK.

25 A. Yeah. 14:26

26 116 Q. MS. TANG: Thank you. I want to look in some detail at
27 one of the, well some of the exhibits that you have
28 provided. If we move to page 16, please? And this
29 page, I should say, refers to part of the workforce

1 plan. It's a report that you and your team provided
2 for the Adult Social and Primary Care Directorate,
3 A. Mhm-mhm.
4 117 Q. And that, as I understand it, is in response to a
5 workforce plan that was put in place for the 14:26
6 Directorate. So is this report a regular report that
7 you would have prepared?
8 A. Well, the initial report was commissioned by Catherine
9 McNicholl when she was Director, and I wasn't the
10 Business Partner at that time. My actual Co-Director 14:26
11 who I reported to was the Business Partner then, but
12 because she also had responsibility for modernisation
13 workforce planning she then instructed the staff to
14 work with the Directorate and pull together a workforce
15 plan, taking into consideration all of the 14:27
16 modernisation that was being, you know, brought
17 forward.
18 118 Q. So if we were looking down through that page we would
19 see all of the different key areas in that ASPC
20 Directorate, as I'll call it? 14:27
21 A. Yeah.
22 119 Q. A good number of projects on Older People's Services?
23 A. Yeah.
24 120 Q. Some on Mental Health, and three at the bottom in
25 relation to Learning Disability. Did those projects 14:27
26 come as a result of the Learning Disability service
27 areas themselves, or were some of those Trust
28 priorities that were then filtered down?
29 A. Well, obviously the resettlement project was something

1 -- it was actually nearly regional that, you know,
2 Muckamore was heading for change. The other two I
3 would say were from within the Learning Disability
4 division, if you like.

5 121 Q. And would something like recruitment and retention have 14:28
6 been seen as a potential modernisation project or a
7 service improvement project?

8 A. Do you mean in terms of --

9 122 Q. The recruitment and retention issues that we talked 14:28
10 about a short time ago, might that have been considered
11 as a workforce project?

12 A. Yeah. Well, workforce was always an issue. So, yes,
13 workforce should have been - I'm not saying, you know,
14 it was an actual project, but within each of those
15 staff, you know, you do look at staff, you do look at 14:28
16 workforce, and you do look at retaining your workforce
17 and, therefore, whenever we enter into a change
18 programme, we have to make sure that staff are assured
19 that there will be no redundancy, because we are such a
20 massive Trust with 22,000 staff, it wouldn't seem right 14:29
21 that we couldn't find an alternative position for
22 staff. So, yeah -- sorry, I've lost my trail of
23 thought now. Yes. Staff, workforce would have been
24 part of all of these, yeah.

25 123 Q. I want to zoom in now if I can on some reports that you 14:29
26 provided relating to the exit interviews and the pilot
27 work that you did on that.

28 A. Yeah.

29 124 Q. If we can move to page 34, please? And what I should

1 set this up with -- you conducted two separate projects
2 in terms of exit interviews, isn't that correct?

3 A. Mmm.

4 125 Q. The first one you tell us in August 2018, and then
5 again in December 2019? 14:29

6 A. Mhm-mhm.

7 126 Q. Can I ask, you mentioned HRPTS, which am I correct that
8 that's the IT system for HR?

9 A. Mhm-mhm.

10 127 Q. Were you getting any useful information from that about 14:30
11 why people were leaving the Trust?

12 A. You would have gained some information, because people
13 would have stated why they were putting in their
14 resignation or why, you know, like retirement or
15 whatever, and there was a section within HRPTS for 14:30
16 staff to complete an exit form, you know, giving
17 reasons why they were leaving, and there was a number
18 of questions on that form. But to be fair, I don't
19 think that that was used very widely at all. I think
20 that staff either didn't really know about it or 14:30
21 weren't directed to it whenever they put in their
22 resignation or whatever. So because of what was
23 happening in Muckamore it was the Director had asked
24 specifically if we could do face-to-face exit
25 interviews with the staff and that. I mean we gleaned 14:31
26 a good bit of information from that.

27 128 Q. Well let's look at some of that information. Moving
28 down page 34 towards the second half of the page. If
29 we can stop there. Thank you. You noticed that there

1 were 45% of the staff within that survey who cited
2 well-being and safety at work as their main reason for
3 leaving?
4 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, does "(5 headcount)" mean there
5 were five people -- 14:31
6 A. Yeah.
7 CHAIRPERSON: -- interviewed.
8 A. Yeah.
9 CHAIRPERSON: So it was quite a small --
10 A. It is very small, yeah. Yeah. Because people, you 14:31
11 know, didn't have to participate if they didn't want
12 to. So it was, you know, it was difficult to get
13 everybody on board with it.
14 CHAIRPERSON: No, sure, I understand. Sorry, Ms. Tang.
15 129 Q. MS. TANG: That's okay. Thank you. Yes, I should 14:32
16 perhaps clarify, you've told us at the top of the
17 report that you had 11 staff interviewed in total,
18 seven of whom had resigned and four had retired.
19 A. Yeah.
20 130 Q. So the five that had cited, the 45%? 14:32
21 A. Yeah.
22 131 Q. That's what that number - it's five people. So in
23 terms of well-being and safety at work, was there
24 anything done by way of follow up of that, of those
25 concerns that they raised? were they asked to give 14:32
26 more detail?
27 A. Yeah. Well in terms of the safety at work, staff had
28 been raising the fact that because so many staff were
29 suspended, and the permanent staff felt that they were

1 under a lot of pressure, and because agency staff
2 weren't necessarily trained in MAPA or restraint, then
3 they felt they had more to do and they felt less safe
4 because of that. And there were incidents that took
5 place, even after, you know, the suspensions and 14:33
6 whatever and, you know, for staff it's a tough job and
7 it is very challenging, and you can, you can be hurt
8 and, you know. So it was the safety, they were a wee
9 bit worried about their safety at work. So we, in
10 terms of well-being and safety, the senior team, the 14:33
11 Directors, made sure that there was staff briefings,
12 and they had staff meetings on numerous occasions up on
13 the Muckamore site, which also allowed staff to put
14 forward their concerns to the highest level, because
15 there were a number of directors sitting round the 14:33
16 table at that time, and the HR Director would have been
17 one of them. They also had put in place supports for
18 staff in terms of counselling sessions or Occupational
19 Health, and Occupational Health would have also been at
20 those meetings. So, yes, they tried to address some of 14:34
21 those. Whether it was done enough or not, I'm not
22 sure.

23 132 Q. Were you surprised by these results?
24 A. No, not really.

25 133 Q. Not really. Were they fed back to the Muckamore senior 14:34
26 management team itself as well as the Directorate and
27 the --
28 A. Oh, yeah.

29 134 Q. -- the senior team.

1 A. Yeah, it would have been fed back. Well, it would have
2 gone to the senior team in the Directorate, but it
3 certainly would have went to the management team within
4 Muckamore.

5 135 Q. Do you know was it provided to any of the Director 14:34
6 level team in the Trust?

7 A. In what way?

8 136 Q. What I mean is, would these results have been - or
9 would your report have been fed back up through, for
10 instance, the Director of HR? 14:35

11 A. Oh, yeah.

12 137 Q. Or to the Director of Nursing?

13 A. Yeah. She would have got a copy of that, as Marie
14 Heaney too would have got a copy of that.

15 138 Q. Did you get any reaction from these individuals on the 14:35
16 content?

17 A. Not that I can remember.

18 CHAIRPERSON: Could I just ask, you said you weren't
19 surprised by these results.

20 A. Yeah. 14:35

21 CHAIRPERSON: Was your lack of surprise Muckamore
22 specific or -- because you presumably see right across
23 the Trust. Is that right?

24 A. Yeah.

25 CHAIRPERSON: And exit interviews for lots of other 14:35
26 hospitals.

27 A. But we don't do face-to-face exit interviews.

28 CHAIRPERSON: No.

29 A. Normally people will either fill out that form, you

1 know, on the HRPTS system. But so for Muckamore this
2 was the first time we did face-to-face interviews.
3 CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see. So I just want to understand
4 why you said it wasn't surprising. Did you not find it
5 surprising because you knew what was going on at 14:36
6 Muckamore?
7 A. Yeah. Yeah.
8 CHAIRPERSON: Right. It is Muckamore specific?
9 A. It's Muckamore specific, yeah.
10 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Sorry. Thank you. 14:36
11 A. Yeah.
12 139 Q. MS. TANG: In relation to some of the things that the
13 staff were saying, one of the other comments was that
14 64% of the people that you surveyed said they would not
15 recommend Muckamore as place to work. Did they say 14:36
16 why? What was it?
17 A. In some instances they would have said they didn't feel
18 that they were supported by their Senior Managers, or
19 like it says above, they didn't feel safe in some
20 respects. And I think people, well staff at that time 14:36
21 were very hurt and bruised by what had happened, and
22 the fact that they, by association, were also looked
23 upon as being, you know, "they're from Muckamore" and
24 whatever. So there was a lot of that, and I think that
25 I'm sure staff felt that they wouldn't want to 14:37
26 recommend Muckamore -- if that's the way they felt they
27 weren't going to recommend it to other people. But
28 that's a sad reflection too, because Muckamore was an
29 essential place, and I remember it used to be a really

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They're quite alarming comments?

A. Absolutely.

143 Q. Any one of these things that would strike me could have been a prompt for some specific work, focused work, to try and address things like insufficient dangerous staffing levels, et cetera, were you aware of any specific pieces of work that were started as a result of these kinds of comments? 14:39

A. Other than what I've said about, you know, the support for staff that was put in place a wee bit more. There was the counselling. The things like they having submitted so many IR1 forms, I'm not sure if that was addressed, because that wouldn't have been anything that I would have been involved with. That was from management in a local perspective. They should have been told, you know, given some responses from, you know, putting complaints. 14:39

144 Q. Were you aware of an action plan or any kind of targeted follow-up on the basis of the findings of these reports? 14:40

A. Well, I know that with Mairead Mitchell, she had introduced a Task and Finish Group, and it was like - that was part of this as well. She had asked, you know, for this to be done. So, yes, I can't really remember exactly what it looked like, but there should be information in the Trust in relation to what came out of these and if there were actions tailored to individuals. 14:40

1 145 Q. We did see on page 37, if we can move down to that,
2 that there were a list of recommendations?
3 A. Yes.

4 146 Q. Can I just be clear, was there any action plan that
5 you're aware of developed in response to those 14:40
6 recommendations?
7 A. Well, some of those would probably have incorporated
8 the issues that were discussed at the Task and Finish
9 Group. So I'm going to say, yeah, there should have
10 been action points in relation to some of those, not 14:41
11 maybe all of them.

12 147 Q. Did you see any follow up, or were you able to ask any
13 follow up questions to find out how the division had
14 got on with addressing those recommendations?
15 A. I can't really recall having voiced any opinion in that 14:41
16 regard. But you see in 2019 then Covid hit and lots of
17 things, you know, people were focused very much on
18 Covid. So while there might have been follow up, I
19 wasn't always aware of that. So I mean I think that's
20 something maybe the Trust could answer. 14:42

21 148 Q. You've made reference to 2019 and that was the second
22 exit interview pilot?
23 A. Yes. Yeah.

24 149 Q. And I noticed there on page 51 of your statement that
25 there were a number of comments that were lifted from 14:42
26 the different responses that were made at that point in
27 time.
28 A. Mhm-mhm.

29 150 Q. And looking down through those, a lot of similar themes

1 coming out still. "Risk of physical harm", is one of
2 them. "Mental scars from physical assault. Not enough
3 staff." It would suggest that these big areas that
4 staff were concerned about and that were actually
5 compelling some of them to leave hadn't really moved on 14:42
6 between those two years, is that a fair assessment?

7 A. Well the staffing levels probably didn't improve
8 greatly during that time, but that didn't mean to say
9 that people weren't trying their best to get more staff
10 in or get funding or whatever. I mean I know the 14:43
11 senior managers and the directors were all, you know,
12 engaged with the Board and the Department and whatever
13 to look at ways of supporting Muckamore. But it was,
14 you know, it was a catch-22 situation. I mean you know
15 you're not going to have a decline in violence against 14:43
16 staff if your numbers are wrong in terms of the
17 staffing numbers or even the skill mix, so it's hard to
18 say, yeah.

19 MS. TANG: Chair, those are all my questions on the
20 witness' evidence. Is there anything that the Panel 14:43
21 wish to ask?

22
23 MS. MOLLOY WAS THEN QUESTIONED BY THE PANEL AS FOLLOWS:

24
25 151 Q. CHAIRPERSON: I've just got this. We've heard quite a 14:43
26 lot about the effect on patients of the removal of
27 activities, closing Day Care, fewer staff to help the
28 patients keep busy and active, but you're saying this
29 also had an effect on the staff, because you were

1 saying, you know, it used to be the position that staff
2 could get out around the grounds and go off and do
3 things with the patients. But the removal or the
4 minimisation of those activities directly affected, do
5 you think, the staff morale? 14:44

6 A. Absolutely, there is no doubt about that, because staff
7 -- clients were constantly then on the ward, they
8 weren't out, you know, using up their energy and
9 whatever, so the staff were constantly there with them
10 as well. So it did create stress for staff, absolutely 14:44
11 it did, because patients liked, or clients liked to go
12 to their Day Care and liked to get involved in the wee
13 workshops that they used to have. I mean they used to
14 make, like I've said, hanging baskets, and it was the
15 clients that did that. And they made a whole lot of 14:45
16 different things. But then, you know, whenever the
17 resettlement came in, all of that stopped because it
18 wasn't to be a home, if you like, it was to be a
19 clinical place. So all of that stopped and it really
20 did have an effect on both the staff and the patients. 14:45
21 Or the clients.

22 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah.

23 152 Q. PROFESSOR MURPHY: So can I clarify, in your workforce
24 modernisation, tab 2, when it said "Day Opportunities
25 Review", was that referring to day opportunities in the 14:46
26 community or in Muckamore? This is page 16 of tab 2.

27 A. I'm sorry, I'm not sure. I can't recall whether it was
28 for the hospital itself or the community, but I do
29 think they tried again to get the Day Care back up and

1 running in Muckamore, because it was having such an
2 effect on clients and staff.
3 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Thank you.

4 153 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And one other thing that I just want to
5 ask about, if we go back to page 36, which is the 14:46
6 speech bubbles. So these are the direct quotes from
7 the staff you interviewed, and on the left we see:
8
9 "I submitted around 50 IR1 forms."
10 14:47

11 Can you just help me, IR1 forms are what?
12 A. Incidents that would have taken place, yeah.

13 154 Q. CHAIRPERSON: An incident.
14 A. Yeah.

15 155 Q. CHAIRPERSON: But it says: 14:47
16
17 "...never was there any follow up or debrief or
18 learning."
19

20 Now that's quite significant. 14:47
21 A. Yeah.

22 156 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Did you follow that up at all?
23 A. Well this went to the senior managers on the site, so
24 it was really for them to put together an action plan
25 based on the recommendations that were given by the 14:47
26 modernisation team, but also on the basis that these
27 are their staff who are raising those issues and
28 something should be done in relation to that.
29 whenever -- you see, whenever there was resettlement as

1 well, you'll probably see in my witness statement I
2 refer to a framework called the "Management of Change"
3 framework, and that framework clearly sets out the
4 responsibilities for everyone involved in change, and
5 that will be your senior managers, your directors, your 14:48
6 trade unions, your staff. So any change, like for
7 instance in terms of the resettlement, that should have
8 been conducted in accordance with that framework, and
9 that was a framework which was agreed in partnership
10 with trade unions. So, whenever the modernisation team 14:48
11 was up supporting change, they would have made sure
12 that that framework was adhered to. So you would
13 imagine some of those things should have been lifted
14 from that and worked through on a change programme.

15 157 Q. CHAIRPERSON: But your position is, you make 14:49
16 recommendations, as you did here, but you don't
17 actually get to see either the action plan or whether
18 the action plan is put into action?

19 A. Now to be fair, I'm not saying I didn't see it. I may
20 have seen it, it may have been sent to me, or at least 14:49
21 to the modernisation team, but it's not for me to
22 ensure that they do that, it's more for the management
23 within the division to ensure that they're followed up.

24 158 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And I should remember, are you still in
25 post or not? 14:49

26 A. No, I've retired. In December it'll be four years, so
27 it's hard to recall.

28 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Yeah, well what we've seen has
29 been useful. Can I thank you very much for coming to

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assist the Inquiry in producing those exhibits, which are interesting and helpful. So thank you very much indeed.

A. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: All right. Well a much shorter day than yesterday, and we will sit tomorrow at 10:00 o'clock. Thank you very much indeed. 14:50

THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED TO WEDNESDAY, 25TH SEPTEMBER 2024
AT 10:00 A.M. 14:50