

MUCKAMORE ABBEY HOSPITAL INQUIRY
SITTING AT CORN EXCHANGE, CATHEDRAL QUARTER, BELFAST

HEARD BEFORE THE INQUIRY PANEL
ON MONDAY, 10TH JUNE 2024 - DAY 90

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APPEARANCES

CHAIRPERSON:	MR. TOM KARK KC
INQUIRY PANEL:	MR. TOM KARK KC - CHAIRPERSON PROF. GLYNIS MURPHY DR. ELAINE MAXWELL
COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY:	MR. SEAN DORAN KC MS. DENISE KILEY KC MR. MARK McEVOY BL MS. SHIRLEY TANG BL MS. SOPHIE BRIGGS BL MS. RACHEL BERGIN BL
INSTRUCTED BY:	MS. LORRAINE KEOWN SOLICITOR TO THE INQUIRY
SECRETARY TO THE INQUIRY:	MS. JACLYN RICHARDSON
ASSISTED BY:	MR. STEVEN MONTGOMERY
FOR ACTION FOR MUCKAMORE & SOCIETY OF PARENTS AND FRIENDS OF MUCKAMORE:	MS. MONYE ANYADIKE-DANES KC MR. AIDAN MCGOWAN BL MS. AMY KINNEY BL
INSTRUCTED BY:	PHOENIX LAW SOLICITORS
FOR GROUP 3:	MR. CONOR MAGUIRE KC MS. VICTORIA ROSS BL
INSTRUCTED BY:	MR. TOM ANDERSON O'REILLY STEWART SOLICITORS
FOR BELFAST HEALTH & SOCIAL CARE TRUST:	MR. JOSEPH AIKEN KC MS. ANNA MCLARNON BL MS. LAURA KING BL MS. SARAH SHARMAN BL MS. SARAH MINFORD BL MS. BETH MCMULLAN BL
INSTRUCTED BY:	DIRECTORATE OF LEGAL SERVICES

FOR DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH: MR. ANDREW MCGUINNESS BL
MS. EMMA TREMLETT BL

INSTRUCTED BY: MS. CLAIRE DEMELAS
MS. TUTU OGLE
DEPARTMENTAL SOLICITORS
OFFICE

FOR RQIA: MR. MICHAEL NEESON BL
MR. DANIEL LYTTLE BL

INSTRUCTED BY: DWF LAW LLP

FOR PSNI : MR. MARK ROBINSON KC
MS. EILIS LUNNY BL

INSTRUCTED BY: DCI JILL DUFFIE

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1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED ON MONDAY, 10TH JUNE 2024 AS
2 FOLLOWS:

3
4 CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. Just before we start,
5 first of all there's a rather sad notification to give 09:58
6 you. Some of you may already be aware that Geraldine
7 O'Hagan, who gave evidence some weeks ago and was a
8 huge support to many of the families who are closely
9 connected to this Inquiry, passed away this morning,
10 and we've had notification from her son. And I know 09:59
11 that many will want to reflect upon that and give
12 thanks for her life and the good that she did in their
13 own way.

14
15 Secondly, on a quite different note, I've been shown 09:59
16 correspondence this morning from Phoenix Law, and have
17 also had the advantage of reading a speaking note
18 provided by Ms. Anyadike-Danes KC on behalf of Core
19 Patient Groups 1 and 2. I think the best thing to do
20 is that I address that after the next witness. 09:59
21 Mr. Doran is going to be introducing Module 6, and
22 that's really what the note is all about, and we've
23 also had correspondence from Phoenix Law, and so I
24 think the better time to address the issues, and the
25 legitimate issues that they raise, is at that time. 10:00
26

27 I should also mention that we have had correspondence,
28 I think this morning, from O'Reilly Stewart Solicitors.
29 I'm afraid I haven't had an opportunity yet of reading

1 that, but of course I will.

2
3 So I think the best thing to do is, because we have a
4 witness waiting in the wings, is to get on with that
5 witness and then we can address these various issues 10:00
6 afterwards. Yes, Ms. Tang.

7 MS. TANG: Good morning, Chair. Good morning, Panel.
8 This morning the Inquiry will hear the evidence of
9 Mr. Clinton Stewart as part of the staff evidence
10 process. The internal page reference for his statement 10:00
11 is 243. And if there are no other issues, could the
12 witness be called, please?

13
14 MR. CLINTON STEWART HAVING AFFIRMED WAS EXAMINED BY
15 MS. TANG AS FOLLOWS: 10:02

16
17 CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Stewart, can I just welcome you to
18 the Inquiry. Thank you for the statement that you
19 made, and thank you for coming along and giving your
20 time to give evidence to the Inquiry. 10:02

21 A. Thank you.

22 CHAIRPERSON: I'll hand you over to Ms. Tang.

23 1 Q. MS. TANG: Thank you, Chair. Hello again, Mr. Stewart.

24 A. Hello.

25 2 Q. Hello. You and I met a short time ago, but just to 10:02
26 remind you, I'm Shirley Tang. I'm one of the counsel
27 to the Inquiry and I'm going to be taking you through
28 your evidence today. Can I check you have a copy of
29 your statement in front of you?

1 A. I've got a copy, yeah.

2 3 Q. And there's a screen in front of you, you'll see there.
3 If I'm referring to a particular paragraph in your
4 statement it'll be shown on the screen as well. And
5 you should also have a cipher list in the file in front 10:02
6 of you as well, and that is essentially a list of any
7 names that you have made reference to in your statement
8 with the cipher number that we've given them, so please
9 try and use the cipher number, if at all possible.

10 Can I check then that -- you've given a statement to 10:03
11 the Inquiry of the 2nd May 2024, are you happy to adopt
12 that statement as your evidence to the Inquiry?

13 A. Yes.

14 4 Q. Thank you. I'm not going to read in the statement
15 because everyone in the room here has already been 10:03
16 provided with it, but I'm going to cover key sections
17 of it, and I may call up some on to the screen or read
18 elements of it. But what I will introduce by saying is
19 that you've told us that you were a nurse working at
20 various different grades at Muckamore Abbey Hospital 10:03
21 between 1974 and 1979 initially, and then you came
22 back, you worked in England for a while and you came
23 back in 1990 where you worked...

24 A. It was '78 I left.

25 5 Q. You left. Okay. Thank you. So you came back in 1990 10:03
26 and you worked at Muckamore for the rest of your time
27 until you retired in 2015. And you tell us in your
28 statement also that you worked in various different
29 wards at Muckamore and that you also worked in the day

1 care services at that point in time. You had moved
2 into management in 1999, and you were promoted to an I
3 grade post in 2004.

4 A. Those dates would be approximate.

5 6 Q. Approximate dates. Thank you. In paragraph 3 of your 10:04
6 statement, if that could be brought up, please? Just
7 by way of introduction, you mention that you attended
8 the Muckamore Abbey Hospital School of Nursing. What
9 was that or how did that work?

10 A. I think that was in March 1975. 10:04

11 7 Q. Okay.

12 A. There was, I think that intake was the first group of
13 student nurses that trained under what was called the
14 Briggs type system of training, which meant that there
15 was modular placements in other hospitals. Previous to 10:04
16 that, the School of Nursing in Muckamore would have
17 been the central focus of nurse training, but we would
18 have travelled to Knockbracken, and there was people
19 from the Downshire, Holywell, Muckamore, you know,
20 psychiatric and learning disability... 10:05

21 8 Q. Mental health and learning disability was concentrated?

22 A. Yeah.

23 9 Q. In that school, from what you're saying?

24 A. Yeah. So the school in Muckamore did focus quite a
25 bit, you know, in your modules there you went into the 10:05
26 school and you got all your theory, and the tutors from
27 the school would have visited you on the wards and
28 those type of things, yeah.

29 10 Q. Okay.

1 CHAIRPERSON: Could I just ask you to pull the
2 microphone slightly closer to you and to speak up a
3 tiny bit. Thank you.

4 11 Q. MS. TANG: So how many students, forgive me if you've
5 told me, but how many students would you have gone into 10:05
6 that school with when you started there?

7 A. There was quite a few. There was quite a few. I
8 couldn't give you an approximate numbers, but from
9 Muckamore, probably more than a dozen, and then from
10 the rest of the hospitals. I do remember there was a 10:06
11 bus that took us to the central school in Purdysburn
12 and it could have been fairly full. So there was quite
13 a number of students.

14 12 Q. Okay. And how long did your training take? How many
15 years were you at that school? 10:06

16 A. Three years.

17 13 Q. Three years. Okay. And after that time you went to
18 England to work in Staffordshire?

19 A. In '78.

20 14 Q. '78. 10:06

21 A. I left to work in England, yeah.

22 15 Q. Okay. Can I move down to paragraph 7, please? Just
23 over the page I think. It should be on the screen
24 shortly. Thank you. There it is. Something caught my
25 eye. There was a hospital garden area? 10:06

26 A. Yeah.

27 16 Q. Can you tell me how that was used with the patients?
28 what part did that play in their therapy?

29 A. Okay. I think I said previously there had been two

1 distinct areas in day care when I first came back and
2 was allocated to a charge nurse post in day care, I
3 went to nursing day care, so the gardens area would
4 have come under day care run by Social Services. That
5 mainly provided work for less dependant fairly able 10:07
6 people that lived in the hospital. They would have
7 gone there. They would have used the greenhouse to
8 procreate plants, they would have grown things in the
9 garden, cut grass. I think there was a little bit of
10 an industry in around producing fire-lighters, those 10:07
11 type of things. So there was a bit of work for the
12 people who were able to do that, yeah.

13 17 Q. So is that the kind of thing that we might today talk
14 about as a day opportunity?

15 A. Yeah. 10:08

16 18 Q. Yeah. Okay. Thank you. And looking at that
17 paragraph, the people who were using that day care,
18 would they have been coming in from community
19 placements or would there have been some in-patients
20 going to that as well? 10:08

21 A. It was all in-patients.

22 19 Q. All in-patients. Okay. Thank you. Can I move down
23 now to paragraph 10, please? In that paragraph, if you
24 have it in front of you there, you tell us that in 1999
25 you were asked to transfer to the admin office, and can 10:08
26 I ask, was that a role that took you completely away
27 from patient contact or were you still doing some
28 clinical work by then?

29 A. It would have been less, it would have been reduced

1 patient contact. My role was focusing in and around
2 the management, day-to-day management of staff on the
3 wards. I would still have patient contact, I would
4 have visited wards for various reasons, but it wouldn't
5 have been a case of direct hands-on care. 10:09

6 20 Q. Mhm-mhm. And how did you find being office based
7 compared to being on the wards more?

8 A. Well I gave it, you know, I did enjoy my time in day
9 care. Day care was, it was a nice place to work.
10 There was opportunities to do things, so I did give it 10:09
11 a bit of thought. But sometimes, you know, you need a
12 change. I felt a change would be good. Day care, I
13 had been doing nine to five, Monday to Friday, you
14 know, so it offered maybe a bit of flexibility in
15 shifts, which maybe would have suited me at that time I 10:09
16 think. So, yeah, you know. I can't remember the
17 question now, sorry.

18 21 Q. That's okay. It was just to see how you found the move
19 across to an office environment?

20 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask, when you were in the nursing 10:10
21 office as a nursing officer, I presume it was called at
22 the time, how often would you have gone to the wards?

23 A. Oh, it's difficult to quantify.

24 DR. MAXWELL: would you have gone every day?

25 A. You could go through a shift without visiting the 10:10
26 wards. It depends what was happening and what you were
27 doing, you know. You might have other things that you
28 had to attend to. But certainly, two, three times a
29 week anyway, you know, you would have went to the

1 wards, and maybe three times a day if the need arose
2 and they needed you there on the wards. So it could
3 have been, you know, it could have been any of those.

4 DR. MAXWELL: And when you were on the wards, what were
5 you actually doing on the wards? Were you asking about 10:10
6 the patients, were you observing care, or were you
7 going in to ask the nurse in charge something?

8 A. I could have been going for a specific reason.
9 Sometimes as a Nurse Manager I was asked by the senior
10 nurse managers to visit the wards if they were off, 10:11
11 just to monitor what was going on, to speak to staff,
12 you know, generally to observe and report back. So it
13 could have been specific or it could have been just
14 general visiting and speaking to people and looking at
15 what was happening. 10:11

16 DR. MAXWELL: And did you interact with the patients?
17 Did you ask the patients how they were?

18 A. Yeah, I would have knew quite a few, well most of the
19 patients, you know, they all came to day care. I would
20 have seen them in day care, so I would have interacted 10:11
21 with the patients.

22 DR. MAXWELL: So you already knew a lot of the patients
23 because they --

24 A. I would have --

25 DR. MAXWELL: -- and they had been in day care. 10:11

26 A. I would have known quite a lot, particularly people who
27 were more dependent, you know, on those wards like they
28 all -- when I first came to Muckamore, those were the
29 type of patients that would have came to the area of

1 day care when I was in.

2 22 Q. MS. TANG: You've mentioned in paragraph 10 that you
3 also took on management of the nurse bank. Can you
4 tell me was that nurse bank made up of primarily nurses
5 that were already employed in Muckamore, or in a mental 10:11
6 health facility, or were some of them people that
7 weren't working in the Trust at all?

8 A. A mixture. Really -- sorry, there was people who put
9 their names down, who were already working either
10 part-time or full-time in Muckamore, who maybe would 10:12
11 have done an extra shift on the bank. Quite a few
12 student nurses would have put their names forward to
13 bank, and then there would have been not so many, but
14 some people, who would have no connection with the
15 hospital who would more or less be permanent job, you 10:12
16 know. Not too many, but some.

17 23 Q. But some. Okay. And you were Duty Officer. Were you
18 able to authorise bank shifts to support individual
19 patients even if the ward technically had enough staff
20 at that point? If you saw a need there, could you 10:12
21 increase the amount of bank resource that was coming
22 in?

23 A. Good question. I think in the early days you could
24 have done that.

25 24 Q. Okay. 10:13

26 A. You know, when the bank first started -- sorry, when
27 the bank first -- when I first came into the office the
28 bank had just started. Basically it was up and
29 running. At that time I've seen myself being in a

1 position that I had to go through the list of bank
2 staff available and look what shifts they had worked
3 and allocate people as best I could, because people
4 might think, you know, 'oh, I didn't get a shift'. We
5 had extra staff on the bank, and those were good days. 10:13
6 The question you asked was did I ever allocate a staff
7 to a ward that didn't need it? I'm sure I did.

8 25 Q. Well, I suppose what I was trying to get at was, if you
9 thought that the ward technically had enough staff.

10 A. Yeah. 10:13

11 26 Q. But you in your own judgment thought they needed a bit
12 of a top-up maybe for a particular patient?

13 DR. MAXWELL: I think you're talking specifically here
14 about what used to be called "specialing" and is now
15 called... 10:14

16 A. Sorry?

17 DR. MAXWELL: We're talking about patients who need
18 "specialing", now called enhanced supervision.

19 A. Well, those would have been included in the numbers on
20 the ward. When I moved into the nursing office as 10:14
21 Nurse Manager, and mainly Duty Officer, I designed a
22 little sheet. So -- particularly for myself. You know
23 when you're new in a job, you know, you want to know
24 what the requirements are. So I had a sheet that
25 outlined the wards, the number of staff required on a 10:14
26 daily basis, nightly basis for those wards, and any
27 enhanced observation that would require additional
28 staff. That information was always there in the
29 nursing office. You know, okay, fair enough, if it

1 suddenly happened that a consultant put a patient on a
2 level of supervision that required a nurse, then you
3 would have to find one, but normally speaking, if that
4 situation was there, you know, you knew about it and
5 you staffed the ward accordingly.

10:15

6 DR. MAXWELL: So you were organising staff according to
7 the daily assessment of need which could fluctuate from
8 day-to-day, rather than to the funded posts?

9 A. Yeah, it could, you know, when you -- I take it a wee
10 stage further in terms of maybe appointments or
11 activities like that was going on, you might need an
12 extra staff on the ward. So, yes, you know, you were
13 flexible in terms of the allocation of staff where
14 possible.

10:15

15 DR. MAXWELL: But wouldn't that mean then that
16 sometimes you were overspending the staff budget?

10:15

17 A. To be honest with you, probably maybe so in a small
18 way. I didn't really have much contact at that time
19 with the requirements of a budget, but I'm sure
20 somebody was monitoring, and it never was pointed out
21 to me that.

10:16

22 DR. MAXWELL: So you weren't constrained by the budget?
23 You actually looked at the patient need and provided
24 the staff?

25 A. Yeah. I don't --

10:16

26 DR. MAXWELL: And if that wasn't within budget, that
27 wasn't your problem. That was somebody else's.

28 A. I think if a staff on the ward, whether it be the
29 Charge Nurse or a Staff Nurse alerted me to the fact

1 that there was a certain activity, a patient needed to
2 go for an appointment, and maybe because of that
3 particular patient's behaviour they needed an extra
4 staff, I don't think there was a problem then. Budget
5 never, money never came into it, you know.

10:16

6 DR. MAXWELL: You did say at the beginning of your
7 answer that in the early days you could do that.

8 A. Yeah.

9 DR. MAXWELL: Does that mean your ability to do that
10 changed over time?

10:16

11 A. I think the demands on the service increased over time.
12 I think at that particular time we did have surplus
13 bank staff, you could have done something like that.
14 As time went on in later years then that opportunity
15 wasn't there.

10:17

16 DR. MAXWELL: Was that because you didn't have enough
17 bank nurses or was that because patient's needs changed
18 and more of them needed enhanced supervision?

19 A. There was a number of factors, variables. The bank
20 system changed, as I think I said. It was managed in
21 the central location, I think it was the Belfast City
22 Hospital. It became more remote. You lost a little
23 bit of contact with bank staff. Again I think one of
24 the things I've said in my statement was that staff
25 previously would have put their name down on the
26 hospital bank list and the Duty Officer could allocate
27 the bank staff to where they were required, you had a
28 degree of control. Under the new system, bank staff
29 could dictate where they worked. So if a ward was

10:17

10:17

1 short, you know, staff mightn't want to work there,
2 that was just the way it was, yeah.

3 DR. MAXWELL: Okay. Thank you.

4 27 Q. MS. TANG: I want to move down now to paragraph 11,
5 please. And you tell us at that point, at the start of 10:18
6 that you refer to your time as I Grade appointed in
7 2004. Can I ask you, how did you assure the quality of
8 patient care on your wards whenever you were in that
9 role?

10 A. Okay. I suppose there was a number of ways. 10:18
11 observation, visits to the wards, it would have been
12 fairly routine. There was a monitoring tool "Equate",
13 that was done, I think it was done at least yearly,
14 twice yearly. It looked into the care plans, patient
15 finances, things like that, you know. 10:19

16 28 Q. Is that the monitoring tool that you referred to that
17 looked at those elements?

18 A. Yeah. Yeah. At later stages you had outside bodies
19 like RQIA coming in doing inspections, various things
20 like that, you know. That's basically how it happened. 10:19

21 29 Q. Yeah. In terms of if there was a complaint, or if
22 there was a governance issue raised, would that have
23 come to you first, or how was that dealt with?

24 A. It probably would have come through, you know,
25 obviously if I wasn't there, on holidays, it would have 10:19
26 come through to the Senior Nurse Manager on-call. If
27 it was out-of-hours or during the day, it would have
28 come through to one of the senior nurse managers, and
29 it would have followed the procedure after that, yeah.

1 30 Q. okay. Can I ask, in that very senior role how much
2 time would you have got to actually spend time on the
3 wards? what percentage of your time would you say was
4 in a clinical area?

5 A. I suppose I started of -- I finished working in a job 10:20
6 share capacity, which meant that I had reduced
7 opportunity really to visit wards. But I had a
8 colleague who was there when I wasn't there. In the
9 early days I would have been on the wards quite
10 regular. Quantifying it would be difficult, but I'm 10:20
11 sure we would try to get round the wards daily, at
12 least, you know, some of the wards anyway.

13 31 Q. Mhm-mhm.

14 A. And certainly at that time we would have been rotating
15 the Duty Officer role. So weekends was always a 10:20
16 brilliant opportunity, you know, you made sure you had
17 visited every wards.

18 32 Q. At the weekend?

19 A. Yeah.

20 33 Q. Okay. 10:20

21 A. Saturday and Sunday when you were on, you know, you
22 done every ward, and maybe all the wards in the
23 hospital at that time as well. So, you know, I can't
24 put a figure on it, but it would have been regular.

25 34 Q. Okay. It sounds like what you're saying is at some 10:21
26 point in any working day you were on a ward?

27 A. would have been. well having said that, you know, if
28 your working day consisted of going to meetings and
29 things like that.

1 35 Q. Yes.
2 A. Then you were off site, you know. But most days if you
3 were available you would have been visiting the ward,
4 yeah.
5 36 Q. And you were asked earlier about whenever you went into 10:21
6 these clinical areas what were you doing when you were
7 there? was that the same sort of thing, checking in
8 with staff, or what was your interaction?
9 A. Various things. You could have been there -- I
10 suppose, again going back to complaints, if you were 10:21
11 there for a specific reason you were looking for
12 certain things, you know, looking at care plans, those
13 type of things, you visited the wards, you had an
14 obligation to check patient finances every so often,
15 you know, you were doing checks there, you were 10:21
16 speaking to staff, you were speaking to staff maybe
17 about certain issues, those were the type of things you
18 were doing, and speaking to patients, you know, those
19 general things, yeah.
20 37 Q. You made reference to staff there and I want to move 10:22
21 down to paragraph 13 and pick up on an issue that
22 you've raised in relation to staff being assaulted by
23 patients, and you've mentioned there that it was a
24 regular thing. "Reported through incident forms, ward
25 reports or by phone." who would you have raised the 10:22
26 level of assaults on staff with?
27 A. Again, I'm trying to think was the -- you always got
28 incident forms. Now having said that, there would have
29 been times when the staff would have accepted it as

1 part of the job, and you didn't always, so you couldn't
2 really quantify it in terms of how -- the numbers. But
3 generally speaking, if there was an incident, a staff
4 injury, it was reported to the incident reporting
5 system, and that would have generated the numbers and
6 types of assaults. 10:23

7 DR. MAXWELL: Did you raise it with the Directorate?

8 A. Sorry, when you say "Directorate"?

9 DR. MAXWELL: So at the time you were -- were you
10 organised in a Directorate? Was Muckamore part of a
11 management unit called a Directorate? 10:23

12 A. I wouldn't have, but my line manager may well have
13 done.

14 DR. MAXWELL: So you would have -- would you have
15 discussed it with your line manager, the number of
16 injuries? 10:23

17 A. Certainly. It would have come through. We had a daily
18 reporting system, as most hospitals do, so it would
19 have come through on the daily reporting systems.
20 Those reports then, I think in later years had changed. 10:23
21 It went on to the electronic system.

22 DR. MAXWELL: PARIS.

23 A. PARIS, yeah. So prior --

24 DR. MAXWELL: So this was the daily nursing report
25 going to the hospital manager, was it? 10:23

26 A. Yeah. Yeah. Before PARIS we would have always met
27 with our line manager in the morning. We would have
28 brought down the reports, discussed the reports, and
29 those incidents would have been highlighted. weekends,

1 weren't there, it was picked up again on Monday.
2 DR. MAXWELL: And who was your line manager at the
3 time?
4 A. When I first went into the nursing office it was --
5 hang on. 10:24
6 MS. TANG: Your cipher list should be there.
7 A. H843.
8 DR. MAXWELL: Okay. Thank you.
9 CHAIRPERSON: And what would have been the job title,
10 his or her job title? 10:24
11 A. It was -- his was Site Director, but he would have been
12 the senior --
13 CHAIRPERSON: Site Director.
14 A. Yeah. It would have been the senior nurse on site. He
15 was the senior nurse. 10:24
16 CHAIRPERSON: So whoever was in that role would be your
17 line manager?
18 A. Yeah.
19 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
20 A. And then later on, H359. And I don't have a number for 10:25
21 the last person.
22 38 Q. MS. TANG: Okay. Thank you. Can I ask you in terms of
23 the risks that staff being assaulted presented, how was
24 that risk mitigated? Was there anything that could be
25 done to reduce it? 10:25
26 A. Okay. I suppose if you start at the basic level of
27 staff induction to the wards, you know, probably the
28 way they were inducted, the information they were
29 given, you know, what to expect, those type of things.

1 You then progressed on to probably the training, you
2 know, staff did have training in the management of
3 aggression and everybody undertook vulnerable adults
4 training. So there was various training and things.
5 So that was one area. Every patient did have a care
6 plan. So I know that risk assessments were done on
7 individual patients and the care plan would have give
8 information on risk behaviours, yeah.

10:26

9 39 Q. Did you notice that there were certain things that made
10 it more or less likely that some patients might become
11 aggressive, for instance? Were there triggers?

10:26

12 A. I suppose you can say that -- I've kind of been away
13 from it a long time, but there was two main types of
14 aggression, you know. You have the type of aggression
15 that patients can plan, you know, for a specific need,
16 for a specific end, and then you have the other type of
17 aggression that, you know, is just spontaneous, you
18 know, people, maybe because of an external stimuli or
19 whatever, you know, react in that manner. The former
20 would have been not as prolific, you know. I know of
21 some instances where that was the case when staff were
22 attacked and it was because a certain objective wanted
23 to be obtained. But mainly the aggression was just
24 spontaneous, maybe sometimes just lashing out, pulling
25 hair, biting, those type of things, you know, that
26 would have been the bulk of the type of behaviours that
27 would have been seen, yeah.

10:26

10:27

10:27

28 CHAIRPERSON: Can you just give me an example of the
29 sort of objective wanted that you've mentioned? would

1 it be to do with attention or food or what?

2 A. well, I suppose I am going back a wee bit. I was
3 speaking to a colleague, an ex colleague I should say,
4 who was badly injured. He nearly lost an eye in one of
5 the semi-secure wards. It's going back some time. He 10:28
6 still wears glasses. His eyesight is still affected.
7 And that -- again, I'm kind of relating what I was
8 told, I wasn't in the area at the time, and it was
9 fairly able patients who were in the semi-secure ward
10 who wanted to get a key I think, or something like 10:28
11 that, you know. So they had planned to, two of them
12 had planned to assault this staff member.

13 CHAIRPERSON: Did that apply more or not to forensic
14 patients?

15 A. It would, it would have applied. I think I mention it 10:28
16 in my statement, you know, I had occasion to visit a
17 ward when I was late at night, I must have been Duty
18 Officer, and a patient had been admitted and he had --
19 I suppose he was a very, very able person, he had come
20 from jail I think, and he had managed to block the lock 10:29
21 on his bedroom door. The doors were designed so that
22 if something was behind them they could open both ways,
23 you know, they would open out and in, but he had been
24 in these situations before probably and he knew how to
25 overcome that. So he had blocked the door and then he 10:29
26 was using the, I think it was the toilet seat to
27 destroy the room, and try and break the glass to get
28 out through the window. So that would have been...
29 CHAIRPERSON: Right. So that was an example of a

1 planned --

2 A. Yeah, he had an objective that he wanted to get out and

3 he was stopping the staff getting in while he smashed

4 the window, yeah.

5 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. Thank you. 10:29

6 40 Q. MS. TANG: Thanks. Just thinking about the unplanned

7 more spontaneous episodes of aggression that could

8 happen. Were there any particular patterns, like times

9 of day, was it more likely at the weekend that you

10 recall? 10:30

11 A. Okay. There was always kind of areas where you were,

12 you were always kind of more kind of on alerts. Meal

13 times was always an area that would have been -- I

14 suppose morning, you know, people getting up, you know,

15 sometimes people is not in the best of moods, that type 10:30

16 of thing. I think hand over time could have been a bit

17 problematic as well. I remember I spoke to a Nurse

18 Manager, Sister, Ward Sister, sorry, who was having

19 problems in around the hand over period. It was kind

20 of noted that behaviours kind of became less 10:30

21 controllable at that time, so they had designed an

22 activity specifically around that area. I think they

23 had arranged to have a film on, and all the kind of

24 little things you have with that, you know, a drink and

25 crisps and stuff, and said it did reduce the level of 10:31

26 incidents around that particular area. So, yeah.

27 41 Q. Do you remember, as the person organising the staffing

28 levels in these areas, did you try and factor how many

29 staff were on at various times to anticipate that there

1 might have been more chance of a flare-up?

2 A. I think the wards were, the wards were staffed. There
3 was a tool, I can't remember what it was now, Telford,
4 was it Telford? I'm not too sure. There was a tool
5 that would have been used to kind of look at staffing, 10:31
6 staffing allocation towards -- I can't, you know, the
7 staffing numbers just reflected the needs generally on
8 the ward, you know. You might have a ward who would
9 have seven staff on in the morning perhaps, and then
10 maybe dropped down to six in the afternoon, and then 10:32
11 come up at 6:00 o'clock to maybe -- with 6 to 11
12 workers coming in, bring it back up to 7 or above, you
13 know, for the evening kind of activities. So I suppose
14 in that respect it did kind of look at the workload and
15 what was happening, but very basic. 10:32

16 42 Q. Okay. Okay. I want to move down to paragraph 15,
17 please, if that could be put on screen? I think it's
18 the lower end of that paragraph where you say:
19
20 "There was always a doctor available if there was 10:32
21 something physically wrong with the patient."
22
23 Was that a doctor on-call from off site or was that
24 somebody actually on the site?

25 A. We would have had doctors on site. SHO would have been 10:32
26 rotating into the hospital. There was always
27 consultants in the hospital. And I suppose
28 out-of-hours it would have been a GP service.

29 43 Q. Okay. So was there any junior mental health doctors on

1 site overnight, for instance?

2 A. There was. There would have been one on-call. The
3 consultant was always on-call.

4 44 Q. Yes.

5 A. The junior doctor, there was a Dr. Ning, I remember, 10:33
6 who would have frequently visited the hospital
7 out-of-hours if there was a reason to do so. So I
8 don't know what the -- I don't know what his
9 arrangements were, but he was frequently there.

10 45 Q. Thank you. Can I turn now to paragraph 16, please? 10:33
11 You mention the resettlement wards in that paragraph.
12 And I wanted to ask you about the nurses who were
13 working in those resettlement wards. Would it be fair
14 to say that they were working with the knowledge that
15 their jobs were to some degree under threat, they were 10:33
16 going to change once resettlement was affected?

17 A. Not originally.

18 46 Q. Not originally?

19 A. I kind of look at the resettlement process, and if
20 memory serves me right, in two phases. The first 10:34
21 phase, resettlement was organised -- I don't have her
22 -- under a consultant, consultant psychiatrist. She
23 was the lead person. It related to Moyola wards,
24 Finglass wards. Those type of wards. Very, very
25 conscientious lady. She would have obviously been very 10:34
26 strong on betterment for the patients. That was the
27 driving force. She always looked to make sure that
28 whatever they had in terms of day care in Muckamore was
29 replicated in the community, those type of things, you

1 know. At that stage I never kind of got the feeling
2 that there was any problems with staff retention or
3 staff jobs, you know, it was grand.
4 I suppose in later years when the core hospital wards
5 opened, and I refer to it there, then it did -- it did 10:35
6 arise for a period of time when the ward closures
7 started to happen, there was a kind of a scheme, I
8 can't remember really, but there was a scheme whereby
9 staff redundancies maybe was mentioned, but it would
10 have been more redeployment and there was a couple of 10:35
11 staff who did take up the opportunity to be redeployed
12 somewhere else in the Trust, you know.

13 47 Q. So was there a policy that you recall of no compulsory
14 redundancies, or might there have been the threat of
15 some compulsory redundancies that you just didn't need 10:35
16 those staff anymore?

17 A. I'm sure there was. I'm sure there was a process and a
18 policy, I just can't recall, but I know there was, at
19 the last resort, wards had closed and there was access
20 staff, and there was failure to redeploy, probably 10:35
21 redundancy was a final and last strong measure.

22 48 Q. Was there, to your recollection, any approach of
23 scaling back on recruitment to make sure that the
24 hospital wasn't overstaffed when resettlements
25 happened? 10:36

26 A. I think there was. I'm not sure.

27 49 Q. Okay. Can I move down to paragraph 17, please? And at
28 that point you describe your role in investigations
29 where there had been some allegations of inappropriate

1 behaviour by staff, and you refer to a time when, as a
2 Senior Nurse Manager, you had investigated an incident
3 where it was alleged a member of staff had struck a
4 patient. Can you tell us what you did as the
5 investigating officer in that situation?

10:36

6 A. There was a process, probably, you worked very closely
7 with the Human Resource Department in that process.
8 Obviously I can't remember if I was on site when it
9 happened, but if it -- if I wasn't -- there was a
10 process that would have been followed in terms of
11 making sure the patient was examined and the relevant
12 people were informed under the policy, you know. I
13 believe police, family, and those type of things. And
14 after that then it was a matter then of making sure
15 that the staff member involved was not on site, was
16 suspended or whatever. That would have been done
17 fairly quickly. And then information gathering after
18 that in terms of witnesses, looking at the environment,
19 you know, all the things that you do in an
20 investigation. Putting together a report. And then, I
21 can't remember the disciplinary process, but you know,
22 you would have followed the process at the time.

10:37

10:37

10:37

23 50 Q. Can I take it part of the investigation and gathering
24 investigation, would you have spoken to the patient?

25 A. If -- I can't remember. If the patient had capacity
26 and that type of thing, yes, you would have involved
27 the patient, yeah.

10:38

28 51 Q. You refer to being in the tribunal as the presenting
29 officer. What was that? What did you have to do as

1 presenting officer?

2 A. There was -- whatever the kind of misdemeanour was,
3 whether it was -- if there was gross misconduct, which
4 obviously is something, that would be -- there would be
5 a Panel set up to hear the evidence. The staff who was 10:38
6 under the disciplinary process and the union rep would
7 have got a copy of all the information that was going
8 to be presented and a hearing would be arranged. If
9 you were the presenting officer you made sure you had
10 got all your information, all your witnesses, 10:39
11 everything set up, and then on the day it was a matter
12 of presenting the evidence that was gathered to the
13 Panel, and the witness, or witnesses, giving their
14 evidence at what they had seen at a particular time,
15 yeah. 10:39

16 52 Q. So is that a different role to the Chair of the Panel?
17 It sounds like what you're saying is you're almost
18 presenting the case against the employee. Do I
19 understand you correctly there?

20 A. The Panel would, similar to what we've got here, you 10:39
21 know, there would have been three people on the Panel.
22 I'm the presenting officer, I would be presenting the
23 facts of what the incident entailed, and the individual
24 who was under disciplinary proceedings would have their
25 union rep, who would have the ability to question and 10:40
26 kind of present alternative information to the Panel,
27 and then the Panel would obviously make a decision
28 based on the evidence that was produced.

29 53 Q. Thank you.

1 CHAIRPERSON: And what would be the make up of a Panel
2 normally?

3 A. It would be certainly, it would be a Senior Nurse
4 Manager, it would be above my grade, it would be an 8B.
5 I suppose my line manager maybe would sit on that 10:40
6 Panel, and then there would be other people, maybe
7 somebody from outside the hospital as well, senior,
8 there'd be senior staff.

9 54 Q. MS. TANG: would there have been an HR person on the
10 Panel? 10:40

11 A. Yeah, there would be a Chairperson, yep.

12 55 Q. Thinking about the process involved in that, how would
13 you describe that process? would you say it was a
14 rigorous process or, when you reflect back on it how
15 did it feel to be in it? 10:41

16 A. I suppose when you're doing those things you look on it
17 as a process, you know, and you just have to follow the
18 guidance and take advice from HR, whatever, you know,
19 it's a process that you do. It's never a pleasant one,
20 but you just focus on the process and that's it. 10:41

21 56 Q. And how would you say -- how did the Trust view these
22 kinds of allegations in your recollection?

23 A. I'm sure there was -- I honestly don't know. They
24 wouldn't have been happy about it, you know, but I
25 honestly don't know that would have been -- it wouldn't 10:41
26 have been something you would have wanted to happen,
27 put it like that, you know. So things do happen, but
28 you try and avoid them as best you can.

29 57 Q. Mhm-mhm. You stated in the paragraph we've been

1 looking at, paragraph 17, that on the occasion that
2 we've talked about, the member of staff was dismissed
3 for gross misconduct. Did you feel that was a fair
4 outcome?

5 A. Based on the evidence I presented and what the Panel 10:42
6 heard, I take it it was a fair outcome. You know,
7 that's what the Panel decided, and I think it's fair
8 enough.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask a date for this? When are
10 we talking about, approximately? 10:42

11 A. It was when the Mallow ward was being used for, I think
12 it was children. So it was before the Iveagh Centre
13 maybe opened.

14 CHAIRPERSON: So it's quite -- yeah. Okay.

15 A. Yeah. 10:42

16 58 Q. MS. TANG: I want to move down now to paragraph 19,
17 please. Thank you. You have mentioned in the
18 paragraph that you had a link in with the Ennis ward.
19 Can you tell us what sort of oversight role you had of
20 Ennis in 2012? 10:43

21 A. Very similar to other wards. It wouldn't have been --
22 it wouldn't have been a ward that would have been any
23 different really. I done all the usual things that
24 you'd be expected, you know. I suppose Ennis ward,
25 Ennis ward was designed -- it wasn't there when I left 10:43
26 Muckamore in '78. So it had been built specifically
27 for an elderly population I think. Ennis and Erne I
28 think had been all one ward, I could be wrong, and then
29 they decided that they would divide it and create two

wards. So it was in some terms environmentally better than the older type wards, the old E Wing wards. But again, at that particular time a fair few patients hadn't totally been resettled, their ward was closing, and a lot of the ladies in Fairview moved down, and I can't remember the numbers, say, 8, 9, 10, had moved down to Ennis, and they were -- there was two areas to the ward. The front of Ennis had individual bedrooms, and maybe a couple of bedrooms with two beds in it, and the back would have been, the back of the ward would have been more kind of four-bedded units and two-bedded, you know. So, I suppose during that time those ladies moved down, they were a different client group, they were mixed together, you know, and it did cause, you know, it did cause a wee bit of unsettlement, for want of a better word.

10:44

10:44

10:45

The Bohill Nursing Home that those ladies would have been moving to, I kind of remember thinking, well, they're there for a fairly short period of time and they would be moving out to Bohill. But, as usual, that didn't happen as planned, so they were there for like a longer period of time maybe than what I would have thought. So, it had a bit of an unsettling influence on the ward, yeah. I'm not too sure if that was the question you asked me?

10:45

10:45

59 Q. It was useful to know, though. Thank you. There was -- you refer to the safeguarding incident on Ennis ward, and I want you to reflect back in November 2012,

1 how did you feel the senior nurses responded to the
2 safeguarding incident in Ennis ward?

3 A. well as I said in my statement, it came as quite a
4 shock to me. I wasn't on site when the complaint was
5 raised. I was up on a training course in Belfast. I 10:46
6 returned to the hospital and, you know, things kind of
7 seemed to expand, you know. There was a couple of
8 allegations made, I can't remember specifically what
9 they were, and then obviously they increased over time
10 to quite a number of allegations. Corporate 10:46
11 management, it was people probably I had never seen
12 before, appeared, and obviously the process kicked in
13 then, there would have been all this process, police,
14 and you know all the protection things, informing
15 patient's relatives of what had happened, and that was 10:47
16 all done. But generally speaking, I, and colleagues in
17 the hospital really weren't involved. We didn't, we
18 weren't allowed to visit the ward, we didn't go near
19 the ward, and as I said in my statement, it was
20 monitored 24/7 by people who were from outside the 10:47
21 hospital, and that changed a wee bit after time, but
22 initially, to my memory, that's what happened, yeah.
23 CHAIRPERSON: So could I just understand that.
24 Normally you'd have been visiting the ward fairly
25 regularly? 10:47

26 A. I would have been, yes. As I say, it was in a process
27 of resettlement, so you would have been down there, you
28 know. Those ladies had come down from Fairview, so I
29 would have been down on that ward, and as I've alluded

1 to previously, you know, you visited the ward for
2 routine checks, that type of thing.

3 CHAIRPERSON: And you'd have known the staff on the
4 ward, presumably?

5 A. Sorry? 10:48

6 CHAIRPERSON: would you have known the staff on the
7 ward?

8 A. Yeah. Mhm-mhm.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. But then as soon as the Ennis
10 allegations, or the Bohill staff allegations were made, 10:48
11 were you then prevented from going on the ward?

12 A. Yeah.

13 CHAIRPERSON: By whom?

14 A. By the investigating team, my line manager, it was her
15 that informed me. But I wasn't the only one. I think 10:48
16 other senior nurse managers weren't allowed to go on
17 the ward either.

18 CHAIRPERSON: So just in terms of the management of the
19 ward, who took over?

20 A. There was a person appointed to lead the investigation, 10:48
21 I think it was a social worker, Aine Morrison, it could
22 be her name. My line manager, who isn't on that list,
23 would have been highly involved in that.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Right.

25 A. And I'm not sure, like I know there was a raft of 10:48
26 people came down from on high, and they were around the
27 place as well. So I'm not absolutely sure. I would
28 still have contact with the ward through the Duty
29 Officer role and they type of thing, but we didn't

1 visit the ward.

2 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you.

3 A. Initially, I should say.

4 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what did you -- I didn't hear

5 that? 10:49

6 A. Initially at the early stages.

7 MS. TANG: I was just going to pick up on the timescale

8 that that covered.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Right.

10 60 Q. MS. TANG: How long did the exclusion of yourself and 10:49

11 your senior colleagues from that ward go on?

12 A. I'm not absolutely sure. Probably -- it wouldn't have

13 been, it wouldn't have been that long, I don't think,

14 you know. But I couldn't put a time frame on it, I'm

15 sorry. 10:49

16 61 Q. Okay. So we're not saying weeks or months, are we?

17 A. Probably talking weeks.

18 62 Q. weeks.

19 A. I would say, yeah.

20 63 Q. Okay. Can I ask you about staffing levels on Ennis at 10:49

21 the time?

22 A. Hmm.

23 64 Q. How would you have described them? Were they at what

24 they should have been or were there challenges?

25 A. They had a staffing compliment like every other ward in 10:49

26 the hospital. Like every other ward in the hospital at

27 that particular time, you know, there was a shortage.

28 The bank system, the bank system would have filled some

29 of the posts, I'm not too sure whether there was other

1 means though at that time. I know there was agency
2 staff brought into the hospital at some stage, I can't
3 honestly remember whether that was before or after
4 Ennis, but they would have had a recognised staff
5 allocation, or a staff requirement, and would have 10:50
6 been, if possible, met, you know. I'm not saying it
7 was always met. There might have been occasions when
8 they had to work a staff down, as other hospital wards
9 did, but generally speaking it would have been, it
10 would have been the intention that they would have been 10:50
11 working with a certain level of staff.

12 65 Q. So can you recall, as the Senior Nurse Manager, did you
13 have any concerns about the level of staffing in that
14 particular area at that time?

15 A. Yeah, I did. I had levels concerned about a lot of 10:51
16 wards. Staffing was always discussed at the meetings.
17 And my late colleague, who I job shared with, I
18 remember sitting down with her and the ward sister
19 after a meeting, in the small meeting room, and
20 discussing possible staff moves. I think just before 10:51
21 that we had identified that she could have maybe been
22 able to transfer staff over from one of her wards, but
23 it wouldn't be for a couple of weeks, you know, but
24 that's how tight it was, staff really was a concern all
25 over the hospital at the time. 10:51

26 66 Q. Was there any kind of link across to other mental
27 health facilities within the Trust to try and share
28 staff between the sites, or was that not appropriate
29 given the patient profile?

1 A. My line manager may have made inquiries in that
2 direction. It's possible. I just can't say.

3 67 Q. You can't?

4 A. I can't recall getting assistance, but the attempts
5 might have been made to look at possible help from 10:52
6 those areas, yeah.

7 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask you? You said you had
8 concerns about staffing throughout the hospital at this
9 time. Was it particularly more a concern in 2012 than
10 it had been in say 2005? 10:52

11 A. I think that would be fair to say, yeah.

12 DR. MAXWELL: So when do you think it moved from 'we
13 could always do with a bit more' to 'this is actually
14 quite significant'? What year do you think it was?

15 A. I think it was towards the end of my working period in 10:53
16 Muckamore. Certainly when the bank changed to central,
17 the bank system, I think there was a decline there in
18 the support you could get. The staffing recruitment
19 didn't seem to be successful. I honestly can't put a
20 time period on it, but we didn't seem to be able to 10:53
21 attract certainly qualified staff. I think at one
22 stage the staff skill mix was reviewed, you know, and
23 we were looking to reach maybe a 60/40 split in
24 qualified, unqualified, something like that. But
25 recruitment was very difficult. But I would say in the 10:53
26 last four or five years of my time in Muckamore it was
27 fairly difficult.

28 DR. MAXWELL: So as you say there's two things there.
29 One is the movement of the bank away from your control

1 to a central bank, which made it less, less well
2 connected, so less availability of bank staff, but you
3 also said a change in skill mix to 60% registered.
4 what had the skill mix been before that?

5 A. I would say, I would say it would have been 50/50 10:54
6 maybe, maybe even less at times, yeah.

7 DR. MAXWELL: Okay.

8 A. It could have been 40/60 the other way, you know. I'm
9 not too sure.

10 PROFESSOR MURPHY: Do you think that it was kind of 10:54
11 general knowledge that Muckamore was going to be
12 closing and wards and patients were being resettled
13 that put people off applying for jobs there? Because
14 you say recruitment wasn't very successful.

15 A. I don't honestly think that was a factor. That's my 10:54
16 own opinion. I've no evidence to think that.
17 Certainly I just think there was difficulty, you know,
18 in attracting people to Muckamore, and I'm not sure
19 what other facilities probably may have had a similar
20 problem. I honestly -- I don't think the fact that 10:55
21 Muckamore was closing featured in that. But, you know,
22 it may well have done. I don't know.

23 CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, I just want to come back to
24 the skill mix. Sorry. Dr. Maxwell asked you that at
25 one stage you were talking about the 60/40, so 60% 10:55
26 registered staff to 40% unregistered.

27 A. Yeah.

28 CHAIRPERSON: Health care assistants and the like?

29 A. Yeah.

1 CHAIRPERSON: Right. And then you said it changed to
2 50/50?

3 A. I think what the question was, what was it before?
4 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. So it had been 60/40.

5 A. No, I think we were trying to move it up to 60/40, and 10:56
6 I stand corrected if that's not right, but we did try
7 and increase the number of qualified staff on wards,
8 yeah.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Right. And that did happen?

10 A. Well the attempt was there, but I'm not absolutely sure 10:56
11 whether it was achieved or not.

12 CHAIRPERSON: Right. Okay. Thank you.

13 68 Q. MS. TANG: Can I ask you, in terms of the Ennis
14 investigation itself, how did you feel it was
15 conducted? What was your... 10:56

16 A. I'm sure it was conducted in a very professional
17 manner. We just didn't -- I didn't know, I didn't have
18 any information really, or I had limited information on
19 what was happening. It was fairly secretive. We
20 wouldn't have been informed of any meetings, any kind 10:56
21 of ongoings of the investigation. So at that point,
22 you know, we were really excluded.

23 DR. MAXWELL: Was that normal? Because this wasn't the
24 first safeguarding investigation ever. Would it be
25 normal to exclude senior nurses in that way? 10:57

26 A. It wouldn't have been, no. I've never known it to
27 happen before. But, again, maybe the manner of the
28 complaint and the way it escalated into -- started of
29 at two issues, two complaints I think, and then

1 suddenly it blossomed out into a number of complaints,
2 and I think that might have been something to do with
3 it.

4 DR. MAXWELL: So how would a safeguarding investigation
5 have usually been conducted? would it have been a 10:57
6 partnership between the senior nurse and the social
7 worker?

8 A. Police, social worker.

9 DR. MAXWELL: And the police.

10 A. Yeah. And obviously the hospital, hospital staff, that 10:58
11 would have been the way, and the relatives, obviously,
12 would have been informed and kept updated, yeah.

13 PROFESSOR MURPHY: So did you pick up the phone to Aine
14 Morrison and say "why am I being excluded from the
15 ward? Can you explain it to me?". 10:58

16 A. No, I didn't do that. And that's a good question.
17 But, again, I suppose it's a traditional thing, you
18 know, you go through your line manager and you speak to
19 your line manager, you know, I didn't go outside that
20 system. 10:58

21 69 Q. MS. TANG: Can I ask, whenever the Bohill staff
22 allegations came to light, did that give you concerns
23 that there may be issues in other ward areas, not just
24 Ennis?

25 A. I suppose I'm trying to think back, you know, and as I 10:59
26 say, it was a shock that the Ennis situation arose.
27 Like I had, as I say, been on the ward. The RQIA had
28 been in, done a full investigation without any issues
29 fairly recent, in fairly recent times prior to the

1 complaint. I knew a lot of staff on the ward. There
2 was some of those nurses on the wards who were looking
3 after people with a learning disability at home, you
4 know, and I know that they wouldn't have stood for any
5 kind of untoward behaviour towards patients.

10:59

6
7 other wards, I suppose there's always a possibility of
8 things happen. Like, you know, all through my time in
9 nursing, things have happened. There's been a response
10 to them, like was described earlier on in terms of
11 disciplinary procedures. It's nothing new. And I
12 think in every organisation you do get people whose
13 maybe performance don't come up to recognised
14 standards, and it happens. So, yes, you always have to
15 be alert, and a lot of emphasis was put on training
16 staff in terms of the vulnerable adult process, and
17 reporting incidents and things like that, and efforts
18 made to support staff in terms of taking forward any
19 kind of concerns they may have had. So, I suppose,
20 yes, you know, you're always kind of aware that things
21 can happen, yeah.

11:00

11:00

11:00

22 70 Q. Did you detect a shift in the organisation's approach
23 after the allegations that came out in Ennis?

24 A. I would have said, okay, on the ground in terms of that
25 training was looked at, you know, ensuring that
26 everybody was trained in those areas, vulnerable adult
27 areas. Certainly my recollection, the staff in Ennis
28 were very deflated, you know, they did, they did tell
29 me that they just felt that they were treated as if

11:01

1 they were all abusers, and that was just how it
2 happened.

3 71 Q. I want to go turn to paragraph 20 now, but before I do
4 so, I should say that Belfast Trust have brought some
5 correspondence regarding the meeting that's referred to 11:01
6 in paragraph 20 to the Inquiry's attention at the end
7 of last week. We've shown you two of those items of
8 paperwork that were brought to our attention which
9 relate to that meeting in order to assist your
10 recollection of the events at that time. 11:01

11 CHAIRPERSON: Can I just interject and say that this
12 was brought to my attention at the end of last week.
13 In general terms I'm very resistant to witnesses being
14 shown documentation just before they give evidence, but
15 having looked at the documentation, it was very 11:02
16 limited, and specifically the two documents that have
17 been shown to the witness have been effectively signed
18 off by him, and I thought in those circumstances it was
19 reasonable to allow him to be shown these documents.
20 Sorry to interrupt. Yes. 11:02

21 MS. TANG: Thank you. I should say also, Chair, that
22 these documents haven't been processed by the Inquiry
23 yet, but we will do shortly.

24 CHAIRPERSON: And we'll obviously be disclosing those
25 to the CPs. 11:02

26 72 Q. MS. TANG: We will indeed. Thank you.
27 Mr. Stewart, turning to paragraph 20 then. You refer
28 to a complaint from a patient on Ennis ward regarding a
29 member of staff, and you describe a concern raised by a

1 social worker who was interviewing a patient along with
2 a police officer, that a nurse deliberately tried to
3 intimidate the patient, and that the co-director at the
4 time had wanted to take action against the nurse in
5 question. From your recollection, do you feel that 11:03
6 there was any underlying issue in terms of how the
7 nurse behaved?

8 A. Absolutely not. I can be fairly certain of that. This
9 was a lady who had been transferred to Ennis after the
10 incident happened. She had 45 years of nursing 11:03
11 experience. She, you know, it would have been -- okay,
12 it would have been fairly normal practice that people
13 would be offered a drink or refreshments, I suppose it
14 wasn't appropriate maybe in the circumstances of the
15 type of interview. But as I say, you know, I was in 11:03
16 the room, the speech and language therapist was in the
17 room, the police officer was in the room, the social
18 worker with the advanced training was in the room. I
19 certainly detected no indication that the patient was
20 being intimidated. I spoke to the police officer, I 11:04
21 spoke to the speech therapist, and nobody in that room
22 detected that there was an attempt to intimidate that
23 individual patient. I think it was just unfortunate.
24 But I think the reaction was over the top.

25 73 Q. Do you feel the social worker who raised this concern, 11:04
26 do you feel --

27 A. No, I think that the immediate reaction was to suspend
28 the nurse, and I think without an investigation, and I
29 thought that just spoke of how the atmosphere maybe in

1 Muckamore had changed, or was at the time.

2 74 Q. So the social worker perceived the incident
3 differently. How would you view how the social worker
4 viewed it? Can you see how they might have perceived
5 it that way? 11:05

6 A. I can. Yes. Certainly if, you know, I don't know, I'm
7 obviously not an expert in circumstances like that, you
8 know, I have been there, but the social worker probably
9 did, in all fairness like, you know, think there was a
10 risk there that maybe the patient was being interfered 11:05
11 with, and I don't blame her for that, but as I say, I
12 think the reaction from the co-director was just over
13 the top.

14 DR. MAXWELL: And from the documents that have been
15 supplied, you spoke to the police who hadn't felt that 11:05
16 it was intimidatory either?

17 A. No, nobody did, no.

18 DR. MAXWELL: Only the social worker?

19 A. Only the social worker, yeah. Which, you know, I'm
20 happy enough to accept that that's her opinion, that 11:06
21 was fine and it was investigated, and as far as I'm
22 concerned I just think the knee-jerk reaction to
23 suspend that staff after 45 years service, hadn't
24 worked on the ward prior to this incident happening,
25 and offering somebody a cup of tea, I just thought it 11:06
26 was over the top.

27 DR. MAXWELL: But you think this was reflective of an
28 atmosphere that had been created that all the staff
29 were abusers?

1 A. I think it was starting to, you know, kind of blame
2 culture to develop in the hospital, yeah.

3 75 Q. MS. TANG: I want to go down to paragraph 22, please,
4 and to pick up on some comment about a sense of a
5 decline in support. 11:07

6 A. Sorry?

7 76 Q. I'm just trying, I'm trying to focus on it here. Just
8 about half way down the paragraph, the sentence begins:
9

10 "When the Belfast Trust opened their central nurse bank 11:07
11 system in and around 2012, I felt that there was an
12 actual decline in support from that quarter."
13

14 Can you find that line in your statement?

15 A. I just think it became more distant. You hadn't that 11:07
16 personal contact with the bank staff. Bank staff had
17 to go on-line and put shifts in that they were
18 available. It wasn't really controlled through the
19 nursing office as such. When I was Duty Officer and we
20 had the bank system in Muckamore, you know, very often 11:07
21 if we were kind of short of staff, and it could happen,
22 I would have known routines and what people were doing
23 who were on the bank, and I have to say I did cold-call
24 people on occasions and ask if they were available for
25 a shift, and those type of things. So just those 11:08
26 little kind of contacts and those that didn't exist
27 anymore. The wards then -- the bank staff, you know,
28 they didn't -- it was the wards really who kind of
29 located the people for the shifts and asked them to put

1 their names down a lot of the time on the bank and, you
2 know, they were ready booked before they went through
3 the system, if you know what I mean, you know. So it
4 just wasn't as effective I don't think.

5 77 Q. So if I understand you right, it sounds like you're 11:08
6 saying it was less responsive?

7 A. It was. You know, they were producing bank staff for a
8 range of hospitals, you know, Muckamore was probably
9 just one other hospital, like you know. Whereas we
10 were focused on Muckamore when we had the bank system 11:09
11 all the time, you know.

12 78 Q. In practical terms did that make it harder to have
13 enough staff or were you still able to get what you
14 needed?

15 A. I think it became -- I don't know if that was the 11:09
16 overriding factor, but I think it did become harder to
17 get staff. The wards spent more time and the Duty
18 Officer spent more time trying to source staff to fill
19 deficits over that period of time until I retired, that
20 seemed to be an ongoing issue. 11:09

21 CHAIRPERSON: I'm just thinking about timing. We've
22 been going about an hour and a quarter. How much
23 longer? I don't want to stop now if you've only got 10
24 minutes left.

25 MS. TANG: I think probably 10 minutes would do it at 11:09
26 most, Chair.

27 CHAIRPERSON: Are you okay to keep going or would you
28 like a short break?

29 A. I would prefer to keep going, please.

1 CHAIRPERSON: Sure.

2 79 Q. MS. TANG: Thank you. I want to go finally to
3 paragraph 24, please. You speak in that paragraph
4 about your training in MAPA, management of aggression
5 and potential aggression. When were you first trained 11:10
6 in MAPA, to your recollection?

7 A. Let me see. It would have been -- I'm trying to think.
8 We first trained in care and responsibility, I think
9 that was in the early '90s. I think I was still
10 working in day care at the time. So probably mid, 11:10
11 early to mid '90s, and then maybe a couple of years
12 later we then adopted the MAPA model.

13 80 Q. Okay. So some time in 'the 90s?

14 A. Yeah, I think so.

15 81 Q. Is what I think you're saying? 11:11

16 A. Yeah.

17 82 Q. And when you attended incidents, did you ever find
18 staff having deployed inappropriate or unsafe holds in
19 the course of those?

20 A. I would have maybe come in at a stage where a patient 11:11
21 who had been posing a high level of risk was being
22 restrained, and I have kind of seen staff, you know, I
23 remember in one incident I came in and -- and things
24 can happen, you know. In a crisis situation, you know,
25 it's not, it's not a classroom you're dealing with, 11:11
26 you know. There's a lot of things going on and things
27 can happen. But I remember -- I'll give an example. I
28 came into a situation where a patient was being
29 restrained, and he was on the floor, and a member of

1 staff was the role of care of the legs, but they were
2 facing the wrong road. Now this would in no way have
3 caused any safety issues with the patient, but it could
4 certainly have caused for the staff. So in that
5 instance I -- we have a system where we teach people 11:12
6 how to take over from colleagues, so I took over, and
7 the staff obviously realised what had happened and, you
8 know, it was corrected. Sometimes MAPA is about not
9 restricting movement, but it's about keeping movement
10 safe. You know patients can move, but to keep staff 11:12
11 safe, you know, obviously you're safe far away from a
12 risk, or you're safe close up to it, you know, and
13 sometimes staff maybe would have a bit of space between
14 them and a patient who was exhibiting risk behaviour.
15 So, you know, it's about closing space down, asking 11:13
16 people to close down, that type of thing, you know. So
17 it would have been -- staff appreciated it as well,
18 like you know. Wee comments, like you know, that would
19 help them be more effective and safe, you know.

20 83 Q. Did you ever have any concerns that physical holds were 11:13
21 being used perhaps before lesser approaches could have
22 been tried to calm the situation down?

23 A. I would hope not. I think during the training we would
24 always have kind of emphasised that it's something that
25 we'd use only as a last resort, you know. So hopefully 11:13
26 not, you know. You can never be sure.

27 84 Q. We have had some evidence from witnesses that indicated
28 that recording of restraint and seclusion wasn't always
29 accurate. Did you ever find examples of inaccuracies

1 in the wards that you covered?

2 A. You know, at one stage I did coordinate the training in
3 Muckamore, and part of that role would have meant that
4 I would have eyesight of all the audit forms coming
5 through, and I'm sure there is times in those audit 11:14
6 forms, because people do things quickly and stuff, that
7 I would have questioned maybe what happened, and gone
8 back to the ward and looked at that. So, yes, I
9 probably would, on occasions, have questioned what
10 exactly happened before the incident or, you know. 11:14
11 There was a kind of an ABC, and antecedent behaviour
12 consequences element to it, you know. So it would give
13 a wee bit of an idea of why people had intervened, and
14 then how they intervened, and what position at the time
15 and that type of thing, you know. So, yeah, there's 11:14
16 times when I've had forms through and gone back and
17 clarified issues with staff.

18 85 Q. So did you do an audit of the MAPA forms, for instance,
19 or how did you approach things?

20 A. Well at the period I was there, and probably after it, 11:15
21 those audit forms came through and I would have looked
22 at all the audit forms, the details, there might have
23 been incident forms as well, there would have been
24 incident forms through, and then those forms went to a
25 lady over who had responsibility for putting them on to 11:15
26 the computer system, and then she would have generated
27 kind of information like -- well you could have got a
28 lot, any information out of, you know, for individual
29 patients, for groups of patients, you know. wards

1 could see what the level of intervention was being
2 used. You could have got the position of patients, how
3 they were being held, those type of things. You had
4 the names of the staff probably who was involved in it.
5 So that information was all kind of correlated into 11:16
6 charts, pie charts, bar charts, and then presented.
7 You know, the wards could request that to be presented
8 at reviews, patient reviews. Senior management
9 obviously had those. I think they reviewed them
10 monthly, you know, or fortnightly. So that basically 11:16
11 was the system, yeah.

12 86 Q. And would there have been feedback given to the wards
13 about the types of restraint and the issues coming in
14 through these platforms?

15 A. Yeah, those reports are all available and they could or 11:16
16 would have used them at their...

17 87 Q. Sorry, could you maybe speak to the microphone a wee
18 bit?

19 A. Those reports were available and they could have used
20 them at their ward reviews, yeah, the patient reviews. 11:16

21 88 Q. Okay. Thank you.

22 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask, because by this time clinical
23 governance had been going for some time, which
24 committee would have looked at those charts and trends?
25 Because it's one thing for people to ask for it and 11:16
26 look at it, but you could miss something. To get
27 systematic assurance you need to present it and
28 discussed, even if you haven't got any particular
29 concerns?

1 A. Yeah.

2 DR. MAXWELL: So which committee would have done that?

3 A. I'm only kind of aware, and there might have been

4 others, but I'm only aware of the hospital management

5 team, they would have got those reports. That would 11:17

6 have been the co-director, medical director, the

7 nursing -- chief nursing person, the senior nurse, and

8 the social worker. So they would have been the ones

9 that I'm aware of that would have reviewed those

10 statistics. 11:17

11 DR. MAXWELL: So you weren't aware, during your time,

12 of any committee that was specifically looking at

13 clinical practice, clinical governance? You think it

14 went into the general management committee?

15 A. I'm not aware of any other, no. 11:18

16 MS. TANG: Thank you. Mr. Stewart, those are all my

17 questions for you, but I'm conscious the Panel may have

18 some remaining questions, so I'm going to hand over to

19 the Chair at this point.

20 11:18

21 MR. STEWART WAS QUESTIONED BY THE INQUIRY PANEL AS

22 FOLLOWS:

23

24 89 Q. CHAIRPERSON: I just want to go back to the two

25 investigations that you yourself conducted, just to see 11:18

26 how they operated.

27

28 In paragraph 17 you were asked to investigate I think

29 it was an assault on a patient, and you were asked to

1 act as the investigating officer for that. Can you
2 remember if that member of staff was suspended pending
3 the investigation?

4 A. He was, yeah.

5 90 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And you would have investigated that 11:18
6 presumably by speaking to the witnesses?

7 A. Yeah.

8 91 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And as presenting officer, would you have
9 called evidence? would you have, rather like this,
10 would witnesses have come along and given evidence, or 11:19
11 would you simply have presented what you were told?

12 A. There was witnesses there, yeah.

13 92 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. So it was dealt with as a full and
14 proper investigation?

15 A. Sorry, could you repeat that? 11:19

16 93 Q. CHAIRPERSON: It was dealt with as a full and proper
17 investigation for that incident?

18 A. Yeah.

19 94 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And did the individual staff member have
20 representation? 11:19

21 A. Yes.

22 95 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Either a union member or a lawyer?

23 A. A union member I think, yeah.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. Okay.

25 96 Q. DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask -- that's sounds like a 11:19
26 disciplinary investigation. was there a separate
27 safeguarding investigation?

28 A. There probably would have been, yeah. Aye. There
29 would have been safeguarding, yeah. I'm just trying to

1 think, and I just can't remember to be honest with you.

2 97 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And then so far as the second matter is
3 concerned, which you've dealt with fairly fully, there
4 was obviously a difference in interpretation from what
5 the social worker thought she saw to what everybody 11:20
6 else in the room saw?

7 A. As I said, I have absolutely no problem with what the
8 social worker reported, you know. I just think like,
9 you know, it was a little bit over the top.

10 98 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Your complaint was not about what the 11:20
11 social worker did but about the reaction of management
12 to it?

13 A. I just thought it was, I just thought it was off a
14 knee-jerk reaction, if you want, and just it was a bit
15 extreme. 11:20

16 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. That's all that I ask. I don't
17 know if anybody else has got any questions?

18

19 Mr. Stewart, can I just thank you very much for coming
20 along to assist the Inquiry and giving up your time in 11:20
21 relation to your service at this hospital over quite a
22 significant period. So thank you very much for coming
23 to help the Inquiry. Is there -- you're looking as if
24 there's something else you want to say.

25 A. I suppose really like, I know the future of the 11:21
26 hospital has been decided, apparently it's to close,
27 you know. But when I was thinking back of being
28 questioned in and around the role of the Duty Officer,
29 what I would say is we would have got calls from people

1 ringing in from their homes very distressed, their
2 relatives have, you know, been causing major problems,
3 they were finding it very difficult to cope. We would
4 have had people maybe ringing in in tears, pleading for
5 help, and what I'm saying is that I hope, like you 11:21
6 know, that those people in the future would get the
7 help that maybe they did get through Muckamore. That's
8 it.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Well, thank you. All right. Again,
10 Mr. Stewart, thank you very much indeed for your 11:21
11 evidence.

12 A. Thank you.

13 CHAIRPERSON: If you'd like to go with the secretary to
14 the Inquiry. We'll take a 15-minute break and try and
15 start again at a quarter to. I've got a few remarks to 11:22
16 make, and then I think counsel to the Inquiry is going
17 to address the room.

18
19 We're going back on live stream from that point. So a
20 quarter to, we'll back on YouTube or wherever it 11:22
21 appears. Thank you.

22
23 SHORT ADJOURNMENT

24
25 THE INQUIRY RESUMED AFTER A SHORT ADJOURNMENT AS 11:22
26 FOLLOWS:

27
28 CHAIRPERSON: Right, just before we start and Mr. Doran
29 addresses everybody, I've been shown some

1 correspondence from Phoenix Law, and I've also had the
2 advantage of reading a speaking note provided by
3 Ms. Anyadike-Danes KC on behalf of Groups 1 and 2, and
4 I've also seen a letter from O'Reilly Stewart on behalf
5 of Group 3, raising similar issues in relation
6 essentially to available preparation time.

11:53

7
8 Can I start by saying this, having spent a good part of
9 both Friday and the weekend, myself, catching up on
10 reading, I do have some sympathy for the complaints
11 that are being made. And, in essence, the
12 correspondence and the speaking note addressed the
13 difficulties of receiving large amounts of evidence to
14 be assimilated quickly and upon which instructions then
15 need to be taken, and there is a concern that's been
16 expressed that as a result Core Participants cannot be
17 sufficiently engaged with what is being put before the
18 Inquiry.

11:53

19
20 Now, I know that Mr. Doran KC is going to address some
21 of those issues when he introduces Module 6.

11:54

22
23 Module 6B, which we are starting in part today, but
24 really tomorrow, and hoping to complete next week, is,
25 as I think we've all, and always recognised, is a
26 complex module and focuses in essence on the issues
27 arising from the Ennis investigation, and there are six
28 central witnesses; Brenda Creaney and Aine Morrison,
29 who are giving evidence tomorrow. Esther Rafferty and

11:54

1 Moira Mannion, who are giving evidence next Monday, the
2 17th June, and John Veitch and David Bingham on Tuesday
3 18th June. Mr. Owen Barr, who is giving evidence on
4 Wednesday, deals with a separate topic.

5
6 Now the main Ennis bundle was served on the 17th May,
7 so 16 working days ago, and well within our protocol,
8 but nevertheless, a very significant bundle to read.
9 We had not originally intended to start any of these
10 witnesses until next Monday, the 17th, but as counsel 11:55
11 to the Inquiry will explain, that had to be changed to
12 accommodate two of the witnesses. One had a booked and
13 planned holiday and the other an event that they
14 couldn't avoid. And to accommodate them, and ensure
15 their evidence was heard before the summer break, we 11:55
16 moved them forward to this week. Now, it was only last
17 week, once the schedule had been prepared, that
18 Ms. Creaney changed her planned plans and would have
19 been available next week, but by then the schedule for
20 next week had been set and a number of flights and 11:55
21 accommodation had been booked for others. So that's
22 just to explain why the Inquiry have moved those
23 witnesses forward.

24
25 I am pleased to say that we have already received 11:56
26 questions for tomorrow's two witnesses from Core
27 Participants, including Groups 1 and 2. But can I then
28 address the question of preparation time?
29

1 In terms of preparation, one of the reasons we do not
2 sit on Fridays is to allow people to have a reading
3 day, and I'm sure those are being well used. We're
4 also fortunate that we're not sitting Wednesday,
5 Thursday or Friday of this week, so there is in fact 11:56
6 further time for the preparation of those witnesses
7 next week.

8
9 I can also indicate that as far as questions from Core
10 Participants are concerned, I do intend to relax the 11:56
11 rules, no doubt to the dismay of counsel to the
12 Inquiry. But the relaxation of the rules will be as
13 follows: to allow questions for Monday's witnesses to
14 be submitted by close of business on Thursday, and
15 questions for Tuesday's witnesses to be submitted by 11:57
16 Friday.

17
18 I do think it's important with this evidence to deal
19 with it according to the schedule, but there are two
20 further factors that I hope are going to help 11:57
21 significantly. The first is that the following
22 witnesses will all be returning in other modules after
23 the summer and will be recalled in the organisational
24 modules. So Mr. Veitch is coming back on Module 7,
25 Ms. Rafferty is coming back in Module 7, and 11:57
26 Ms. Creaney is coming back in Module 9. So should
27 there be any outstanding issues arising from Module 6,
28 which could not have been dealt with in this session,
29 those can be addressed in the summer, and I will

1 certainly be open to applications to allow that to
2 happen.

3
4 Finally, if after hearing from witnesses who will not
5 be returning, so that's Aine Morrison, Ms. Mannion and 11:58
6 Mr. Bingham, if CPs want to submit questions which
7 would have been asked of those witnesses and filtered
8 through counsel to the Inquiry, then I will certainly
9 give consideration to allow those questions to be
10 submitted to the witnesses for a short further 11:58
11 statement to be taken. If it proves absolutely
12 necessary to do so, we will consider inviting them to
13 return, but I hope that doesn't become necessary.

14
15 Now, although it's always a pleasure to hear from 11:58
16 Ms. Anyadike-Danes KC, I have read the speaking note, I
17 am aware of the issues, and it seems to me that we
18 would lose precious time today, and I think the better
19 course, if I may say so, is for her and for counsel to
20 Group 3, to have a counsel's discussion with counsel to 11:59
21 the Inquiry to find the best way forward to deal with
22 the concerns raised.

23
24 Finally, I am aware of an issue being raised over the
25 alacrity with which some of the correspondence is being 11:59
26 answered. I think Core Participants have to understand
27 that there is a great deal of correspondence received
28 by the Inquiry which has to be processed. Each Core
29 Participant will look at it from their own point of

1 view, but you will remember each that there are a
2 number of Core Participants, all of whom are writing to
3 us.

4
5 But having said that, I do accept that on some 12:00
6 occasions it has taken the Inquiry longer to respond to
7 letters than it perhaps should have done, and I am
8 going to raise this internally and see how things can
9 be better managed.

10 12:00
11 Now if Ms. Anyadike-Danes still wishes to speak to me
12 after she has had the conversation with counsel to the
13 Inquiry, then I will of course be content to hear her,
14 and indeed from anybody else who wants to speak. But I
15 think the best thing to do now is to hear first of all 12:00
16 from Mr. Doran KC, and then move on to the witness.

17
18 INQUIRY COUNSEL'S INTRODUCTION TO MODULE 6

19
20 MR. DORAN: Thank you, Chair. 12:00

21
22 Chair, following on from your announcement at the start
23 of this morning's hearing, I just want to say that the
24 thoughts of the Inquiry team are with the family,
25 friends, and colleagues of Geraldine O'Hagan, who was 12:00
26 with us in this room so very recently.

27
28 Chair, Panel, before the Inquiry moves on to hear the
29 oral evidence for the remaining parts of Evidence

1 Module 6, I'd like to provide a brief introduction to
2 set that evidence in context. I also want to explain
3 why we are dealing with this evidence now, rather than
4 last year when most of the other evidence in the
5 evidence modules was heard. I will also say something 12:01
6 about the preparation for this evidence, and I will
7 provide an overview of the various witnesses involved
8 and how they fit into the module.

9
10 I wonder if we could just have on screen, please, the 12:01
11 outline of the evidence modules which is of course
12 published on the website. Just looking at the list,
13 Module 1, Bamford and Mental Health Law in Northern
14 Ireland. Module 2, Health Care Structures and
15 Governance. Module 3, Policy and Procedure. Module 4, 12:02
16 Staffing. Module 5, Regulation and Other Agencies.
17 And then Module 6, MAH Reports and Responses.

18
19 These modules generally were designed to cover the law,
20 policies, procedures and practices relevant to the 12:02
21 Inquiry's Terms of References, and it's worth
22 mentioning in passing that the Inquiry heard from 35
23 witnesses last year for the purpose of those modules,
24 and the written evidence gathered in the course of this
25 work was voluminous. The statements and exhibits I 12:02
26 think provide a helpful compilation of the legal and
27 policy documents of significance to the work of the
28 Inquiry, and those statements and exhibits have been
29 published on the Inquiry's website.

1
2 I want to turn now specifically to Evidence Module 6,
3 and this relates to reports relating to the hospital
4 and responses to those reports, and the Panel will see
5 that there are five elements to Module 6.

12:03

6
7 First of all the EHSSB/NWBT Review of December 2005.
8 Secondly, the Ennis Ward Adult Safeguarding Report,
9 October 2013. Thirdly, Review of Safeguarding at
10 Muckamore Abbey Hospital, "A way to go" November '18.
11 Fourthly, Review of Leadership and Governance at the
12 hospital July 2020, and then, finally, identification
13 of other key reports concerning MAH.

12:03

14
15 The Panel will recall that we dealt with both 6(a) and
16 6(c) in evidence last year. Miriam Somerville gave
17 evidence on the 15th May about the Eastern Health and
18 Social Services Board and North and West Belfast Health
19 and Social Services Trust Review of Policies and
20 Procedures to Safeguard Children and Vulnerable Adults
21 in Muckamore Abbey Hospital, which was completed in
22 December 2005.

12:04

12:04

23
24 As regards 6(c), the Panel heard from Dr. Margaret
25 Flynn on the 25th of May of last year. Dr. Flynn was,
26 of course, the Chair of the Review Team, whose work
27 resulted in the report, A Review of Safeguarding At
28 Muckamore Abbey Hospital, "A way to go", which was
29 published in November 2018.

12:04

1
2 In order to address the Ennis ward Adult Safeguarding
3 Report, Module 6(b), the Inquiry asked Aine Morrison,
4 who was the designated officer appointed to lead the
5 safeguarding review, to make a statement and to give 12:05
6 evidence about the process. She provided the Inquiry
7 with a statement on the 1st May 2023.

8
9 By way of a very brief overview, the Ennis safeguarding
10 process followed on from allegations made by a care 12:05
11 assistant employed by an independent care provider
12 about the conduct of certain staff towards patients on
13 Ennis ward in November 2012. The allegations prompted
14 a lengthy vulnerable adult safeguarding procedure that
15 resulted ultimately in the report by Ms. Morrison and 12:06
16 her colleagues in October 2013.

17
18 As some of the allegations were criminal in nature, the
19 investigation was conducted in parallel with a criminal
20 investigation under the joint protocol. There were 12:06
21 subsequent criminal proceedings against two staff
22 members. One of them was acquitted. The assault
23 conviction of the other was overturned on appeal.
24 There was a disciplinary investigation that did not
25 result in disciplinary proceedings being taken against 12:06
26 the staff members concerned.

27
28 The response to the Ennis allegations also involved the
29 introduction of an early protection plan and the

1 formulation of action points as the safeguarding
2 process took its course. As well as the involvement of
3 PSNI on the criminal side, there was input from RQIA,
4 which made unannounced inspections of the ward and made
5 recommendations as a result of those inspections. 12:07

6 I emphasise that this is only a very brief sketch of
7 the multiple processes that followed on from the
8 initial reporting of concerns on the ward.
9

10 Now, aside from Module 6(b) and Ennis, the Inquiry had 12:07
11 also asked David Bingham to attend to give evidence.
12 Mr. Bingham was a member of the independent Review
13 Team, whose work culminated in the review or the report
14 titled "Review of Leadership and Governance" published
15 in 2020, and that report is the subject of Module 6(d). 12:07
16

17 In addition to asking witnesses to assist the Inquiry
18 with regards to individual reports, the Inquiry also
19 asked the Trust to provide a statement addressing all
20 of the reports referenced in Module 6. That statement 12:08
21 was produced by Martin Dillon on the 26th April 2023.
22 Mr. Dillon was Chief Executive of the Belfast Trust
23 from 2017 to 2020.
24

25 In conducting its work in preparation for the evidence 12:08
26 modules, the Inquiry team was also mindful of Module
27 6(e), which relates to the identification of other key
28 reports concerning the hospital. I will return to
29 those other reports in a moment.

1
2 As the Inquiry and Core Participants are aware, it was
3 initially intended to hear all of the evidence relating
4 to Module 6 last year. On consideration of the
5 material that I have mentioned, however, a number of 12:09
6 things became apparent, and I want to draw attention to
7 three things particularly.

8
9 First, in order for the Inquiry to properly examine the
10 Ennis report and its outworking, it would be necessary 12:09
11 to hear accounts not only of the, or from the
12 designated officer Ms. Morrison, but also from some
13 others who were involved in the process at the relevant
14 time.

15 12:09
16 Secondly, in order to assist the witnesses in providing
17 their accounts of what occurred, it made sense to
18 provide them with the core documentation relating to
19 the safeguarding process and subsequent developments.

20 12:10
21 Thirdly, on considering the Ennis materials alongside
22 the leadership and governance review, it was apparent
23 that those two processes would be more effectively
24 considered at or around the same time in oral evidence.
25 And there are two reasons for that. First, the 12:10
26 leadership and governance review regarded the Ennis
27 investigation as one of the key events that needed to
28 be considered for the purpose of its work. The Inquiry
29 will see that a significant portion of the report is

1 devoted to reflections on Ennis and its aftermath.

2
3 Secondly, separately from the leadership and governance
4 review, David Bingham was also involved in examining
5 concerns raised by Aine Morrison about how she was 12:11
6 treated in the course of the Ennis safeguarding
7 process. He also produced two short reports about
8 those matters.

9
10 Having regard to all of these matters, consideration of 12:11
11 Ennis and leadership and governance was deferred to
12 enable the Inquiry to take further preparatory steps
13 prior to the oral evidence on these reports being
14 heard.

15 12:11
16 You, Chair, explained the position in a statement of
17 the fifth of May 2023, when you said:

18
19 "On consideration of the material received by the
20 Inquiry to date in respect of topic 6(b) and topic 12:11
21 6(d), as well as the responses to those reports, the
22 Panel has determined that further groundwork will be
23 required prior to the hearing of oral evidence in
24 respect of those matters. This may include the
25 obtaining of further statements to ensure that the 12:12
26 Panel will have obtained a comprehensive picture of the
27 processes that led to the production of those reports."

28
29 And I will outline very briefly what that further

1 groundwork has entailed.

2
3 First, the Inquiry team compiled a bundle of the
4 materials regarded as necessary for the various
5 statement makers to consider when giving their account. 12:12
6 Statements were then requested and received from five
7 individuals relating to the Ennis process. Each
8 witness was asked to address questions tailored to
9 their particular role or position, and the five
10 witnesses are; first, Aine Morrison, who made a 12:12
11 statement on the 2nd February 2024. As I have said,
12 she was the designated officer responsible for the
13 investigation. She was also the lead author of the
14 report with two colleagues, Colette Ireland and Carmel
15 Drysedale. 12:13

16
17 I have mentioned that Ms. Morrison also made a
18 statement about Ennis last year. That was, of course,
19 without the benefit of the materials in the Ennis
20 bundle. That statement has also been disclosed to Core 12:13
21 Participants in the interests of transparency, but the
22 focus of the Inquiry will be on the second statement in
23 which she responds to the specific matters raised by
24 the Inquiry.

25
26 The second of the five witnesses is Esther Rafferty,
27 who was Service Manager at the hospital in 2012, and
28 she made a statement on the 13th April 2024.
29 Ms. Rafferty was also the Associate Director for

1 nursing for Muckamore Abbey Hospital and Community
2 Learning Disability Services at that time. She was
3 involved in the initiation of the safeguarding
4 procedure and in the implementation of action points
5 that were generated in the course of the safeguarding
6 investigation. 12:14

7
8 Thirdly, John Veitch, who made a statement on the 23rd
9 February 2024. He was Co-Director for Children and
10 Adult Learning Disability Services in the Belfast Trust 12:14
11 at the relevant time. Mr. Veitch was centrally
12 involved in the Trust's strategic response to the
13 allegations.

14
15 Fourthly, Moira Mannion, who was Co-Director for 12:14
16 Nursing Education and Learning at the Trust. She made
17 a statement on the 19th January 2024. Ms. Mannion was
18 deployed to implement monitoring on the ward in the
19 aftermath of the allegations and to provide an
20 improvement plan as part of the strategic response to 12:15
21 the issue.

22
23 I should mention that Ms. Mannion had also assisted the
24 Inquiry through the provision of an earlier statement
25 dated the 19th September 2023. This statement dealt 12:15
26 more generally with Ms. Mannion's role as Co-Director
27 of Nursing Education and Learning from 2007, and then
28 from 2018 as the Deputy Director of Nursing workforce,
29 Education, Regulation and Information Technology. When

1 Ms. Mannion gives her evidence relating to Ennis, it is
2 proposed also to ask questions as appropriate arising
3 from that more general statement, in order to complete
4 her evidence at one sitting if possible.

5
6 And finally then, Brenda Creaney, the Executive
7 Director of Nursing and User Experience, has provided a
8 corporate statement relating to Ennis on behalf of the
9 Belfast Trust dated the 22nd of February 2024.

10
11 The witnesses were provided with the Ennis bundle for
12 the purpose of assisting them in making their
13 statements. They were also at liberty, of course, to
14 exhibit other materials referenced in their statements.
15 I should add that each witness has more recently been
16 provided with the statements made by the others in
17 advance of the oral evidence being given.

18 The five statements obtained as a result of this
19 exercise are also being published on the website along
20 with the other statements from the evidence modules,
21 and the Ennis bundle itself will also be published on
22 the website as soon as possible.

23
24 Now the Inquiry will hear from Ms. Creaney on behalf of
25 the Trust tomorrow morning. As you indicated, Chair,
26 it had initially been intended to call upon Ms. Creaney
27 after the other witnesses next week, but due to an
28 availability issue the evidence was moved forward to
29 this week. As it transpires, the witness would have

1 been able to attend next week, but for the reasons you
2 outline, Chair, we have decided to keep to the planned
3 schedule.

4
5 If, of course, there are issues arising in the course 12:17
6 of the other witnesses evidence that need to be
7 addressed on behalf of the Trust, those matters can be
8 picked up at a later stage, and I will say a little bit
9 more about that in due course.

10
11 Chair, I should draw attention also to the fact that 12:18
12 DLS, on behalf of the Trust, provided the Inquiry with
13 two further compilations of material on Friday of last
14 week for consideration in this phase of the evidence.
15 One is a bundle of documents that are referred to in 12:18
16 the statement of Ms. Creaney that do not appear in the
17 MAHI bundles. The second is an additional bundle of
18 documents that are not referred to in Ms. Creaney's
19 statement, but that the Trust say would have been
20 included as exhibits if they had been identified at the 12:18
21 time the statement was made. And DLS indicate that
22 Ms. Creaney may wish to refer the Panel to some of
23 those documents during her evidence.

24
25 The Inquiry team is not going to conduct a last minute 12:18
26 review exercise to prepare this material for disclosure
27 in advance of the evidence. The material will be
28 reviewed and disclosed as appropriate in due course.
29 Having considered the material briefly, we are

1 confident that it can be dealt with in an appropriate
2 way in the course of the evidence without causing
3 disadvantage to anyone.
4

5 Ms. Morrison will give evidence then tomorrow 12:19
6 afternoon. The Inquiry is not, as you have indicated,
7 Chair, sitting on Wednesday or Thursday of this week.
8 Ms. Rafferty will give evidence next Monday morning,
9 the 17th of June, followed by Ms. Mannion in the
10 afternoon. Mr. Veitch will give evidence next Tuesday 12:19
11 morning, and then Mr. Bingham in respect of leadership
12 and governance on Tuesday afternoon.
13

14 So the plan is that the oral evidence in respect of
15 evidence Module 6(b) and 6(d) will be significantly 12:20
16 advanced by next Tuesday, 18th June, and I use the term
17 "significantly advanced", because as I have said, there
18 may be issues arising from Ennis, and indeed leadership
19 and governance, that will need to be addressed by the
20 Trust in evidence at a later stage. 12:20
21

22 Mr. Veitch and Ms. Rafferty have been asked to assist
23 the Inquiry with statements for Organisational Module
24 M7, Hospital Organisational Management or, sorry,
25 Operational Management. Ms. Creaney has been asked to 12:20
26 provide a statement for Organisational Module M9, Trust
27 Board. Mr. Dillon, who I have said made a global
28 statement on behalf of the Trust in relation to the
29 various reports, will also feature in Organisational

1 Module M9. The fact that these witnesses will also be
2 involved in the Inquiry at a later stage has, of
3 course, had a bearing on our approach to the two
4 recently received bundles of material that I mentioned
5 just now. If there are matters arising from those 12:21
6 materials that really need to be addressed at a later
7 stage, then the opportunity to do so will arise in the
8 course of the organisational modules. And I should
9 emphasise, Chair, that if any issues arise in the
10 course of the Ennis oral evidence that need to be 12:21
11 revisited at a later juncture once everyone has had the
12 opportunity of taking stock of the evidence and the
13 materials, that will be done at the appropriate time.

14
15 It's important to add that requests for corporate 12:22
16 statements to other organisations have also included
17 requests for assistance with the role of those
18 organisations in the follow-up to the Ennis
19 allegations. That applies to PSNI, RQIA, the Public
20 Health Agency, and the Health and Social Care Board, 12:22
21 which now of course has been superceded by the
22 Strategic Planning and Performance Group or SPPG.

23
24 Ennis has been and will be raised with other witnesses
25 as appropriate. It would neither be possible nor 12:23
26 desirable to address the matter in a completely
27 compartmentalised way. Nevertheless, as I've said, it
28 is hoped that the evidence in relation to Ennis and its
29 outworking will have been significantly advanced by

1 next week.

2
3 Now, before we hear from the witnesses, I want to make
4 two important points in relation to the Inquiry's
5 approach to this evidence. 12:23

6 Firstly, when the Inquiry was hearing evidence for the
7 purpose of the evidence modules last year, the primary
8 objective was to ensure that the Panel was fully
9 informed of issues such as the legal and regulatory
10 framework, the organisational structures, and the 12:23
11 relevant policies, procedures, and practices that were
12 in place at the relevant time. Issues of adequacy and
13 effectiveness would generally be deferred until the
14 later stages of the Inquiry, and that was made clear in
15 the correspondence to the relevant witnesses at the 12:24
16 time, and you, Chair, also outlined that approach in a
17 statement on the 21st December 2022.

18
19 When it comes to considering the response to the Ennis
20 allegations, the Inquiry will inevitably be doing so 12:24
21 with a critical eye, so to speak. So the Inquiry's
22 interest in this evidence will not be confined to
23 gaining an understanding of what occurred, but in the
24 adequacy and effectiveness of the response. That is
25 reflected in the questions that the witnesses were 12:25
26 asked to address in their statements.

27
28 The second point I want to make is that this part of
29 Evidence Module 6 has generated a great deal of

1 material for consideration by the Panel and, indeed,
2 Core Participants, as you have mentioned, Chair. The
3 allegations gave rise to multiple responses, including,
4 as I have outlined, a lengthy safeguarding process,
5 criminal proceedings, and a disciplinary investigation. 12:25
6 The Inquiry has explained to Core Participants in a
7 message of 3rd June 2024, that it does not intend to
8 re-examine with the witnesses the facts that led to the
9 Ennis safeguarding process, the related criminal
10 proceedings, and the subsequent disciplinary 12:26
11 investigation. Neither does the Inquiry intend to
12 explore in the oral hearings the granular details of
13 those and related processes. Rather, the focus will be
14 on issues such as the nature and effectiveness of the
15 approach adopted to the issues arising, whether the 12:26
16 investigation and the subsequent report could have been
17 or ought to have been dealt with differently, how Trust
18 management responded to the investigation, the lessons
19 to be learned, and whether the issues arising in Ennis
20 ought to have prompted a wider examination of conduct 12:26
21 and practice within the hospital at that time.

22
23 Similarly, the approach to the leadership and
24 governance review in oral evidence will be to assess
25 how the report and its findings may assist with the 12:27
26 Panel's consideration of the Terms of Reference, rather
27 than to revisit in detail the methodology and conduct
28 of that review.
29

1 The Inquiry is also conscious of the interpersonal
2 disputes to which these review processes gave rise, but
3 witnesses will be reminded that the focus of the
4 evidence will be on matters that can realistically
5 assist with the Terms of Reference.

12:27

6
7 That brings me back then to evidence Module 6(e), the
8 identification of other key reports concerning the
9 hospital. This was to cater for the possibility that
10 the authors of other reports of particular relevance or 12:27
11 interest might be invited to assist the Panel by
12 answering questions from those reports. This list
13 should not necessarily be regarded as a finite one, but
14 the Panel has requested to hear evidence in relation to
15 the following four reports specifically. First, Yvonne 12:28
16 McKnight, Francis Cannon, and Professor Owen Barr,
17 authors of the final report of the Independent
18 Assurance Team in September 2018. This report was the
19 culmination of an independent assurance review of
20 decisions taken by senior staff at the Belfast Trust 12:28
21 following the identification of safeguarding concerns
22 in 2017.

23
24 Secondly, Lorna Montgomery, Professor Owen Barr,
25 Maureen Brown, Jan Houghton, the Muckamore Abbey 12:29
26 Hospital Adult Safeguarding File Review from September
27 2021. This report was the result of a review
28 commissioned by the Department of Health in response to
29 concerns about the numbers of referrals implicating

1 staff in alleged abuse of patients, and the report
2 related specifically to the period January 2020 to
3 April 2021.

4
5 Third, Brianne Mongan and Ian Sutherland, the 12:29
6 independent review of the Learning Disability
7 Resettlement Programme in Northern Ireland, published
8 in July 2022. This report resulted from an independent
9 review commissioned by the Health and Social Care Board
10 in October 2021. The subject of the review was the 12:29
11 Learning Disability Resettlement Programme in Northern
12 Ireland, with particular focus on resettlement from
13 Muckamore.

14
15 And then fourthly and, finally, Gillian Traub, 12:30
16 Muckamore Abbey Hospital, "what is different now?",
17 from April 2021. This paper was prepared by Ms. Traub
18 and colleagues when Ms. Traub was Interim Director for
19 Learning Disability Services. The report is described
20 as a product of a conscious new process of drawing on 12:30
21 the combined expertise and experience of the Trust's
22 Executive Directors for social work, medicine and
23 nursing, with one or more service director to make
24 corporate sense of what's going on in any of the
25 Trust's services. In this case, Muckamore Abbey 12:30
26 Hospital. And the paper was prompted by a discussion
27 at Board level in September 2020 about a Muckamore
28 safety report.

1 The Panel will note that Professor Owen Barr was one of
2 the co-authors of the first two reports, the report of
3 the Independent Assurance Team in 2018, and the Adult
4 Safeguarding File Review in 2021. He has been asked to
5 assist with the Inquiry's understanding of those two 12:31
6 reports in oral evidence, and he will attend to give
7 evidence on the morning of Wednesday, 19th June.

8
9 The Panel and Core Participants will recall that
10 Professor Barr previously gave evidence to the Inquiry 12:31
11 in Evidence Module 4 "Staffing", on behalf of the
12 University of Ulster on Wednesday, 26th April last
13 year. So Professor Barr will be attending again next
14 Wednesday, the 19th.

15
16 The Inquiry considered that the third report, that is
17 the Resettlement Review Report, would be best
18 accommodated within the later Organisational Module M6,
19 which focuses on the subject of resettlement. It is
20 intended that Ms. Mongan and Mr. Sutherland will attend 12:32
21 to give evidence in respect of their report in week
22 commencing the 24th of June.

23 CHAIRPERSON: And I think the intention is to call them
24 together?

25 MR. DORAN: That's correct, Chair. 12:32

26 CHAIRPERSON: To hot-tub them.

27 MR. DORAN: That's the expression indeed.

28 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

29 MR. DORAN: Finally then Ms. Traub, the author of the

1 paper titled "what is different now?", is giving
2 evidence this afternoon. Ms. Traub had in fact been
3 invited to make a statement to assist with the staff
4 phase of the Inquiry. Her statement covers matters
5 that extend beyond the "what is different now?" paper, 12:33
6 and her evidence will not therefore be confined to that
7 paper alone.

8 CHAIRPERSON: I do apologise for interrupting, but is
9 there any reason that that evidence in its entirety
10 could not be streamed, or are we going to try and break 12:33
11 it up?

12 MR. DORAN: well, Chair, I think consistently with the
13 approach to evidence that falls within the staff phase,
14 it would probably not be appropriate to stream the
15 evidence this afternoon. As regards the report itself, 12:33
16 it will be available on the Inquiry's website. It is
17 exhibited to the statement of Mr. Dillon, and of course
18 the transcript of the evidence in relation to that
19 report will be published on the Inquiry's website.

20 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And after Ms. Traub is finished, 12:34
21 from tomorrow on we should be able to stream all of
22 Module 6?

23 MR. DORAN: Yes, Chair.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you. Sorry to interrupt.

25 MR. DORAN: Chair, just let me qualify that in one 12:34
26 respect. When Ms. Moira Mannion comes to give
27 evidence, she will give evidence not only in relation
28 to her role in the Ennis process, but also in relation
29 to her broader role in respect of which she made a

1 statement for the purpose of the staff phase of the
2 Inquiry. Now as regards her evidence, I do think it
3 may be suitable to have a streamed session in the first
4 instance that deals with the Ennis process
5 specifically, because it would be somewhat unusual not 12:34
6 to have the evidence of one of the Ennis witnesses
7 streamed.

8 CHAIRPERSON: Quite.

9 MR. DORAN: But perhaps then once she has dealt with
10 Ennis we could revert to the normal procedure that is 12:35
11 used for witnesses within the staff phase.

12 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Well we can -- I'll re-look at
13 that again. In general terms there were very good
14 public policy reasons for not streaming staff evidence,
15 which I think has actually proven of some benefit for 12:35
16 various reasons, but we can look at that individual and
17 see if it's possible to split it up.

18 MR. DORAN: Absolutely. And of course as we move
19 towards the later organisational evidence, Chair, that
20 will all be streamed. 12:35

21 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Okay. Sorry to interrupt you.

22 MR. DORAN: Not at all, Chair.

23
24 Now that completes my introduction to Evidence Module
25 6. On completion of the witness evidence relating to 12:35
26 that module, the Inquiry intends to move on to evidence
27 relating to Organisational Module 5, RQIA and the
28 Mental Health Commission, on Wednesday, 19th June. And
29 in the final week of evidence then before the summer

1 break, that is week commencing the 24th June 2024, we
2 hope to hear evidence in Organisational Module M6
3 Resettlement, as well as some further staff evidence.
4

5 Now, Chair, I wanted to make some comments about that, 12:36
6 and I think it's important to say that whilst we will
7 hear evidence in relation to Organisational Modules 5
8 and 6 relating to the RQIA, MHC, and the topic of
9 resettlement, I think it's important to repeat the
10 comment that I made earlier about Evidence Module 6, 12:37
11 and that is that it is neither possible nor desirable
12 to deal with topics of that nature in an entirely
13 compartmentalised way. So, Chair, whilst the Inquiry
14 will hear evidence, for example, in relation to
15 resettlement for the purpose of Organisational Module 6 12:37
16 prior to the summer, one can envisage that the topic of
17 resettlement will feature very prominently in much of
18 the later organisational evidence and, in particular,
19 the evidence relating to operational management at the
20 hospital and also the Trust Board evidence. So I think 12:37
21 it's very important to emphasise that even though on
22 paper one might look at the schedule and say, 'well,
23 Organisational Modules 5 & 6 were attended to in the
24 closing weeks of June 2024, it's very important not to
25 lose sight of the fact... 12:38

26 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

27 MR. DORAN: ...that the opportunity to address the
28 matters addressing will arise at a later stage.

29 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah.

1 MR. DORAN: And I think that is generally an important
2 point to make actually as we move towards the break for
3 the summer, because once we have completed the evidence
4 in this term, there is going to be quite a significant
5 period of time in which I think we can all take stock, 12:38
6 the Inquiry team and Core Participants, just to make
7 sure that when we resume the evidence in September,
8 that nothing has been missed and that proper plans are
9 put in place to ensure that all outstanding issues are
10 properly covered prior to the close of oral evidence in 12:39
11 the Inquiry.

12 CHAIRPERSON: I think it may be worth interjecting at
13 this point that I think it is planned also to have
14 another week after the summer of staff evidence.

15 MR. DORAN: That's correct, Chair. Yes. 12:39

16 CHAIRPERSON: So if anybody is under the view that this
17 is the staff and we've finished, we haven't, there is
18 more staff evidence to come.

19 MR. DORAN: There will be more staff evidence in
20 September. 12:39

21 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Mr. Doran, thank you for that
22 lengthy and useful explanation. I think the witness
23 has been asked to be here for the afternoon session.
24 So...

25 MR. DORAN: Yes, Chair. Can I just flag up that 12:39
26 Ms. Bergin will be taking the witness this afternoon.

27 CHAIRPERSON: Right. Fine. Okay.

28 MS. ANYADI KE-DANES: Chair.

29 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

1 MS. ANYADI KE-DANES: I think I heard you correctly to
2 offer the possibility of a meeting with you today? I
3 would very much like that. I think it would be hugely
4 constructive if we could do that, and I don't
5 necessarily mean it's confined to me alone, there's
6 senior counsel here for Group 3 if he would like to
7 participate, but I think it would be helpful, if you
8 could find that time do it?

12:40

9 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. We'll do that after the witness
10 has given evidence.

12:40

11 MS. ANYADI KE-DANES: I'm in your hands.

12 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you very much. Okay.
13 2:00 o'clock.

14
15 LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT

12:40

1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED AFTER THE LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT AS
2 FOLLOWS:

3
4 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

5 MS. BERGIN: Good afternoon, Chair, members of the 13:54
6 Panel. This afternoon's witness is Gillian Traub. The
7 statement reference is STM-230. There are no
8 restriction orders. And subject to the Chair, if the
9 witness can be brought in?

10 CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. Is it Traub or Traub? 13:55

11 MS. BERGIN: Traub. But she has indicated that she's
12 happy to be referred to as Gillian.

13 CHAIRPERSON: Okay. All right.

14
15 MS. GILLIAN TRAUB, HAVING BEEN SWORN, WAS EXAMINED BY 13:55
16 MS. BERGIN AS FOLLOWS:

17
18 CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Traub, can I just welcome you to the
19 Inquiry. I understand you're happy to be referred to
20 as "Gillian". 13:55

21 A. Yes, thanks.

22 CHAIRPERSON: I was going to call you "Ms. Traub". I'm
23 going to hand you over to Ms. Bergin. Thank you though
24 for your statement and thank you for giving up your
25 time this afternoon. 13:56

26 A. No problem.

27 99 Q. MS. BERGIN: Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon,
28 Gillian. I have met with you briefly this afternoon
29 and explained to you how we'll be dealing with your

1 evidence. You should have a copy of your statement in
2 front of you, it is dated 17th April 2024, and at the
3 end you sign the declaration of truth and you have
4 attached one exhibit to your statement called "What is
5 different now?", a report dated 4th March 2021. Now, 13:56
6 you have indicated helpfully that there is one small
7 correction to be made at paragraph 4 of your statement,
8 and it should read - if we can bring up paragraph 4
9 please? Thank you. It should read:
10
11 "In September 2019, I was approached by the Deputy
12 Chief Executive and Medical Director of the Belfast
13 Trust."
14
15 A. That's right. That's right. 13:57
16 100 Q. And subject to that correction, are you happy to adopt
17 that statement as your evidence?
18 A. Yes, I'm happy. Thank you.
19 101 Q. Thank you.
20 CHAIRPERSON: And can I just check, what you've got in 13:57
21 front of you is, you've got your statement in front of
22 you?
23 A. Yes.
24 CHAIRPERSON: And anything else or not?
25 A. I brought some, I brought a copy of my report and some 13:57
26 annotated notes that I had handwritten on it.
27 CHAIRPERSON: And they're your annotations.
28 A. They're my notes.
29 CHAIRPERSON: Absolutely fine. Thank you.

1 102 Q. MS. BERGIN: Thank you, Chair. And as I've already
2 explained to you, because we all have a copy of your
3 statement and report, I won't be reading your statement
4 aloud, but I will be doing a brief summary in just a
5 moment. The final matter of housekeeping is that you 13:57
6 should have a cipher list in front of you?

7 A. Yes.

8 103 Q. And when you wish to refer to a member of staff,
9 particularly those that you can see are already
10 ciphered in your statement, if you could use that 13:57
11 cipher, and if in doubt when referring to any patient
12 or staff member, if you could check the cipher list and
13 if you're unsure just ask the secretary?

14 A. No problem.

15 104 Q. Okay? Finally, something I also have to remind myself, 13:58
16 if you could speak slowly and clearly into the
17 microphone for the ease of the stenographer.

18

19 So turning to your statement, you outline your
20 qualifications, including a postgraduate diploma in 13:58
21 health services management, and a Masters in
22 leadership, and your various professional experiences
23 in various management positions from 2001 to 2019 at
24 hospitals in England and Northern Ireland. Before
25 going to Muckamore Abbey Hospital, you had no 13:58
26 experience working in Learning Disability Services, but
27 you had experience in various leadership positions in
28 different specialities. You were appointed as the
29 Interim Co-Director for MAH for eight months between

1 the 14th October 2019 and the 14th June 2020.

2
3 Dr. Cathy Jack, then Deputy Chief Executive of the
4 Belfast Trust, was putting together a new management
5 team in view of the significant challenges faced at 13:59
6 Muckamore, and as part of this you, and other senior
7 managers, were appointed to various posts. You
8 reported to H786, Deputy Chief Executive, and you
9 outline in your statement that you were well supported
10 by this team and by your line manager. Jan McGall was 13:59
11 appointed as Interim Senior Service Improvement Manager
12 and reported to you. H296 remained the Director for
13 Community Learning Disability Services, and they had
14 responsibility for resettlement until June 2020, and
15 H785 acted as a professional nursing adviser to the 14:00
16 Belfast Trust during this time and was based on site
17 two to three days per week in early 2020, and their
18 role on behalf of the Department of Health included
19 supporting the Trust to stabilise the nursing workforce
20 and provide expert advice, and as part of the 14:00
21 management team that you were working alongside, H315
22 became Interim Divisional Nurse and H425 was the
23 divisional social worker for Learning Disability
24 Services.

25
26 You then outline various aspects of your role as
27 co-director, including responsibility for strategic
28 direction of the service, safety and quality,
29 stakeholder engagement, workforce management, and in

1 addition to this, Dr. Jack had asked you and the new
2 management team to focus in particular on addressing
3 the significant issues highlighted by RQIA in respect
4 of three Improvement Notices issued to the Trust in
5 August 2019, and we will come to those. And to provide 14:01
6 assurance that care continued to be safe at Muckamore.

7
8 You were based in the administration building full-time
9 and were on site every day, and you visited the wards
10 regularly to meet with staff, and you also met 14:01
11 patients.

12
13 You outline various changes made by your management
14 team, including improvement or introduction of systems
15 for safety, adult safeguarding, staffing levels, 14:01
16 patient finances, and improving communication with
17 families, and you were then the Interim Director for
18 Adult Community Services and Learning Disability
19 Services in the Belfast Trust between June 2020 and
20 August 2021, and during this time you prepared the 14:02
21 report "What is different now?".

22
23 Then in 2021, you took up a different Director post
24 within the Belfast Trust, and you left the Trust in
25 2023 to take up a Director position within the Northern 14:02
26 Trust. So hopefully that fairly summarises some of the
27 key points in your statement.

28
29 what I am going to now ask you about are firstly in

1 this order; your experiences as a staff member at
2 Muckamore Abbey Hospital, and then we will turn to the
3 "what is different now?" report.

4
5 So if we could begin at paragraph 8, please? And 14:02
6 looking to paragraphs 8 and 9. Thank you. Here you
7 say that when you took up the role of co-director,
8 staff suspensions were impacting staffing levels and
9 the turnover in management team had left staff feeling
10 unsupported and lacking communication, and I've already 14:03
11 summarised some of the reasons why you were asked to
12 take on the role.

13
14 Although you had previous management training and
15 experience, did you have any concerns about launching 14:03
16 yourself into what was essentially a remodelling of a
17 learning disability service, given that you had no
18 particular or specialist experience in the learning
19 disability field?

20 A. I think naturally I was concerned because I understood 14:03
21 that the service was experiencing significant
22 challenges on an unprecedented scale and an ongoing
23 PSNI investigation. So while I have experience of
24 working in different services and different
25 specialities, going into areas where I had no previous 14:03
26 knowledge or understanding of the service, while I had
27 some confidence from being able to do that and bring my
28 skills with me, there was a level of concern because of
29 really the extent of the challenge that I understood

1 there to be in Muckamore.

2
3 I suppose by way of addressing that, I knew that I
4 wasn't going in on my own, I was going in as part of a
5 team, so a team comprising, as you've said, the
6 divisional nurse, who had nursing, could bring a
7 nursing oversight to the service. There was an
8 existing senior social worker already there who had
9 experience of working in Learning Disability Services.
10 We had the professional advisers you've described there
11 in the summary of my statement, and a very clear line
12 management into H786 at the time, and a very real sense
13 of a collective approach within the organisation to
14 supporting the management team.

15
16 So being able at any point to bring in assistance from,
17 for example, the Director of HR, the Executive Director
18 of Social Work, the Executive Director of Nursing,
19 Medical Director. So, yes, there were concerns, but I
20 understood what supports were available. I understood
21 there was a team approach and there was very clear
22 visibility to the issues in Muckamore, and opportunity
23 for discussion and escalation of any issues or
24 concerns.

25 105 Q. In terms of the staff suspensions impacting staff
26 levels that I've referred to, when you became aware of
27 the impact of suspensions on the service delivery, was
28 there any discussion within the team about whether on
29 balance all of those suspensions were necessary? Were

1 suspensions something that was looked at by that
2 management team at all?

3 A. It was very clearly set out for us that our
4 responsibility was in regard to the running of the
5 hospital service, the safety of that service, and 14:05
6 managing the risks associated with it. There was a
7 separate process which by nature needed to be separate
8 in respect of the historic abuse, the review of the
9 CCTV, and the decision-making process around the need
10 for suspension, and that happened entirely separate to 14:06
11 us and, therefore, we were advised of staff suspensions
12 and we made the necessary arrangements to ensure that
13 any staffing gaps arising from that could be mitigated
14 against.

15 106 Q. We will come to the staffing gaps in just a moment in 14:06
16 more --

17 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask you about that? So I
18 understand that you weren't part of the decision-making
19 for suspensions, but what you seem to be saying is that
20 one of the unintended consequences of suspensions was 14:06
21 that staffing was challenging. Was it potentially
22 unsafe at times?

23 A. So when I came into post I think I recall there were 32
24 Registrants suspended. By the time I left post that
25 had increased to over 60. So that level of reduction 14:06
26 of the workforce undoubtably could lead to points in
27 time when we were not -- we were unsure whether we
28 would have sufficient staff to maintain a safe level of
29 care on the ward, absolutely. But that was the

1 management task.

2 DR. MAXWELL: I understand, and I know you're not
3 responsible for it, but we've heard from quite a lot of
4 nurses giving evidence that actually at times there
5 weren't any RNLDs on the ward, that they were down to 14:07
6 one or two registered nurses on each shift. That
7 doesn't sound like safe staffing to me.

8 A. I think the separation between the two was important,
9 so that a decision around -- so the decision of 'was
10 the threshold met for suspension?', had to be answered 14:07
11 separate to the question of 'Can we maintain a safe
12 service?'.
13 DR. MAXWELL: Yes.

14 A. But, yes, it left us on occasion with challenging
15 staffing levels, which were not ideal. 14:07
16 DR. MAXWELL: which were not safe.

17 A. No.

18 DR. MAXWELL: would you characterise it as not safe at
19 times?

20 A. I would say on occasion we would find ourselves in 14:07
21 situations when there was not a safe staffing level, as
22 determined by our staffing model. So we put in place a
23 staffing model to give us a framework to assess that,
24 and that informed us around that, and then you tried to
25 -- you took as many steps as you could to try and 14:08
26 address it, but it was day to day.

27 DR. MAXWELL: Thank you.

28 107 Q. MS. BERGIN: Thank you. We will come on to the
29 staffing levels in a little bit more detail in a moment

1 also. But in terms of the reference that I've already
2 referred to about staff feeling unsupported and lacking
3 communication about what was happening when you first
4 arrived, potentially around those suspensions, did your
5 management team take any steps to try and address those 14:08
6 issues with the staff that were there?

7 A. I mean the lack in communication around what was
8 happening for me was greater than the issue of staff
9 suspensions. I think staff understood that they would
10 not be forewarned that staff were being suspended, and 14:08
11 actually nor were the management team. The management
12 team were advised of a suspension when it happened. I
13 think we were able to explain that to staff.

14
15 In terms of lacking communication about what was 14:09
16 happening, that extended to, for example, the future of
17 the hospital. It extended to PSNI investigation, the
18 totality of what was happening in relation to
19 Muckamore. The first day that the management team
20 arrived on site in Muckamore happened to be the day of 14:09
21 the first arrests of staff that took place, which was
22 then documented in the media, and that was an example
23 where staff felt 'Oh, we didn't know that that was
24 going to happen', and obviously these were previous
25 colleagues of staff members in Muckamore Abbey 14:09
26 Hospital. Again, it was for us as a management team to
27 explain 'Actually, it's not within our remit, we will
28 not know that either, but let me explain that to you
29 and this is', you know, we could help the staff to

1 understand the framework within which this was
2 happening. And that when we did, we did put in place
3 regular communication with staff, recognising that
4 there was so much of what they were experiencing was
5 being played out in other forum, for example, in the 14:10
6 media or in the news, that it could leave them feeling,
7 you know, that they weren't being communicated with.
8 So it was trying to clarify what they could know and
9 what they couldn't know.

10 108 Q. Between paragraphs 9, and then 11 and 13, and I don't 14:10
11 expect you to be able to glance through all of those,
12 but that's where we're focusing on now, you describe
13 aspects of your role as ensuring systems were
14 strengthened, and one example is strengthening systems
15 in relation to understanding staffing levels and 14:10
16 workforce, and another one is to ensure systems were in
17 place. So this seems to be describing not only
18 strengthening what's existing, but also introducing new
19 systems. And in terms of patient safety in particular,
20 you have outlined helpfully in your statement I suppose 14:10
21 a list of measures or systems in place. For example,
22 site wide daily safety briefs. A weekly safety report
23 being circulated to staff management and the Trust
24 Board on a monthly basis, including, for example,
25 analysis of the use of restrictive practice, and 14:11
26 contemporaneous CCTV reviewing reports. Were these,
27 for example the patient safety systems, were these
28 systems all in place prior to your arrival, or were
29 these systems that were strengthened, or was it a

1 mixture of both?

2 A. It was a mixture of both. It was a mixture of both.
3 And I think there were a number that had been in maybe
4 a number of months, and I suppose coming in new as a
5 management team, even though the systems and processes 14:11
6 were already there, it was incumbent on us to review
7 them and reflect on them to see if we could improve
8 them. But I would say it was a combination. There
9 were definitely systems and processes that had been
10 introduced before we came. 14:11

11 109 Q. In terms of the RQIA inspection, and we will come to it
12 in more detail, but you say at paragraphs 13 to 15,
13 that there was robust reporting, recording, and
14 analysis of the use of restrictive practice, and this
15 is during your time, and there was a focus on 14:12
16 reduction. The RQIA inspection in December 2019
17 determined that the hospital seclusion policy and
18 procedure had been updated and there was strong
19 governance, a significant reduction in the use of
20 seclusion, and you give an example of establishing a 14:12
21 Reducing Restrictive Practices Steering Group in 2019.
22 What did the analysis of restrictive practice entail?
23 What was actually being collated and analysed? What
24 type of information?

25 A. Okay. So it's largely set out in my Section 13. We 14:12
26 had a dataset of the various aspects of restrictive
27 practice which may have been occurring on site, and
28 they range from, as they're stated there, the use of
29 seclusion as a restrictive practice, the use of

1 voluntary confinement as a restrictive practice, the
2 use of physical intervention as a restrictive practice,
3 the use of rapid tranquillisation, the use of restraint
4 as a restrictive practice, and the use of medication,
5 PRN medication as a restrictive practice. So there was 14:13
6 a dataset which was, data was collated weekly in
7 respect of the use of these practices, and ultimately
8 the role of the group was to further -- to take that
9 analysis further. But the weekly collation of that
10 data looked at the week that had just passed, but also 14:13
11 in the safety report there was analysis over time and
12 analysis of themes, so that we could understand not
13 just the detail of what had happened in the last week,
14 but we could understand whether that represented an
15 improving position, or a deteriorating position, or 14:13
16 whether, you know, it allowed us to analyse to
17 understand do we need to go further? Do we need to go
18 back and look at something in more detail? We tried to
19 have a systematic approach to the analysis of the data.
20 CHAIRPERSON: Could I just ask about that? Sorry, 14:14
21 you're looking at data which means records.
22 A. Yes. No, not care records. So we're looking at, for
23 example with seclusion, the number of times that
24 seclusion occurred on site in the last week.
25 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. But you are gleaning that 14:14
26 information?
27 A. Yes.
28 CHAIRPERSON: From a record?
29 A. Yes.

1 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

2 DR. MAXWELL: A record or an audit form?

3 A. It could be -- so it could be either. I mean audit, we

4 did seclusion audits monthly. So they actually

5 supplemented the weekly analysis of seclusion. But the 14:14

6 reporting of the use of, for example, physical

7 intervention, came from records at ward level. So

8 there's a variety of inputs to the data.

9 CHAIRPERSON: So what your analysis relied on was

10 people recording seclusion and restraint accurately? 14:15

11 A. Yes. Yes.

12 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you.

13 DR. MAXWELL: And when you had done your thematic

14 analysis, what change in practice did that lead to?

15 A. In a particular area or in any? 14:15

16 DR. MAXWELL: Well, just some examples, because you

17 know, to quote various people, you can't inspect

18 quality into a service. That just monitors what's

19 happening. Actually changing practice is different.

20 A. I suppose if -- some of the analysis we also did was in 14:15

21 relation to adult safeguarding incidents, it's not

22 quite as restrictive -- it's not restrictive practice

23 per se, but we were able to utilise some of the

24 thematic analysis there to make changes at ward level

25 to reduce opportunities for interactions between 14:16

26 patients, or to look at where were occasions within the

27 day when we were more likely to experience

28 patient-on-patient interaction, and we looked at

29 amendments to meal times, and staggered meal times for

1 individuals, and staggering times when patients were on
2 the ward. So there was some strategies taken at
3 patient level in relation to that.

4 DR. MAXWELL: So was it possible to do that with this
5 very challenging staffing? I can imagine that you 14:16
6 would look at your thematic analysis and your
7 safeguarding and say 'well, clearly, this was a
8 trigger. If only staff were engaging them or
9 separating them.' But then you've also told us that it
10 was sometimes unsafe staffing. How did you resolve the 14:16
11 challenge between knowing what best practice is and
12 implementing it?

13 A. I think that was, that was the lived experience of
14 trying to manage that service safely and
15 compassionately with the resources of the staff that we 14:17
16 had and didn't have, and their experience. And I think
17 on some occasion we achieved what we set out to do in
18 terms of making those changes, and on some occasions we
19 may have achieved it for a period of time and then they
20 may have, you know, it could have lapsed because of the 14:17
21 staffing challenge. I think it was very much a
22 day-to-day, week-by-week, and I think that was part and
23 parcel of why an additional management presence or
24 input was required, because of the attention to detail
25 needed by everybody, because it was such a fluid 14:17
26 situation and a very vulnerable situation for
27 everybody.

28 110 Q. MS. BERGIN: Thank you. In respect of the analysis of
29 restrictive practices, you've discussed I suppose

1 tracking that and analysing that. Did that also
2 include, or could that be broken down to, for example,
3 how frequently a particular patient was involved in a
4 restrictive practice, or was it more general in terms
5 of how frequently restrictive practices were just being 14:18
6 used on particular wards?

7 A. From memory there was a patient, also a patient that
8 was anonymised, but there was an ability to analyse
9 that by patient, because the use of seclusion would
10 have by necessity been in the care plan of that 14:18
11 individual, and therefore you would understand, you
12 would expect to see seclusion only in the instances
13 where those individuals was documented in their care
14 plan. So it was important that we understood who
15 seclusion was being used for at that patient level, and 14:18
16 that the MDT associated with that ward of that patient
17 would be reviewing those seclusions and reviewing them
18 and reviewing the care plan after each event.

19 111 Q. So that analysis was then being fed into that patient's
20 medical team? 14:18

21 A. Yes. Yes, absolutely. And at ward level in the MDT as
22 well as at a managerial level.

23 112 Q. In terms of the site wide daily safety brief, you've
24 already provided some context in respect of staffing
25 levels, but one of the aspects of that was to review 14:19
26 staffing levels for the next 24 hour period to help
27 identify any areas that required staffing support. So
28 this is one of the measures that was brought in by
29 yourself and your team. Did this daily brief identify

1 for the next sort of shift, or the next day, what the
2 levels of learning disability staff looked like?

3 A. So I routinely would not have been present at that
4 huddle. That huddle would have been led by the Service
5 Manager and lower managers attending with the service 14:19
6 managers, and with the divisional nurse in attendance.
7 So I wasn't a regular attender. But did it look ahead
8 to the next period of time in terms of the staffing
9 levels? Yes, it did, to understand the skill mix that
10 each ward would have or expected to have. So you could 14:20
11 be trying to plan ahead the next morning. So as you're
12 looking ahead, the next morning you'll be 'well, do we
13 have everyone who we expected to have yesterday and
14 where are we now if someone has phoned in sick or
15 something had changed?', and then you take stock again, 14:20
16 and you have to continually take stock of that
17 situation.

18 113 Q. Okay. And you've indicated that the weekly safety
19 report included contemporaneous CCTV viewing reports?

20 A. Yes. 14:20

21 114 Q. Was contemporaneous CCTV viewing something that was
22 occurring right up until you left Muckamore?

23 A. Yes, it was.

24 115 Q. And when we talked about earlier the robust reporting,
25 recording and analysis of the use of restrictive 14:20
26 practice, did that CCTV viewing filter into that
27 analysis in any way?

28 A. So when I first came in, when we came in as a new
29 management team, the contemporaneous CCTV recording was

1 in the safety report, and I suppose we took stock of
2 that and looked at that to see how could we improve how
3 we were using that information. Because, yes, it was
4 included in a safety report and it was maybe discussed
5 at ward level, but we felt there was -- we could do 14:21
6 more with that information. So we actually introduced
7 a step in that process. We worked with our CCTV
8 viewers on what they were recording and then we
9 introduced a step whereby there would be a QA with the
10 adult safeguarding team and the management team, and an 14:21
11 analysis and an agreed action plan if there was any
12 concerns on the CCTV. So over time within the safety
13 report you would have had the account of the
14 independent viewer and then the determination as to any
15 actions required, whether that was an adult 14:21
16 safeguarding investigation, or noting good practice, or
17 for management team to pick up maybe if there was a
18 management practice issue, but not necessarily a
19 safeguarding issue. So we tried to strengthen how we
20 used that information over the first six months that I 14:22
21 was in post.

22 116 Q. So was your team involved then in a change essentially,
23 or changes, to the CCTV policy or CCTV viewing?

24 A. Yes. When we came into post, yes. So I established a
25 CCTV reviewing group, or a group that would look at 14:22
26 that system and process of what had been in place. I
27 talked to the CCTV viewers. There was some suggestions
28 that they had around second screens, or making their,
29 making what they were doing more effective, and we just

1 tried to improve that and strengthen that process, from
2 the point of view of the staff themselves maximizing
3 any learning, and also being assured that anything that
4 they found that was of concern was being acted upon in
5 a timely way. So there was a series of changes made
6 over a number of months in relation to that.

14:22

7 117 Q. The Inquiry may already know the answer to this, but I
8 am going to ask you just for the purposes of your
9 evidence. So was there an updated, for example,
10 written policy on CCTV viewing during that stage, or
11 was it more that you were putting in place processes
12 practically?

14:23

13 A. It was practical changes I suppose ultimately. So
14 there was the original CCTV policy, as I understand it.
15 I can't recall the date. There was then an addendum
16 made to it in 2019 to extend its remit to
17 contemporaneous viewing. Because as the policy was
18 originally written, it purely was for the purposes of
19 investigations into adult safeguarding. So the
20 addendum in January 2019 widened the scope to
21 contemporaneous viewing within the policy, so that that
22 was the extant policy then when I came in.

14:23

14:23

23
24 One of the areas that was being considered, it didn't
25 come to fruition when I was in post, was could the CCTV
26 be used for training for staff and to support staff in
27 their training and learning, and ultimately we were
28 aware that if that was a direction of travel, the
29 policy would need to be updated to reflect that,

14:23

1 because it had -- the scope of the policy was really
2 key, you know, to the governance framework around that.
3 DR. MAXWELL: So the policy, the original policy, which
4 I think was June 2017, didn't allow for using CCTV for
5 educational and development policy, and the addendum in 14:24
6 2019 didn't allow for that either?

7 A. No. It extended its scope to, yes, the
8 contemporaneous.

9 DR. MAXWELL: The contemporaneous. Without there being
10 an identified concern? 14:24

11 A. Yeah.

12 DR. MAXWELL: Thank you.

13 118 Q. MS. BERGIN: If we could turn to paragraph 15, please?
14 And here you outline that in 2019, the East London
15 Foundation Trust visited the Belfast Trust to share 14:24
16 best practices. Do you know how often this sort of
17 visit by another Trust had occurred before this?

18 A. You mean specifically the East London Foundation or
19 more generally?

20 119 Q. Any other Trusts coming to visit the Belfast Trust to 14:25
21 share knowledge?

22 A. Beyond Learning Disability Services? Sorry, yes.

23 120 Q. Yes.

24 A. I mean I think that that is not uncommon. I think what
25 was maybe, you know, services, we would all be 14:25
26 encouraged as leaders and managers of services to
27 understand where there might be good practice outside
28 of Northern Ireland, and to reach out and ask for
29 support or input that may or may not be a visit. So I

1 think that's a fairly standard approach. I think this
2 was possibly just slightly different in that the Chief
3 Executive of our organisation had specifically asked
4 for an organisation to come in very formally to assist
5 us with Learning Disability Services. 14:25

6 121 Q. And what did that look like? what was the benefit, if
7 there was one, of that process?

8 A. In terms of East London?

9 122 Q. Yes.

10 A. I mean I came into the service after the engagement 14:26
11 piece, and the visit and the report had taken place.
12 But that was the hoped for benefit, that we had gone to
13 a Trust, which was recognised to be good practice in
14 terms of Learning Disability Services, and that they
15 had come in, assessed our arrangements, our 14:26
16 environment, our workforce, talked to staff, talked to
17 managers, professionals, clinicians, and given us an
18 assessment of where they felt we were doing well and
19 where they felt we could improve. So it was the aim to
20 improve. 14:26

21 CHAIRPERSON: I'm just trying to get a sense of how
22 common this was.

23 A. Yes.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Because I know some Trusts in England,
25 and Dr. Maxwell probably knows much more about this, 14:26
26 but I know some Trusts in England have a sort of buddy
27 system with another Trust.

28 A. Yes.

29 CHAIRPERSON: And they will effectively not inspect,

1 but they will look at each other's practices. Do you
2 have something similar in Northern Ireland?

3 A. No, not to that degree. It was very much for an
4 individual Trust or service area to think 'Actually,
5 that would be a useful thing to do'... 14:27

6 CHAIRPERSON: And actually outreach to somebody...

7 A. Yes.

8 CHAIRPERSON: And say...

9 A. Yes.

10 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. So, again, can I just come back to 14:27
11 it. Before this event, how often had it happened in
12 the last five years, do you know?

13 A. No, I don't know. I don't know. I'm sorry.

14 CHAIRPERSON: No. Fair enough. Okay. Fine. Thank
15 you. 14:27

16 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just clarify then? You've put in
17 your statement that they came to share best practice,
18 but I think what you're saying is they came to do an
19 assessment?

20 A. I think there was two strands to that. 14:27

21 DR. MAXWELL: And was there a written report of their
22 assessment?

23 A. Yes, there was.

24 DR. MAXWELL: And so that should be available to the
25 Inquiry if we want it? 14:27

26 A. Yes, it is. And a set of recommendations.

27 DR. MAXWELL: And did they follow up? Because East
28 London Foundation Trust are getting a bit of a
29 reputation for going around England doing this. Did

1 they ever follow up with the Trust, or was it just a
2 one-off?

3 A. I think they came and they did a report. A number of
4 us went and visited them in my time. And I think
5 latterly since, since I left I understand they've had 14:28
6 some involvement in resettlement, but that's...

7 DR. MAXWELL: So there has been an ongoing
8 relationship?

9 A. There has. There has been, yes.

10 DR. MAXWELL: But you're not entirely sure what 14:28
11 happened after you left?

12 A. No. But I understand it was in respect of
13 resettlement.

14 123 Q. MS. BERGIN: Thank you. At paragraph 16 you outline
15 some of the actions which were taken to ensure that 14:28
16 staff understood adult safeguarding procedures, and you
17 say that there were systems in place to deal with adult
18 safeguarding referrals, adult protection plans were put
19 in place, and some of these systems included training,
20 reporting and MDT reviews. In terms of staff training, 14:29
21 did existing staff then receive additional adult
22 safeguarding training? Was there an update to the
23 adult safeguarding training?

24 A. This was one of the areas where there had been a
25 significant amount of work led by our divisional social 14:29
26 worker H425 before I came in, myself and the team came
27 in, and there was a programme of training for all staff
28 on site in adult safeguarding. I don't know the detail
29 other than to say I expect for many that that was a

1 refresher or an update from a pre-existing training,
2 but we took the opportunity at that time to put
3 everybody, insofar as we could, through training,
4 bearing in mind some of the challenges with turnover,
5 and that was part and parcel of preparation and
6 responding to, sorry, responding to the RQIA
7 Improvement Notice on safeguarding.

14:29

8 124 Q. In terms of the chronology of changes or improvements
9 that were being made, just picking up on the visit by
10 the East London Foundation Trust also, so are you
11 saying that there were essentially a series of
12 recommendations made earlier in 2019, and then yourself
13 and the other members of the management team had then
14 been approached to come in to Muckamore to essentially
15 I suppose carry forward some of those recommendations,
16 or some of them, as you've indicated, by the senior
17 social worker were already in track?

14:30

14:30

18 A. I think -- so there was the RQIA inspection earlier in
19 the year, which led to the three improvements notices.
20 So as soon as the RQIA had reported on its concerns and
21 put the notices out, then there was activity associated
22 with trying to address those, of which one of them was,
23 as I've described, the adult safeguarding piece, so
24 that had started and considerable work had been done.
25 In parallel to that, there was the East London piece,
26 but they were two distinct pieces, and work had started
27 in relation to both of them. We came in and we were
28 continuing that on, or supporting that work, or adding
29 to it.

14:30

14:30

1 125 Q. okay. Thank you.
2 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask about the safeguarding
3 training? Because by this time you were using quite a
4 lot of agency staff, and I understand a lot of them --
5 I think at one point there was block contract for 50 14:31
6 agency nurses -- how they were trained, because
7 safeguarding is slightly different in Northern Ireland
8 from England?
9 A. I couldn't be entirely sure on my accuracy on this
10 point. 14:31
11 DR. MAXWELL: Okay.
12 A. I would be surmising. My sense is that we put all of
13 our staff, whether they were substantive or agency,
14 through the same training, because the legislation is
15 the Northern Ireland legislation and, therefore, they 14:31
16 needed to understand the context that they were working
17 in. But I...
18 DR. MAXWELL: Okay. We can ask someone else about
19 that.
20 A. Yes. Thank you. 14:32
21 MS. BERGIN: At paragraph 17 then, please, and here you
22 outline that you reinstated and then co-chaired the
23 Carers Forum, and there were three meetings before they
24 stopped due to Covid-19 pandemic, before it was
25 reinstated in 2021 by H627, and one of the purposes of 14:32
26 that forum was to receive feedback and look at ways to
27 improve care and services for patients, and your
28 colleague, H627, oversaw carers questionnaires being
29 issued to families and carers. 19 of the 48 were

1 returned and an action plan was developed to address
2 some of the issues which emerged. Do you know what
3 types of issues emerged from those engagements?

4 A. From the carers questionnaire? There was a very clear
5 sense. So I think it was 66% of Respondents in those 14:33
6 questionnaires were positive around the care and
7 experience of their loved ones and their experience as
8 a family member. But there was a very -- it was the
9 remaining two third were indicating that more, the
10 Trust could do more to support them as a carer, so give 14:33
11 them more information, and also to give them more
12 information around what other supports were available
13 to them as carers. So that was one example, and that
14 came across quite strongly.

15 126 Q. And in terms of any other engagement with relatives, 14:33
16 outside of simply their being carers, in terms of that
17 support, did your management team undertake any
18 specific work or engagement with relatives in respect
19 of patient care itself, in terms of how they were --
20 what their experiences were at Muckamore? 14:33

21 A. I suppose not per se. The clinical team and the ward
22 team, we would encourage them to have regular and
23 ongoing communication and involvement with families
24 around their loved one's care. That was really
25 fundamental. And families were, on occasion, you know, 14:34
26 would raise on occasion their concerns around
27 information not being timely, or how we could improve
28 communication, and on those occasions then one or two
29 of us as a management team might meet with a family

1 member if they didn't feel that a concern was being
2 resolved.

3 127 Q. And in terms of those issues that were, I think you
4 said by the one third raised about more support for
5 them as carers, were any actions then taken to... 14:34

6 A. I mean part of our work, and it is referenced in my
7 statement, in terms of the recruitment of a care
8 involvement lead was really that there was so much that
9 we couldn't recognise that we could and should do in
10 support of carers in trying to create an ongoing 14:35
11 communication with them. So the ward level
12 communication, and then as a management team, given all
13 that was happening in relation to Muckamore. So we
14 wanted to bring in our care involvement lead, and then
15 when she came in latterly then she really, I think, 14:35
16 part of her remit was to say 'well, how could we' --
17 reaching out to carers and families saying 'what is it
18 that you need from us? what actually can we do to help
19 you?' so that really got probably work started in
20 detail when the individual was appointed as the carer 14:35
21 lead and involvement lead.

22 128 Q. And at paragraphs 23 and 24, and also within the
23 exhibit, but I'll come to that later, you outline that,
24 and we've discussed it briefly, shortly before you
25 started at Muckamore there were three RQIA Improvement 14:35
26 Notices. They were in respect of firstly, workforce
27 management of staffing levels; secondly, adult
28 safeguarding, and, thirdly, patient finance. And the
29 first RQIA unannounced inspection took place in

1 December 2019, which was within the first three months
2 of the new management team's arrival. Now, in respect
3 of the management of staffing levels, the first of
4 those, you say here that:

5
6 "RQIA's concern was that nursing teams did not
7 sufficiently understand the staffing levels and skills
8 mix required to provide safe care."

14:36

9
10 And we've already discussed the staffing model that you
11 developed with the divisional nurse to enable staff to
12 assess staffing levels on a shift by shift basis. You
13 say that:

14:36

14
15 "Subsequently, the RQIA inspection determined that
16 whilst staffing levels were not where they should be,
17 there was a robust approach based on this new model."

14:36

18
19 And as Dr. Maxwell has already asked you about in
20 relation to 22% of Band 5 Registrants being Trust staff
21 at one stage, the Trust then had a contract with a
22 direct health care to provide registered nurses who
23 were block-booked, and you also indicate here that
24 there was progress in recruiting senior nursing
25 positions in 2019 and 2020.

14:36

26
27 So, it seems that the assessment of what staffing
28 levels were required had improved somewhat, but was the
29 issue with staffing levels actually sorted out or was

14:37

1 the hospital not still very reliant on agency staff?
2 DR. MAXWELL: Before we get to that, can you help me
3 understand what this new staffing model was? Because
4 I've heard people talk about it and I don't really
5 understand what they mean. People just constantly say 14:37
6 Telford, and Telford is actually based on professional
7 opinion.
8 A. Yes.
9 DR. MAXWELL: And then you add the on costs.
10 A. Yes. 14:38
11 DR. MAXWELL: So how was this model different?
12 A. So I suppose I'll start by saying I am not a
13 professional nurse, and I was very heavily reliant on
14 my divisional nurse and nursing expertise in that
15 regard. So as I understand it, it was based on 14:38
16 Telford, which does apply a professional judgment, and
17 it was then supplemented by what was unique in this
18 regard in Muckamore, which was the use of
19 non-Registrants for one-to-one or for observation. So
20 there was an element of it which was core, and then 14:38
21 there was the patient by patient or ward assessment of
22 what may be required to supplement that.
23 DR. MAXWELL: But we have heard from nurses telling us
24 that from the '80s onward they were using Telford, and
25 we've also heard just this morning that actually they 14:38
26 were already adding to that when there was enhanced
27 supervision.
28 A. Yes.
29 DR. MAXWELL: So I'm really -- and you may not be the

1 right person to answer this, but I'm really struggling
2 to know how a model that was essentially the same was
3 any different?

4 A. Again, as a non-professional, each ward manager's
5 budget or funded staffing level for nursing within 14:39
6 Muckamore had probably -- my understanding, had been
7 set at a point in time in the past when the patient
8 numbers were obviously much higher than they were in
9 2019. So there was an element of this which was about
10 saying, well, actually that level of reporting and 14:39
11 understanding or funded staffing level, which is what
12 you should have in theory at a point in time has moved
13 on. So for your eight patients that you have today,
14 actually this is what we now think you need to work to,
15 because the historic piece around that was potentially 14:39
16 muddying it because it was so out of date. So it was
17 paring it back in a way and bringing it to the point of
18 'well, you've got eight patients and this is their
19 observation level. Patient 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. If you add
20 that on to your Telford, this is what we feel you 14:40
21 should have by way of a funding staffing level, and
22 this is what it might look like on a shift', and then
23 that is the information that came into the safety
24 huddle to say 'I believe I should have five Registrants
25 and eight non-registrants and I don't today.' 14:40

26 DR. MAXWELL: So are you saying that when this, after
27 the RQIA Improvement Notice and staffing was
28 re-examined, the establishments for each ward were
29 increased?

1 A. No, they were clarified. They were clarified.
2 DR. MAXWELL: So did that result in an overall increase
3 or decrease or no difference? Or did it vary from ward
4 to ward?
5 A. I think there were a number of wards, from memory, that 14:40
6 were there or thereabouts where we felt they should
7 have been on paper, and I'm talking about on the model.
8 I think there was a number of other wards where there
9 was one where we felt there could have been
10 additionality and one which we felt actually we could 14:40
11 probably make some changes and reductions here. But it
12 was tied in to also the review of those observations,
13 so at patient level, you know, asking ourselves 'This
14 patient has been historically on a three to one. Can
15 we understand, can the MDT just review that and 14:41
16 reassure us or assess that that is still required and
17 that's an appropriate level of -- what effectively is
18 also a restrictive practice?'.
19 DR. MAXWELL: Okay. So there was this whole issue
20 about how many were funded for, which on a few wards 14:41
21 was just about right, and some were tweaked a little
22 bit. But then there was the second problem that
23 although you had the money, you couldn't fill the
24 posts?
25 A. Yes. Yes. Yes. And it was -- the aim was to give us 14:41
26 the ability to describe and to find the extent, was
27 there a -- the extent of a workforce shortage on a
28 ward, because we had a measure, and we could then
29 communicate that where we needed to communicate it to,

1 including to outside of the organisation.

2 129 Q. MS. BERGIN: And so, was the hospital then still very
3 reliant on agency workers?

4 A. Absolutely. Absolutely.

5 130 Q. And in terms of the profile of those workers, were they 14:42
6 mostly overseas workers? Were they learning disability
7 trained?

8 A. From memory the majority of them were mental health
9 trained.

10 131 Q. Not learning disability? 14:42

11 A. Not learning disability trained.

12 132 Q. Okay. In terms of that skills deficit then around
13 specialist learning disability, what, if any, steps
14 were taken to try and meet that?

15 A. I mean, I think this was a work in progress and it 14:42
16 continued on after I was the co-director. In support
17 of the individuals coming in to their organisation and
18 understanding, you know, appropriate induction
19 arrangements, similar to preceptorship arrangements, so
20 support over a period of time, that was challenging, 14:42
21 because on occasion we could have been so short staffed
22 that you were reliant on the individual coming in, but
23 it could have been their first time in Muckamore, but
24 trying to create the space for a supported period when
25 they arrived. Helping them to get to know the 14:43
26 individual patients that they would be caring for,
27 having access to care plans, being able to observe
28 other staff I suppose, and I think that was, you know
29 with time the benefit, if I can call it that, of having

1 a block contract, was that we were trying to address
2 the temporary nature of agency staff by saying 'We want
3 to retain these staff for as long as possible because
4 we need them' and, therefore, they are less temporary,
5 and you can invest in them and develop them and support 14:43
6 them, and they develop experience in Learning
7 Disability Services and individual learning disability,
8 if they don't arrive with it. But it was a challenge.

9 133 Q. Was any type of actual learning disability training
10 provided to any of those staff? 14:43

11 A. I can't recall in all honesty. I would probably not be
12 the best person to ask that question.

13 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask then, you know, they're coming
14 from another country, they're not learning disability,
15 we've heard quite a lot of them were overseas trained 14:44
16 and not UK trained. So it was quite a lot for them to
17 take on board. Did the Trust fund supernumerary status
18 for a while, while they adjusted, or did they come
19 straight in and they were in the numbers on day one?

20 A. So I don't -- I couldn't be confident in answering that 14:44
21 question. I think there was a desire to give them some
22 time when they arrived to be supernumerary, as much as
23 possible.

24 DR. MAXWELL: But you're not sure?

25 A. No. 14:44

26 DR. MAXWELL: To what extent?

27 A. No. No.

28 CHAIRPERSON: You were asked about the deficit around
29 specialist learning disability and you said -- you

1 started off by saying "it's a work in progress".

2 A. Yes.

3 CHAIRPERSON: But does that really mean they were on
4 the job and discovering -- they were learning on the
5 job? Is that what that really came down to? 14:45

6 A. I think in terms of learning disability, even if we had
7 been consistently able to provide them with a period of
8 supernumerary status, that would have been, if
9 achieved, a number of weeks. They would -- that is not
10 sufficient. So really it was only through time, and 14:45
11 experience, and exposure, that they would develop more
12 of an understanding and experience around Learning
13 Disability Services with time.

14 CHAIRPERSON: I understand that. But for that to work,
15 do you not need learning disability specialist nurses 14:45
16 or health care workers there at the same time?

17 A. Yes.

18 CHAIRPERSON: Did you make sure there were?

19 A. Again, I wouldn't have been operating at that level of
20 detail around the management of those rotas. 14:45

21 CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

22 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask one more question, and I
23 appreciate you may not be able to answer this, but I
24 appreciate the intention behind block booking...

25 A. Yes. 14:45

26 DR. MAXWELL: But as we've heard from witnesses,
27 there's no obligation on an agency nurse to stay beyond
28 the shift they're on.

29 A. No. That's right.

1 DR. MAXWELL: And we've also heard that whilst some
2 stayed for a significant time, some did a week and said
3 "not for me".
4 A. That's right.
5 DR. MAXWELL: So do you know what percentage actually 14:46
6 stayed for a long time?
7 A. I don't. I don't know the percentage.
8 DR. MAXWELL: But that's potentially something the
9 Trust should be able to supply?
10 A. Yes. Absolutely. And I do know of a number of staff 14:46
11 that stayed. When I was there, there were numbers
12 stayed, had been there a year or more, a number I saw
13 being promoted, you know, and really establishing
14 themselves as a resident in Northern Ireland
15 effectively. But equally there definitely were a 14:46
16 cohort who didn't appreciate what they were coming to
17 and for whom very quickly apparent that it wasn't for
18 them, and we wouldn't want anyone to stay who didn't
19 feel it was for them.
20 DR. MAXWELL: So the contract was for the agency to 14:46
21 supply 50 nurses.
22 A. Up to 50.
23 DR. MAXWELL: Ideally the same, but the contract
24 couldn't enforce that, so it could be 50 different
25 people. 14:47
26 A. Yes. I suppose I am just speaking from -- in practice
27 I am aware that there were a number that stayed for a
28 long period of time.
29 DR. MAXWELL: Yeah. Yeah.

1 A. But equally we had no ability to hold them to anything.

2 134 Q. MS. BERGIN: You then outline the number of measures to
3 try and bolster new staff numbers, and one of those was
4 a Directive from the Department of Health in October
5 2019 for other Trust to provide learning disability 14:47
6 nurses to work at Muckamore, but only three or four
7 staff came and they worked part-time. Didn't that
8 Directive really just remove staff from one Trust or
9 another department that needed them? So how successful
10 was that? 14:47

11 A. Well I think as you can see, the intension was the
12 provision of up to six nurses from each Trust, which
13 would have given a cohort of up to 30 nurses, if
14 successful, and the reality was we had a very small
15 number, the majority of whom already had employment, 14:48
16 obviously, with another Trust and, therefore, where
17 they were able to help us they were doing it as
18 additional hours, or additional shifts, which is really
19 hence why it was part-time hours. So it was largely
20 unsuccessful. And it was in the context, as I say 14:48
21 there, that Northern Ireland was not, you know, had a
22 challenge with learning disability nursing levels.
23 Muckamore was not unique. We had a very extreme
24 deficit, but other Trusts were also operating with
25 vacancies, and so therefore were not plush to provide. 14:48

26 135 Q. In terms of how long those few nurses that did come
27 stayed for, do you have any idea?

28 A. There was a variety. A number -- there was a number --
29 there was one or two that may have been a number of

1 months. I don't know. I don't know the detail. It
2 was a variety, because it was so individualised to the
3 personal circumstances of the person, and effectively
4 they were coming forward to volunteer to help.

5 136 Q. Another measure was a 15% pay increase, but that was 14:49
6 stood down in 2020. Again, how successful was that at
7 recruiting anyone?

8 A. That was difficult to quantify, because did we find
9 ourselves in a period where no staff member left during
10 this time when they were getting 15%? No, we didn't. 14:49
11 Did it provide a morale boost to staff when it was
12 introduced? It undoubtedly did. Did it feel like a
13 loss from staff when it was removed? Yes, it did. Did
14 it address retention? No, it did not. But I
15 understand that this has since been reestablished 14:50
16 actually as a measure.

17 137 Q. Well, I was going to ask why was it stopped, and could
18 you tell us then if you know anything about it being
19 reestablished?

20 A. I think it was -- you'd have to ask the Department 14:50
21 probably for the exact detail of why it was stood down.
22 We understood at the time that it was to be an interim
23 measure only and it would be reviewed, and I would
24 understand the review. The review of it was that they
25 couldn't confirm that it had addressed the issue and, 14:50
26 therefore, could be removed.

27 138 Q. You say that exit interviews were conducted with staff
28 who were leaving to understand why they were resigning.
29 Can you recall what the main reasons or recurring

1 reasons were that staff were leaving?

2 A. I think there were a variety of reasons. There was a
3 number of staff who retired. It was their time for
4 retirement. There was a number of staff who were
5 promoted, were leaving for a promotion. A number of 14:51
6 staff who left to go closer to home or to work in a
7 different Trust for personal reasons. There were a
8 number of staff who said that their decision was
9 retirement was expedited by the situation of working,
10 the challenge of working in Muckamore and continuing to 14:51
11 work in Muckamore. So there were a variety.

12
13 In terms of the staff for whom they referenced working,
14 you know, their working life as a factor in their
15 decision-making, that was in part due to the scrutiny 14:51
16 that they were under, the uncertainty for their job,
17 and the challenge of continuing to try and provide safe
18 and compassionate care, with all of the factors that
19 we've heard about today that went into making that
20 difficult. 14:51

21 139 Q. Thank you. If we could look at paragraphs 26 and 27,
22 please? Here you outline the steps that you yourself
23 and the interim senior service improvement manager took
24 to develop an action plan trying to tackle the issues
25 raised by the RQIA Improvement Notice about patient 14:52
26 finances, and you outline some of these steps, and I
27 won't list them all, but these included a dedicated
28 finance liaison officer, with spot checks on them.
29 Introducing financial audits and meetings with patients

1 and relatives. You say that:

2
3 "When RQIA carried out the unannounced inspection they
4 were satisfied with the progress made at MAH."

5
6 I appreciate that the RQIA Improvement Notices were
7 before you started at MAH, but why do you think it
8 required an Improvement Notice for MAH to realise there
9 was an issue or, indeed, to act in relation to patient
10 finances?

11 A. I couldn't answer that question, I'm sorry. I wasn't
12 there at the time.

13 140 Q. Well in terms of the fact that the systems or the
14 improvements, shall we call them, that you oversaw...

15 A. Yes.

16 141 Q. Were many of those already in place at the time? Or
17 what did the landscape look like in terms of patient
18 finances before you arrived?

19 A. So it was patchy, I think it's fair to say. So there
20 was some very good examples where there was good
21 documentation in relation to patient finances, finance
22 plans for patients, financial capacity assessments,
23 some good practice at ward level around management of
24 monies. But it was not consistent and was incomplete
25 in some instances. So every patient, you know, the
26 number of patients who we would have expected to have a
27 financial capacity assessment, we might have found a
28 percentage of them did have it, but a percentage did
29 not. So it may have been that there was systems and

1 processes introduced at a point in time and that they
2 had lapsed in some instances. I would suspect that the
3 turnover at many levels within the hospital from at the
4 ward level, ward manager level, Assistant Service
5 Manager level, would have taken some attention off this 14:54
6 issue potentially. So we had to bring back the focus
7 and the training that was necessary to refresh people
8 on what their roles and responsibilities were.

9 142 Q. At paragraph 28, please, you say that when you began at
10 Muckamore in October 2019, there were 53 in-patients. 14:54
11 Responsibility for resettlement was retained by H296.
12 But you also reported at a high level on resettlement
13 progress to the Trust Board. What were the challenges
14 to resettlement during your time at Muckamore?

15 A. So, I suppose I took on responsibility as when I came 14:55
16 into the Director post overall for resettlement, which
17 was in June 2020, really which was in the mouth of
18 Covid-19, and that undoubtedly delayed significantly
19 progress in relation to resettlement from a very
20 practical point of view. For example, around reducing 14:55
21 footfall onto the site going into other facilities, and
22 in terms of the management attention needed to keep the
23 site and our patients safe during Covid-19, and the
24 number of outbreaks that we had to deal with. So there
25 was a slowing down in that year around resettlement. 14:55
26

27 More broadly, the challenges in relation to
28 resettlement I think are well described elsewhere, but
29 really a lack of provision in the community for

1 resettlement of some very complex individuals. And
2 again in my report to Trust Board, I talk around also
3 the internal expertise and experience around planning
4 and preparation for resettlement, and again we had lost
5 a little bit of ground there around having the 14:56
6 attention and the expertise to drive some of that
7 forward.

8 143 Q. I think we're going to come to the report in just a
9 moment, but I think one of the aspects of that report,
10 if I am correct, is that essentially responsibility for 14:56
11 resettlement rested with one person, and when they
12 retired, a lot of that expertise went. Is that
13 correct?

14 A. It was really the -- they didn't own the responsibility
15 for resettlement, but they provided a core function in 14:56
16 that process, which was around bringing a planning eye
17 to it, understanding the needs of the individual, and
18 looking for options for individuals and bringing a
19 planning approach business case discussions with
20 providers, et cetera, so that they -- and they had an 14:56
21 expertise around that. So that particular function had
22 been lost for a period of time, coupled with Covid-19,
23 had a part to play for about 12 months or more.

24 144 Q. Okay. Thank you. Another aspect of your role as
25 Interim Director from June 2020, was that you became 14:57
26 responsible for raising any early alerts to the
27 Department of Health. What is the early alerts system?

28 A. It's a system whereby the Trust will notify the
29 Department of Health of an issue as set out in the

1 criteria for an early alert, and I don't have them to
2 hand. But, for example, if there was an issue of
3 particular significance, possibly involving patient
4 harm where there would be police involvement, then that
5 may meet for criteria for an early alert. You'd want 14:57
6 to make the Department of Health aware that this had
7 occurred, where you might anticipate there could be
8 media interest in a particular issue within an
9 organisation, you may feel that the threshold for an
10 early alert has been met, and you would complete the 14:58
11 early alert notification, you would telephone a named
12 contact within the Department of Health to talk to them
13 about their alert, and then it would be submitted
14 through -- and I think other agencies have sight of the
15 early alerts when they're submitted, such as RQIA, the 14:58
16 Health and Social Care Board, as it was then.

17 145 Q. In terms of, you've said, completing the form and
18 making the referral onwards, who decided whether
19 something met that criteria that you've referred to
20 within Muckamore? 14:58

21 A. So ultimately if one of my team raised an issue to me,
22 or I was aware of an issue, I would take a view as to
23 whether I felt it met the criteria for an early alert
24 and the decision would be with the Director at the
25 time. If there was a doubt, it would be good practice 14:58
26 to talk to maybe the Deputy Chief Executive, Chief
27 Executive, just to say 'look, this feels to me that it
28 would be important to raise this', and you could sort
29 of QA that if you felt -- if you weren't entirely sure.

1 But it was the Director's responsibility.

2 146 Q. And how frequently, if at all, were you involved in
3 relation to early alerts during your time at Muckamore,
4 or even before when you weren't directly responsible
5 for raising them but were still in a management 14:59
6 position?

7 A. Yes. Not infrequently. You know, it could be every
8 couple of months. There may or may not have been an
9 early alert or discussion around one. So. And prior
10 to coming to Muckamore I would have had experience as 14:59
11 well of the system of raising an issue.

12 147 Q. Without necessarily going into the specifics of a
13 particular patient, but can you give us some examples
14 of the types of I suppose incidents that would fall
15 into early alert, as opposed to, for example, something 14:59
16 that falls into serious adverse incident, or maybe
17 they're parallel, or one follows the other?

18 A. So, they've different criteria. So you could find that
19 an issue meets the criteria of an SAI, but it could
20 also meet the criteria for an early alert, but not all 15:00
21 SAIs will necessitate an early alert.

22 148 Q. Okay.

23 A. So it's a case-by-case assessment and guided by the
24 early alert criteria. So if you had a concern that --
25 in Muckamore, it was, I suppose Muckamore was possibly 15:00
26 unique in this regard because so much of it was in the
27 media, and part of the criteria for the alert might be
28 that consideration that an issue happening in the
29 hospital might attract media attention. So you could

1 find yourself more regularly thinking 'Should we put an
2 early alert in here so the department is aware of
3 something that might find its way into the media?'.
4 CHAIRPERSON: So is it more focused on reputational
5 issues? I'm sure we'll get the criteria, so don't 15:00
6 worry, but was that your understanding or not?
7 A. An early -- yes, I think that's an element of it.
8 Absolutely. So the Department of Health, we would not
9 want, as a Trust, the Department of Health to learn
10 about an issue, a significant issue in our organisation 15:01
11 that we hadn't briefed them about.
12 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
13 A. And I think it was also about that, the ability to
14 brief. Because something gets played out somewhere
15 else it may not be exactly the full set of facts. So 15:01
16 we had an opportunity as a Trust to brief on an issue.
17 CHAIRPERSON: Okay.
18 149 Q. MS. BERGIN: During the time that you were the Interim
19 Director from 2020, the Review of Leadership and
20 Governance Review took place, and the Review of 15:01
21 Leadership and Governance Report was published on 31st
22 July 2020, and that was obviously during your time.
23 Did you have any role or engagement in relation to that
24 review or the report itself?
25 A. I was interviewed as part of -- by the Review Panel, 15:01
26 alongside my colleague, H315, when we were co-director
27 and divisional nurse respectively in Muckamore. And
28 when the report was published, as the Interim Director
29 for Muckamore Abbey Hospital, I had responsibility

respect of progressing a number of the recommendations made by the report, and also sharing the report internally and communicating with staff around its findings and sort of supporting them through 'This is the report. This is what it said. Here's what we're going to do next.' So sort of different levels of involvement and responsibility associated with it.

15:02

150 Q. Okay. Thank you. Chair, I wonder -- that's the first part of what I wanted to ask the witness. Before we move on to the "what is different now?" report, I wonder if it would be an appropriate time for a short break?

15:02

CHAI RPERSON: Okay. Yeah, I think that's a good idea. Okay. All right. So we normally take a 10 or 15 minute break around now, so we'll do that. But we'll certainly complete this afternoon I think?

15:02

MS. BERGIN: Yes, certainly. There's not too much further to go.

CHAI RPERSON: okay. Thank you very much.

15:03

A SHORT ADJOURNMENT

THE INQUIRY RESUMED AFTER A SHORT ADJOURNMENT AS
FOLLOWS:

15:21

CHAI RPERSON: Thank you.

151 Q. MS. BERGIN: Thank you, Chair and Panel. All right
Ms. Traub. So picking up now, what I want to ask you
about is the exhibit to your report, if we could have

1 that up on the screen, please? So during your time as
2 Interim Director for Learning Disability, you prepared
3 this report entitled "MAH: what is different now?",
4 dated the 4th March 2021, and you say in your statement
5 that you.

15:21

6
7 "...prepared this report alongside the Executive
8 Director for Nursing, the Executive Director For Social
9 Work, and the Medical Director, and that the report was
10 a collective view of the situation at Muckamore. It 15:21
11 was prepared in response to a request from the Chair of
12 the Trust Board for a fulsome assessment of the service
13 and of the learning disability context. It was
14 presented and discussed at a Trust Board workshop in
15 March 2021, and the report considers whether things 15:22
16 have changed in Muckamore and is a response to the
17 question of 'What is different now in Muckamore Abbey
18 Hospital?'."

19
20 In addition to the Directors that you say you prepared 15:22
21 the report with, you say that:

22
23 "The report was informed by the ongoing development of
24 the quality management system and weekly safety
25 reports."

15:22

26
27 So, who did you consult with or what evidence did you
28 rely upon to prepare the report?

29 A. I suppose it was a collective set of evidence being

1 brought forward by all of the parties to the report,
2 and that varied depending on the issue described in the
3 report, so, you know, in respect of safety, and drew
4 upon some of the data around seclusion. In respect of
5 carers it drew upon some of the feedback from our 15:23
6 carers. It varied by the subject matter, but it was --
7 and some of it was my own experience of being
8 Co-Director and Director, and observing and
9 experiencing, you know, what was happening in terms of
10 Muckamore and Learning Disability Services. 15:23

11 152 Q. And was that also based on, for example, engagement
12 with specific staff members?

13 A. So there was not a deliberate engagement with staff
14 about this report.

15 153 Q. Okay. 15:23

16 A. It was, it was pulling together all of our experience
17 over time, and data, and the collective, and the
18 discussion with colleagues, to try and make sense of it
19 or articulate some of the key points relating to it.

20 154 Q. In terms of, just staying on this point, I think if I'm 15:23
21 correct, the team that you've described who were
22 involved in preparing the report were mostly, if not
23 all, new to Muckamore, in terms of that new management
24 team. So I suppose what information -- when you're
25 saying what is different now compared to previously 15:24
26 around the 2017 allegations, I suppose how were you
27 able to gauge what was now different?

28 A. Well, I suppose as you go through it you can see where
29 we're able to understand, you know, data from '20, you

1 know, from that point in time, and we were able to draw
2 comparisons too, and based on our own understanding --
3 and, yes, some of us were not there at the time, but we
4 probably had some awareness of what was happening
5 through other staff -- and certainly between the four, 15:24
6 myself and my Executive Director colleagues, a number
7 of them had been in post certainly for some time. So
8 it wasn't just through my own experience or my own
9 management team's experience, it was a wider set of
10 experiences brought to the discussion. 15:25

11 155 Q. okay. Thank you. At Section 2 the report states:

12
13 "While we do not know when it started, the 2012 Ennis
14 Ward investigation was a missed opportunity to seek
15 assurances that abuse was not happening across the 15:25
16 site."

17
18 So you describe the Ennis Report as a missed
19 opportunity. Wasn't that really a missed opportunity
20 not by the Ennis investigators, but rather by the 15:25
21 Trust?

22 A. So I suppose in respect of this comment, I was not in
23 post at the time of the 2012 Ennis investigation, I was
24 not party to it, or the report, or the outworkings of
25 it, having come in some seven years later. This 15:25
26 comment refers to what was probably very fresh in our
27 minds, which was the Leadership and Governance Review
28 Report, which the Trust had recently been on record as
29 accepting the findings of. Our focus was on

1 implementation of the recommendations. But this is, I
2 suppose, a direct lift across to that, which said that
3 there was a missed opportunity I think.

4 CHAIRPERSON: So you were parroting the Leadership and
5 Governance Report rather than actually giving your own
6 comment? 15:26

7 A. Yes. Yes. Yes. It's not particularly clear there. I
8 appreciate that.

9 CHAIRPERSON: No.

10 DR. MAXWELL: And were you aware, as the Inquiry is 15:26
11 going to hear more of, that actually there were a
12 number of different views about what had happened in
13 Ennis? There was the safeguarding report, commonly
14 called the Ennis Report; the work that Moira Mannion
15 had done looking at the 24-hour monitoring of the 15:26
16 wards, and disciplinary investigation, and they didn't
17 actually all come to the same conclusion. Were you
18 aware that there were these different narratives?

19 A. Not particularly. I wasn't aware of Ennis until some
20 time into my post, because it wasn't -- 15:27

21 DR. MAXWELL: Okay.

22 A. You know, it wasn't -- it didn't have a direct bearing
23 on my day-to-day role at the time as co-director. So I
24 became aware of it through the --

25 DR. MAXWELL: So you became aware of it through the 15:27
26 Leadership and Governance Review, and you're quoting
27 them by saying this.

28 A. Yes.

29 DR. MAXWELL: Rather than having an independent

1 knowledge of the situation.

2 A. A direct opinion. No. That's right.

3 156 Q. MS. BERGIN: If we look at Section 3.1 of the report,
4 please, and here admission pathways are discussed and
5 this section outlines that:

15:27

6
7 "From December 2019, MAH stopped being the default
8 option for patients with learning disabilities who
9 became mentally unwell, so there was no admission
10 pathway to MAH. This had a significant impact not only 15:27
11 on MAH but also the region, because whilst the Southern
12 Health and Social Care Trust and the Western Trust had
13 their own in-patient units, Muckamore was the service
14 for the Northern Trust and the South Eastern Trust for
15 patients with severe learning disabilities." 15:28

16
17 And the report goes on to say that:

18
19 "In the months before the report was written there had
20 been requests for admission to MAH and proposals were 15:28
21 being developed to reopen some beds for patients with
22 severe learning disabilities."

23
24 So you seem to be saying here that the effective
25 closure of MAH as a pathway for those patients for 15:28
26 admission from the community looks like a significant
27 downside or disadvantage for those patients?

28 A. So, Learning Disability Services nationally, you would
29 expect to see a facility for individuals who have a

1 learning disability who maybe have a period of, you
2 know, mentally unwell, who require a period of
3 specialist assessment and treatment by a learning
4 disability team, multidisciplinary team. Muckamore was
5 designed to be that for patients from three Trust 15:29
6 areas. So it's effective closure did remove that
7 pathway. And, therefore, as we tried to describe, it
8 was something which needed to be addressed, because we
9 would expect, we should expect for our patients who
10 require that, for it to be available for them. The 15:29
11 reality at the time was that the staffing levels were
12 not robust or resilient enough, and that patients
13 coming in for an acute admission would require a
14 significant level of intensive review, assessment, and
15 treatment that we could not -- we did not feel we could 15:29
16 stand over in terms of the workforce that we had at the
17 time. So it wasn't a decision lightly made, and we
18 were aware that it was something that needed to be
19 addressed for the system as a whole.

20 157 Q. So what happened to those patients who required an 15:30
21 acute admission?

22 A. So there were a number of different outworkings of
23 that, and when we looked back in preparation, we looked
24 back for a period of time, we looked at a seven month
25 period, and we had 14 requests for admission from our 15:30
26 own Trust. So we also were closing this pathway off
27 for Belfast Trust as much as for our colleagues in our
28 other two Trusts. A number of the patients were
29 admitted for assessment and treatment into adult mental

1 health in-patient services. The majority from the
2 Belfast Trust perspective found themselves in that
3 pathway, and then a number were supported to remain in
4 the community with additional support or wraparound
5 from community services and community teams. So those 15:30
6 were really the two main alternative pathways which
7 were available to us.

8 158 Q. And I appreciate we're sort of speaking in the past
9 tense around 2021, and I know you still work within
10 health care within the Northern Trust? 15:31

11 A. Yes.

12 159 Q. Can you help us at all with what the current position
13 is in terms of patients who do require a crisis
14 admission who have a severe learning disability?

15 A. I couldn't comment on behalf of the Belfast Trust. My 15:31
16 own organisation, the Northern Trust, they have
17 established a small in-patient learning disability unit
18 with three beds for people who require acute assessment
19 and treatment.

20 CHAIRPERSON: And just so that I understand, if those 15:31
21 patients were being admitted into an adult mental
22 health service.

23 A. Yes.

24 CHAIRPERSON: They wouldn't necessarily have learning
25 disability nurses there? 15:31

26 A. That's right.

27 CHAIRPERSON: So they're going into a mental health
28 environment without their particular needs being
29 catered for?

1 A. Yes, that's right. In some instances the learning
2 disability team might have provided some in-reach or
3 input, but the core staffing in those services was
4 entirely mental health.

5 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask then, you're saying at the 15:32
6 Northern Trust now there are three beds. Is that
7 staffed with people with learning disability
8 experience?

9 A. Yes, it is. Yes, it is.

10 DR. MAXWELL: And qualifications? 15:32

11 A. Yes, it is.

12 160 Q. MS. BERGIN: At Section 3.2 of the report, this deals
13 with resettlement, and this section outlines the
14 various resettlement targets from 1997 onwards, which
15 have been missed, including the 1997 regional strategy 15:32
16 for health and well-being that stated that by 2002 all
17 long stay patients were to be resettled, and then more
18 recently some of the Bamford action plans that called
19 for resettlement by March 2015. This section also
20 states that there was a renewed focus on resettlement 15:33
21 at Muckamore following Covid-19, and that in 2021, 10
22 patients had been at Muckamore for more than 20 years
23 and one resident had been there since 1976.

24

25 I'm jumping about, but we're still staying with this 15:33
26 theme of resettlement, but the conclusion of the report
27 states that:

28

29 "Our sense is that as it is currently constructed MAH

1 offers an outdated service model which is providing
2 care in the wrong place and at the wrong time and in a
3 number of ways by the wrong staff. The future is a
4 much pared-back hospital service sitting alongside a
5 comprehensive community model and predominantly a
6 social care model, not a nursing model."

15:33

7
8 So I suppose two points there. The targets for
9 resettlements of patients from Muckamore seem to have
10 consistently been missed for many years. That's the
11 first point. Yes. And the second then, is there an
12 argument that for a small group of patients Muckamore
13 Abbey Hospital, or a hospital setting like it, is in
14 fact the best place for them?

15:34

15 A. Yes, and it goes back to the previous discussion, that
16 when you have a severe learning disability you may also
17 have autism or other complexities, and you have a
18 period of mental health crisis which requires the
19 intervention of a specialist learning disability team,
20 you would want to be in that environment in a hospital
21 setting, but that should be for a period of time for
22 your treatment, and at the point at which your
23 treatment is completed that you would then move back
24 out into your home or into a new home in the community.
25 And that spoke to the fact that in Muckamore Abbey
26 Hospital, at the point of writing this report, we had
27 one patient in active treatment and the remaining 43,
28 41 patients, were delayed discharge. So they had come
29 in, they had been assessed and treated, they were

15:34

15:34

15:34

1 delayed. what you would want to see is assessed and
2 treated with the multi-disciplinary learning disability
3 team, and a transition, a timely transition into their
4 home environment and community.

5 DR. MAXWELL: would it be your assertion then that for 15:35
6 those patients not only was it the wrong place, but
7 actually it was potentially harmful for them?

8 A. I think I mean we had many families who described
9 confidence in the care and their experience of their
10 loved one in Muckamore. You know 20/30 years it became 15:35
11 their home. There is an obvious argument there that
12 they became institutionalised and by default it became
13 their home, but actually they weren't living in a home
14 environment with the maximum amount of independence
15 that they could have had. 15:35

16 DR. MAXWELL: So it wasn't harmful, but it wasn't
17 ideal.

18 A. Yes. Yeah.

19 161 Q. MS. BERGIN: At Section 3.2 then, remaining in the same
20 section, throughout the report there are some examples 15:36
21 and discussion of some of the positive steps or
22 strategies that were put in place, and some of the
23 positive changes in terms of a focus on patient
24 experience, for example, but at Section 3.2 it outlines
25 that: 15:36

26
27 "What was different about MAH in 2021 was a loss of
28 organisational memory and expertise."
29

1 So whilst there were some improvements, it seems that
2 actually things had become worse in terms of
3 knowledgeable management and staff who had experience
4 in caring for learning disability patients.

5 A. Yes. Yes. That's undoubtably true. And I think we -- 15:36
6 in writing the report we wanted to be very reflective
7 of the fact that while we would be at pains to point
8 out where we felt we had made some inroads and
9 improvement, we were also aware that there were other
10 aspects which we were struggling to improve, or were 15:37
11 deteriorating, or had deteriorated. But I suppose in
12 doing so, to be able to say 'well, look, we've
13 identified this, we can see this is a problem, but
14 we're going to work on it', so we were cited on it.
15 But that issue around loss of memory and knowledge and 15:37
16 experience, spoke to that post. But it was a broader
17 challenge for all of us, because, you know, because to
18 take an issue to resolve it sometimes you need to go
19 back to find out the provenance of it and get your head
20 around it, but actually sometimes you couldn't do that 15:37
21 because the person or people that were involved at the
22 time were not there. So it could take longer, et
23 cetera, et cetera. So there were a range of challenges
24 associated with loss of organisational memory.

25 162 Q. And then at Section 4.2, please? So this section deals 15:37
26 with safety, and one of the things that was different
27 in 2021 was that there was now Ward to Board reporting
28 on a range of safety metrics. What does "Ward to
29 Board" actually mean in practice?

1 A. In respect of Muckamore Abbey Hospital, it meant that
2 we had a safety report which described a range of
3 safety measures, and we've talked around some of them
4 earlier in relation to restrictive practice, and that
5 that safety report was shared with the Trust Board. So 15:38
6 you could see a line through from what was happening on
7 the ground in Muckamore Abbey Hospital into the line of
8 sight of Trust Board. So Ward up to Board.
9 CHAIRPERSON: But only in relation to safety reports?
10 A. Yes. 15:38
11 CHAIRPERSON: And tell us -- sorry, go on.
12 A. So there was -- in every Trust Board there was a
13 Muckamore Abbey Hospital Update Report. We made a
14 report to the Trust Board on a range of issues to
15 update them, and we also provided a safety report by 15:38
16 way of example. So the safety reports were weekly,
17 Trust Board reports were monthly, but we provided one
18 of them so they could understand the level of detail
19 and data that existed around safety. But there was
20 also a cover report which went into a little bit more 15:39
21 detail around various issues.
22 163 Q. MS. BERGIN: Did that ward to Board reporting, and
23 indeed the frequency of that to the Trust Board, was
24 that -- you've said "Muckamore", is that something that
25 was particular to Muckamore or were other hospitals 15:39
26 doing the same thing?
27 A. That frequency and that level of detail was particular
28 to Muckamore Abbey Hospital in my time in the Belfast
29 Trust.

1 164 Q. okay.
2 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask you then around the
3 governance arrangements in the Belfast Trust, because
4 clearly not every hospital and not every speciality can
5 make it to the Board every month, because there just 15:39
6 wouldn't be enough time. If you had an area that
7 hadn't had an area of grave concern like this, what
8 would be the mechanism for the Board to assure
9 themselves that actually safety was being monitored and
10 they were being alerted when they needed to be? 15:40
11 A. So I suppose that was via the Integrated Assurance
12 Framework that operated within the organisation. And
13 there was, for example, the Assurance Committee, which
14 reported directly into Trust Board.
15 DR. MAXWELL: How would the Assurance Committee know? 15:40
16 what's the different levels?
17 A. What's the trigger? So I talk about it in this paper
18 about the QMS, the Quality Management System approach.
19 So the Belfast Trust introduced in 2020 this approach
20 which was a proactive approach for all services to 15:40
21 bring forward a dataset of information around their
22 risks and issues, emerging risks, achievements, on a
23 rota system. So there could be an assurance that every
24 service was being -- there was an airing of every
25 service with an agreed frequency coming through 15:41
26 Assurance and into Trust Board.
27 DR. MAXWELL: So would it be fair to say the Assurance
28 Committee decided what actually got discussed at the
29 Board?

1 A. No. No, I don't think that's accurate.
2 DR. MAXWELL: In terms of the risks that had been --
3 A. No, I don't think that's accurate. I think the
4 Assurance Committee was one feeder into Trust Board,
5 but there could be, you know, a Director in discussion 15:41
6 with the executive team could say 'Actually, we feel
7 this needs to come to Trust Board. You know, it's not
8 in our cycle of reporting, but it is an emerging
9 issue', you could bring an issue to Trust Board if you
10 felt it was necessary. 15:41
11 DR. MAXWELL: But one of the challenges if you have too
12 many routes, things fall between two stools.
13 A. Yes. That's right.
14 DR. MAXWELL: So potentially if there lots of routes
15 in, it might mean that potentially something gets lost 15:41
16 if it hasn't gone through one route?
17 A. But I suppose the assurance system, or that system
18 whereby every Director would twice yearly bring forward
19 their service and summarise the risks and the safety
20 issues, was only one part of it. So that was very 15:42
21 clear, and it was clear it was into Assurance, and then
22 Assurance into Trust Board. You know I suppose there
23 has to be a mechanism for being able to bring an issue
24 at a point in time as well as --
25 DR. MAXWELL: So that's exceptional reporting really? 15:42
26 A. Yes.
27 DR. MAXWELL: Okay. Thank you.
28 MS. BERGIN: At Section 7.3 then.
29 A. Yes.

1 165 Q. And here the -- the screen is just catching up with us,
2 but I'll begin reading. Here this section of the
3 report states that:
4
5 "The service management and senior management input to 15:42
6 the service is hugely disproportionate to its size.
7 The scrutiny, accounting, responding and reporting
8 required regarding every aspect of this service is
9 relentless, outwith normal control limits, for obvious
10 reasons." 15:43
11
12 And in the conclusion of the report it also states
13 that:
14
15 "MAH is safer and better understood but it remains an 15:43
16 inherently high risk service."
17
18 Now, in relation to the line that:
19
20 "...the input to the service is disproportionate to the 15:43
21 size of MAH, but this is for obvious reasons."
22
23 I presume the "obvious reasons" is referring to the
24 abuse at Muckamore?
25 A. I think it goes to the complexity and challenge of 15:43
26 managing the service as well as working within a
27 context where you are interacting with the Department
28 of Health regularly around Muckamore, you're
29 interacting with RQIA regularly in Muckamore, et

1 cetera, and a number of stakeholders and a number of
2 groups. So the management of itself, given the
3 challenge, and the workforce challenge, and the ongoing
4 PSNI investigation is one aspect, but then the work,
5 the detail required and the work required around the 15:44
6 scrutiny is another, and the multiplicity of groups and
7 stakeholders that we need to be able to have an ongoing
8 conversation and communication with is a greater
9 management, there's a greater management activity than
10 anything I have ever experienced before, and that 15:44
11 speaks to the issues that brought us here today in
12 terms of the abuse, is the starting point.

13 166 Q. Presumably there is a balance to be struck between
14 ensuring that management and Trust Board have enough
15 oversight and detail about Muckamore so that they do 15:44
16 know what's happening, but balanced against, they can't
17 practically know every single outworking on a daily
18 basis. Are you suggesting here that, I suppose, all of
19 these measures, and you might call it course correcting
20 in terms of Muckamore, have gone too far, or given that 15:45
21 you've described the service as inherently high risk,
22 are these proportionate to those risks?

23 A. Having worked in the service, and seen the management
24 team, and the scale of the management team, and the
25 management activities, and the work, and reflection, 15:45
26 and discussion, and the attention to detail required, I
27 think it was necessary, because there was so -- there
28 was, and I'm sure there still is, so much to be done
29 and continued to be done, so that we don't ever find

1 ourselves where we were. But in terms of a service
2 finding itself in normal business, then you would
3 expect to see a paring back of some of that. But I
4 think because we're aware of the ongoing PSNI
5 investigation, and there continue to be very real 15:45
6 challenges in sustaining that service, it may need that
7 greater level of management input for some time yet.
8 But I think we would all have wished to see a
9 Muckamore, you know, Muckamore may close and that may
10 address some of that, but insofar as, as long as we 15:46
11 have Muckamore I suspect we will need to have this
12 level of engagement and input to it.

13 167 Q. The report outlines some actions to be taken, for
14 example, that the Trust should map out patient
15 experience of abuse to inform future care needs. It 15:46
16 should explore how to obtain regular feedback in a
17 learning disability setting, and that Muckamore was
18 designing terms of reference for a full evaluation of
19 advocacy arrangements at that time in 2021. After the
20 "what is different now?" report was provided to the 15:46
21 Trust Board, do you know what, if any, actions were
22 then taken by the Trust in response to the issues
23 raised?

24 A. I can talk to two of the three of those issues that you
25 highlighted there. So in respect of the review of 15:46
26 advocacy services, that was a recommendation of the
27 leadership and governance review. So as Director, I
28 initiated an independent review of advocacy services in
29 my time there, and we involved families, it was an

1 organisation called "Families Involved NI", and we
2 worked with them on a set of Terms of Reference for the
3 review of advocacy services, and engaged two
4 independent reviewers, and then that process started.
5 I understand it's concluded, but I had left post in the 15:47
6 intervening period from initiating it.

7
8 In terms of the section in relation to patient
9 feedback. When I was still there in June 2021, we
10 introduced real-time patient feedback into Muckamore 15:47
11 Abbey Hospital. So that was an approach taken with our
12 speech and language therapists with the use of talking
13 mats and our real-time patient feedback independent
14 staff. So they would come into the site and they would
15 use talking mats as a tool with our patients and ask 15:47
16 them a series of questions under a set of headings just
17 to understand their experience, and then we received a
18 report from that. So we were able to get, insofar as
19 we could through this approach, some real-time feedback
20 from our patients about their experience, and they 15:48
21 would come on site fortnightly to do that. It was
22 something which had been -- I think I may have said
23 this in the report -- it was something which had been
24 rolled out in other parts of the hospital, but never
25 before in a learning disability setting. It just 15:48
26 required a little bit more time and thought as to how
27 do we engage with our patients, because some of them,
28 for example, were non-verbal or had other needs, so
29 hence the input of speech and language therapy and

1 talking mats. So that was introduced and gave us some
2 useful feedback.

3
4 And in terms of the last point, I wouldn't have
5 necessarily been involved in those ongoing discussions 15:48
6 around the historic abuse and how we might understand
7 the impact or the experience of those patients, and
8 that probably was an ongoing discussion, but I couldn't
9 update you on that today, I'm sorry.

10 168 Q. No, not at all. Apart from those two specific examples 15:48
11 that I've pulled out, are you aware of any other
12 actions or changes that occurred after the report was
13 shared with the Trust Board at all?

14 A. I guess for me this report was a reflection of all of
15 the ongoing work associated with being a Director 15:49
16 involved or responsible for learning disability and
17 being the Executive Director of Nursing, Medicine and
18 Social work. And, therefore, where issues were
19 highlighted, they were highlighted in an understanding
20 that the team had seen them and was trying to do 15:49
21 something with them. So there was not an official
22 action plan, as it were, arising from this report. It
23 did -- we did then, subsequent to this report, have a
24 risk summit with regional stakeholders in relation to
25 Muckamore Abbey Hospital really to have an opportunity 15:49
26 as a region to reflect on where we were with Muckamore
27 or where our risks and gaps were, and to get a shared
28 sort of collective sense of the situation. So that was
29 maybe -- I think that had been in train, but came after

1 this report, which probably gave us a sense of 'Right,
2 well here's where we are today', and then the risk
3 summit, it fed into the risk summit where we were
4 presenting that to our stakeholders, the other Trusts,
5 RQIA, Department of Health, PHA. 15:50

6 169 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.
7

8 MS. TRAUB WAS QUESTIONED BY THE INQUIRY PANEL AS
9 FOLLOWS:

10 15:50

11 CHAIRPERSON: Can I just -- sorry, Ms. Bergin.
12 MS. BERGIN: No.

13 170 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Can I just understand a bit more what
14 happens to this sort of report. You were asked to
15 write it, and the date that we've got on the front, 4th 15:50
16 March '21, is that the date that it was published or
17 sent to the Trust?

18 A. Is there a cover sheet? Sorry, let me just check.

19 171 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it's our page STM-230-21.
20 A. That was the date that it went to Trust Board. 15:50

21 172 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Right.
22 A. It should be -- I haven't checked that, but it should
23 be the date of the Trust Board meeting.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Fine.

25 173 Q. DR. MAXWELL: It's described as a workshop. 15:50
26 A. Yes.

27 174 Q. DR. MAXWELL: Rather than a paper to the Board. So was
28 it a separate event to the Trust Board meeting?
29 A. So, Trust Boards will have a range of workshops in the

1 course of the year, so it went to a workshop format as
2 opposed to a formal Trust Board meeting. I think it
3 may have been a single agenda item. I can't exactly
4 recall.

5 175 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Right. So what I wanted to ask, so you 15:51
6 had left that job in August '21?

7 A. Yes.

8 176 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And then you went on to another post?
9 A. Yes.

10 177 Q. CHAIRPERSON: So in between March '21 and August '21, 15:51
11 is the only period when you were at the Trust in this
12 post when could you have, I suppose, found out what was
13 happening.

14 A. Yes. Yes.

15 178 Q. CHAIRPERSON: To your recommendations. And did you 15:51
16 have any meetings? I know you've just mentioned that
17 there was...

18 A. A risk summit.

19 179 Q. CHAIRPERSON: A summit. And when was that?
20 A. It was the 29th April 2021. 15:51

21 180 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And could you just explain a bit more
22 about that? who was there?

23 A. So from the Belfast Trust we had the Chief Executive;
24 myself, the Director of Nursing; the Director of --
25 Executive Director of Nursing, apologies. The 15:52
26 Executive Director of Social work, Director of Medicine
27 -- Medical Director, apologies. And then from the
28 Department of Health we had the Chief social work
29 Officer, we had the Director of Nursing from the

1 Department of Health, and a number of other officials
2 from the Department of Health.

3 181 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Right. And at that summit were you
4 presenting this report?

5 A. No, this was an internal report. But at the summit 15:52
6 there is a slide set of what we presented to the
7 summit, which was a summary of the key risks and issues
8 that we felt were relevant for that regional
9 discussion. So some of them will reflect what was in
10 the "what's different now?", but some of them will not, 15:52
11 because they were different audiences.

12 182 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. No, I can see that. And so far as
13 the Board of the Trust is concerned, did you have any
14 -- and your report, or whatever this is, the workshop,
15 went to the Board, were you ever invited to go and 15:53
16 speak to the Board, or did you speak to the Chief
17 Executive?

18 A. After or before?

19 183 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Yeah.

20 A. So I'm a member of the Board. As a Director I was a 15:53
21 member of the Board.

22 184 Q. CHAIRPERSON: So did you present this at the Board?

23 A. I presented it at the Trust Board workshop.

24 185 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Right.

25 A. There was a discussion. Sorry, and it wasn't -- the 15:53
26 four authors of the report collectively presented.
27 CHAIRPERSON: okay.

28 186 Q. DR. MAXWELL: were there minutes of the workshop?

29 A. I don't believe so. I would need to check that, but I

1 don't believe a workshop is minuted.

2 187 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And after that meeting did you get any
3 updates, as it were, as to what had happened in terms
4 of your views and recommendations?

5 A. Not as you've described it in that sentence. And I 15:54
6 think because some of this, this was our work as well,
7 it wasn't that we were expecting other parties to take
8 forward a lot of what was in here, some of it was for
9 us to do as directors responsible.

10 188 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes. 15:54
11 A. So it was an ongoing work for us.

12 189 Q. CHAIRPERSON: I see.

13 A. But we left -- I think our intention was with the Trust
14 Board workshop to ensure that all of our Trust Board
15 members had a broader, had a broader perspective on 15:54
16 everything that was happening within the hospital, but
17 also more broadly within Learning Disability Services.

18 190 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And I think one of your concerns, whether
19 you put it explicitly or not, was that the closure of
20 Muckamore, if that happened, was going to close off 15:54
21 what might actually have been quite a useful necessary
22 service?

23 A. [Witness nodded].

24 191 Q. CHAIRPERSON: You're nodding. Just for the transcript
25 I think you're possibly agreeing with that? 15:55
26 A. I think the purpose for which it was there, there was
27 still -- we still needed to fulfil the purpose which
28 was for assessment and treatment in a learning
29 disability specialist environment.

1 192 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

2 A. With Muckamore, it's the size, the scale, the location.

3 The workforce, was that right? I'm not saying it was,

4 but the purpose, we needed to recreate something.

5 193 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And can you remember what the 15:55

6 reaction was to that suggestion?

7 A. I think that's absolutely accepted. You know the

8 conclusion of Muckamore offering the wrong model of

9 care at the wrong time, you know, that's part and

10 parcel of that. So if we accept that patients will 15:55

11 need assessed and treated at a point in time, how do we

12 do that for northern -- how do we do that for Belfast

13 Northern Trust and the South Eastern Trust? Muckamore,

14 it's not Muckamore as it is today, but let's go right

15 back to what its intention was. 15:56

16 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Do you have anything else?

17 194 Q. DR. MAXWELL: I do. Can I ask you, on page 9 of your

18 report, and Section 4.3, Adult Safeguarding, when you

19 go on to page 9, you talk about the fact that there are

20 -- at the time there were 27 staff working under 15:56

21 enhanced training and supervision as part of a

22 safeguarding protection plan, but you then go on to

23 say:

24

25 "That plan isn't as robust as it should be due to the 15:56

26 PSNI restrictions on disclosure."

27

28 Can you just say a little bit more about how that meant

29 that the protection plan couldn't be as robust as it

1 should be?

2 A. Again to some extent I was a little peripheral to this,
3 but I was a member of the operational group with the
4 PSNI and RQIA where this was their business. It was
5 because the detail -- so the reason for a member of 15:57
6 staff being on a supervision, or a protection plan or a
7 supervision and training plan, the full reason for that
8 could not be disclosed to them. So, therefore, they
9 were aware that there was an issue of concern, they
10 weren't aware of the full detail of that, but they 15:57
11 understood that we then needed to put them in to a
12 training and supervision plan for a period of time. So
13 that had been raised as a concern by the Department of
14 Health, and I think by RQIA as well, as to how robust
15 is it if the person who is -- I mean you're within this 15:57
16 training plan, is doing what's being asked of them, but
17 ultimately they don't, haven't been given full sight of
18 what it was, was the original concern. In that sense
19 it wasn't felt to be as robust. And I think as I've
20 said, there wasn't a DAPO involved in the review 15:57
21 process of that.

22
23 That did move on, as I understand it, there was then a
24 period where all of those plans were reviewed, and
25 there was an agreement made with the police as to what 15:58
26 level of information could be provided to staff, and I
27 think there was agreed themes or headings that could be
28 shared, which helped, as I understood it, helped a
29 little bit with that issue.

1 195 Q. DR. MAXWELL: we have had statements from staff who
2 were supposed to be supervising these staff saying they
3 didn't understand what they were supposed to be
4 supervising them in. So that, you know, how did they
5 work at all if neither the supervisor or the person 15:58
6 being supervised knew what it was that they had to
7 improve on?

8 A. Well I think that was -- I mean I think that was the
9 inherent challenge for that as it was set up at the
10 start, which is why -- 15:58

11 196 Q. DR. MAXWELL: This is 2021.

12 A. Yes.

13 197 Q. DR. MAXWELL: This is four years after the initial
14 concerns were raised.

15 A. Yes. 15:58

16 198 Q. DR. MAXWELL: So it seems like it is a bit of a hole in
17 the safeguarding plan.

18 A. I mean again, not being my area of expertise, but as I
19 understood that the Trust was very much guided by the
20 PSNI in terms of what information could be shared and 15:59
21 what could not. That -- over time that moved on.

22 199 Q. DR. MAXWELL: No, I understand that. But the
23 consequence was perhaps not what the PSNI were
24 anticipating?

25 A. And I think you would have some sympathy with staff and 15:59
26 the supervisors in trying to engage in that process
27 when they didn't have all the information that you
28 would wish, you know, perhaps wish that they could
29 have.

1 200 Q. CHAIRPERSON: I just want to understand that. The
2 tension is there. Because the Trust have duties to
3 their patients, of course.
4 A. Yes.
5 201 Q. CHAIRPERSON: But they also have duties to their staff. 15:59
6 A. Yeah. That's right.
7 202 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And the two occasionally coincide,
8 because if you don't look after the staff, the staff
9 may not be able to look after the patients.
10 A. That's right. 15:59
11 203 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying effectively this whole
12 thing was governed by what the PSNI wanted?
13 A. At the outset, and I appreciate that that's a number of
14 years when I say "at the outset", but latterly I
15 suppose the balance tried to be addressed to say 'Look, 16:00
16 this isn't as effective as it could be. It's not
17 necessarily just fair to the individuals. What could
18 we do to enhance that without compromising the
19 investigation?', and I think that was also part of the
20 issue is that obviously the CCTV viewing process, the 16:00
21 historic viewing process was ongoing. So there was an
22 element of, you know, that hadn't concluded yet. So we
23 didn't -- the system didn't necessarily know that it
24 had got to know everything that it needed to know, but
25 very challenging for all parties in trying to do the 16:00
26 right thing.
27 204 Q. DR. MAXWELL: It does sound potentially though that
28 protecting the police investigation took precedence
29 over protecting the patients?

1 A. Well I guess there was a training and supervision plan
2 for individuals for whom there had been a level of
3 concern raised, and they were -- appreciating the
4 example you gave, but they should have been subject to
5 regular review and supervision on whatever it was 16:01
6 agreed that they needed to pay attention to. So there
7 could be some improvement in relation to that.

8 205 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And it sounds as if -- because you
9 couldn't tell the staff as openly as you may have
10 wanted to what was going on, we've heard from members 16:01
11 of staff who have told us that the uncertainty
12 effectively caused them to leave.

13 A. Yes. Yes. Without doubt that was a driver in
14 individuals choosing to leave.

15 206 Q. CHAIRPERSON: And those people who were leaving would 16:01
16 normally be the LD trained staff?

17 A. That's right.

18 207 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Because they had been there.

19 A. That's right. That's right. And on occasion -- not on
20 occasion -- for those that were not retiring but were 16:01
21 moving on, they were largely moving on to other
22 learning disability units in other Trusts.

23 208 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Which leaves those who remain with a
24 greater burden and, therefore, more likely to
25 eventually end up leaving? 16:02

26 A. Yes. Yes. You could see that as a self-fulfilling...

27 209 Q. CHAIRPERSON: Vicious circle. Yes.

28 A. Yes. And we did lose some really highly skilled and
29 experienced staff as a result of the combination of

1 that, and scrutiny, and just the very real challenge of
2 working on site.
3 CHAIRPERSON: Yes. No, I understand.
4
5 Ms. Traub, can I thank you very much indeed for coming 16:02
6 along to assist the Inquiry, it's been helpful and
7 enlightening, and thank you for giving up your time.
8 A. No problem. Thank you very much.
9 CHAIRPERSON: All right. If you would like to go with
10 the Secretary to the Inquiry. Right. 10:00 o'clock 16:02
11 tomorrow, please. Thank you very much.
12
13 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED UNTIL TUESDAY, 11TH JUNE 2024 AT
14 10:00 A.M.
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